LOCAL PRESS

Small chances for Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO (Politika)

The diplomatic battle between Belgrade and Pristina regarding UNESCO is in full swing. Serbian Foreign Ministry Ivica Dacic’s guest yesterday was Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijan’s candidate for the new UNESCO Secretary General who will succeed Irina Bokova at this post. Bulbuloglu is one of nine candidates for this post. The decision will be taken at the UNESCO General Conference in November, and apart from Azerbaijan, there are also candidates from France, Vietnam, Egypt, Qatar, China, Guatemala, Iraq and Lebanon. It was announced following the meeting that the guest from Azerbaijan presented the priorities that will be the basis of his program if he is elected. Dacic acquainted Bulbuloglu with the activities of Serbia that is a member of the UNESCO Executive Council until 2019. Alluding to Kosovo’s attempts to become a member of this organization, Dacic pointed to Belgrade’s active commitment against the politicization of UNESCO’s work. The fact is that Pristina missed one deadline in April. The second session of the Executive Council, as the Serbian Ambassador with UNESCO Darko Tanaskovic explains, will be held in October. He recalls that Pristina last time submitted the application precisely in October. According to him, if they want to renew the application they will need to start from the beginning, i.e. to first address the UNESCO General Director, who should transfer this under the authority of the Executive Council, and afterwards the Executive Council needs to adopt a recommendation for the General Conference to place this request on the agenda. Serbia’s membership in the Executive Council of this organization is of great importance for Belgrade, because this contributes to better information on developments in the organization, enables participation in the preparation of materials and in debates at sessions, as well as in decision-making, explains Ambassador Tanaskovic. It could also be of big importance for Serbia who will be at the helm of this organization in the new mandate – whether it will be a candidate of the country that recognized independence of Kosovo or of the country that respects Serbia’s territorial integrity.

Dacic, Stefanovic to discuss Kosovo’s membership in international organizations (Danas)

Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic and Serbian Interior Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic will meet on Friday to discuss Kosovo’s admission in Interpol on the eve of the Interpol General Assembly in Beijing in September. “The situation with Kosovo’s admission in Interpol is more complicated than its admission in UNESCO. It is clear that Kosovo doesn’t have more than two-thirds of the votes for UNESCO. I am going to the Interior Ministry on Friday to discuss Interpol, since this issue is in the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry. Interpol’s big meeting will be held in China in September. Apart from Kosovo, Palestine and the Solomon Islands also applied. How does one say vote for Palestine but not for Kosovo,” Dacic explains for Danas. He adds that Kosovo has already applied for Interpol’s membership, while there is still time for the voting on UNESCO’s admission. “The UNESCO Executive Council is in October. They have time until then to submit an application. If they do so, the voting will take place in November,” says Dacic, adding that Kosovo will never join this organization. The optimism of the authorities regarding Kosovo’s admission in UNESCO might be in the fact that MPs of the ruling coalition think that Kosovo will give up from applying this time. According to their interpretation, such development of events would imply that, despite US pressure, Kosovo cannot do anything without Serbia.

Strong US support to development of Western Balkans (RTS/Beta)

Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic and US Ambassador to Serbia Kyle Scott exchanged views on the current bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the light of the recent successful visit of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to Washington at the invitation of US Vice President Michael Pence. It was assessed that the meeting of senior officials of the two countries represented a good platform for the continuation of the previous cooperation and the improvement of overall bilateral relations in the upcoming period. They also exchanged views on the topical events on the world political scene. The importance of intensifying regional dialogue, as a path that preserves the stability and overall development of the countries of the Western Balkans was highlighted, as well as the strong support of the United States in this process, according to a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Russian Humanitarian Mission helping Serbian healthcare (Beta)

Russian Humanitarian Mission director Yevgenii Prymakov has stated that representatives of that mission would hand over a special medical vehicle to the Urgent Medical Center in Medvedja. The funds come from contributions from Russian citizens. During talks with the Head of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Djuric, Prymakov said the Russian Humanitarian Mission helped Serbian health care institutions in Kosovo. The organization’s team is in Kosovo getting its bearings in order to define priority actions, he added. According to a press release, Prymakov, who is deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, said part of the mission’s activities was to help refugees and displaced persons, 247,000 of whom come from Kosovo. Primakov expressed gratitude for the support and understanding of the Office for Kosovo and briefed Djuric on the mission’s goals and plans to expand its activities in Serbia. Djuric thanked him for the assistance, stressing that the Office for Kosovo and Metohija was open to cooperation with the Russian Mission, whose regional Balkan office is in Belgrade.

REGIONAL PRESS

Zvizdic presents report on work of B&H CoM to B&H parliament (FTV)

Chair of the B&H Council of Ministers (CoM) Denis Zvizdic presented a report on the work of B&H CoM and results achieved in 2016 before B&H parliament on Wednesday. Zvizdic said that after years of stagnation, 2016 was the most successful year for B&H when it comes to the European integration. Zvizdic also reminded of poor situation B&H CoM inherited in the field of the European integration and added that this convocation of B&H CoM seriously launched the issue of the integration and implementation of the Reform Agenda. He noted that impressive and quality progress towards the EU was achieved and added that reports of the European Commission confirm this. Zvizdic reminded that improvement of economic indicators, as well as of regional cooperation and fight against terrorism were just some of achievements of B&H CoM which resulted in B&H getting the Questionnaire. Zvizdic said that most important achievements were acceleration of the process of European integration and active work on registration of prospective military property as one of the most important preconditions for activation of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), economic growth and development, rule of law and fight against organized crime, corruption and all forms of extremism, as well as strengthening and improvement of the regional cooperation. Zvizdic said that all bodies within the coordination mechanism were established and added that working groups are actively working on preparation of answers to the Questionnaire. He also added that meetings concerning the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) were intensified during 2016. Zvizdic concluded by saying that, compared to the countries in the region, B&H is the least indebted country in the region since its debt amounts to approximately EUR 6 billion which is approximately 40% of its GDP.

B&H HoR MPs do not give support to Work Report of CoM for 2016 (Hayat)

The House of Representatives (HoR) of the B&H parliament held a session in Sarajevo on Wednesday, at which it discussed Council of Ministers of B&H’s (BiH CoM) Work Report for 2016. MPs from the opposition parties criticized the work of B&H CoM, stressing that it failed to work in an efficient and adequate manner. Moreover, the opposition MPs underlined that the institution’s Work Report for 2016 is exaggerated, noting that information were presented in a confusing and complicated manner in order to hide the true results of work of B&H CoM, which are extremely poor. They noted that, during the mandate of the current convocation of B&H CoM, some 150,000 citizens left B&H. The opposition MPs also recalled that, out of 60 proposed laws, only 16 of them received parliamentary support. Commenting on the issue, SDP B&H MP in B&H HoR Sasa Magazinovic voiced dissatisfaction and criticized the fact that B&H CoM’s Report is exaggerated. DF MP in B&H HoR Damir Becirovic stressed that it seems as if members of B&H CoM live in a parallel universe. Independent MP in B&H HoR Senad Sepic argued that B&H CoM failed to unite B&H and solve issues through dialogue. SBB B&H MP in B&H HoR Mirsad Djonlagic underscored that the current convocation of B&H CoM was expected to do much more during its mandate, noting that the institution should have worked in a more efficient manner in order to change the current difficult situation in B&H. HDZ B&H MP in B&H HoR Nikola Lovrinovic pointed out that it does not matter if B&H CoM’s Report is green-lighted or not, adding that they should discuss if removal of the current convocation is necessary.

Covic: Only through talks we can resolve crises and that is why I feel sorry the meeting got cancelled’ (Vecernji list)

Chairman of the B&H Presidency Dragan Covic says aim of the meeting of political leaders that he was supposed to organize in Mostar on Wednesday was to create, in a relaxed atmosphere, conditions for an agreement among party leaders regarding acceleration of the Euro-Atlantic road, the Law on Elections of B&H and the Law on Public RTV System. Covic stresses he does not plan to give up on the attempt to achieve progress, despite the fact the Mostar meeting got cancelled, adding that, in his opinion, some things started moving this week. “It is expected that the Questionnaire will be filled out by end of August and submitted for translation. It is realistic that the translation is completed by end of September”, said Covic. According to the daily, the second topic of future sessions of the Presidency will be progress in terms of meeting conditions for activation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is task given to Defense Minister Marina Pendes. According to Covic, the idea is to get a positive opinion about MAP activation in October and to get activate the MAP in December. Regarding the issue of Transport Community Treaty, Covic believes the issue would have been solved had Chairman Zvizdic brought along entity Ministers of Transport to the Trieste Summit, stressing that Mogherini expects the issue is resolved by end of August. “I am almost certain we will get status of candidate not because of us, but because of Brussels. Whether it will be start of next year, mid-year, before the elections or immediately after the elections, it will be their calculation”, said Covic. According to daily, Covic said that Commissioner Hahn has been informed about decisions of the B&H Constitutional Court, which erased certain provisions of the Law on Elections, and the fact that in case the CC’s decisions are not implemented, the next general elections will not be fully implemented.

Izetbegovic says deals and statements of Dodik, Covic and Radoncic represent constant disputing of B&H institutions (Al Jazeera)

Asked for the reasons why he rejected an invitation by B&H Presidency Chairman and HDZ BiH leader Dragan Covic to attend a working lunch of B&H Presidency members in Mostar on Wednesday with RS President and SNSD leader Milorad Dodik and SBB B&H leader Fahrudin Radoncic, SDA leader Bakir Izetbegovic stated that he did not want to attend the meeting because “we have not succeeded to keep certain agreements.” He noted that it is impossible to take the side of the opposition and authorities at the same time, which is a practice of SBB B&H led by Radoncic. Asked to explain his statement on coordinated undermining of B&H institutions, Izetbegovic replied: “Dodik is the one who primarily undermines B&H Council of Ministers (CoM), the FB&H government, the Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) of B&H, the Constitutional Court (CC) of B&H and the whole judicial system. Sometimes he is joined by Covic when it comes to the CC. Radoncic also gave some severe statements on Tuesday, which was also one of the reasons why I refused to come to Mostar on Wednesday”, Izetbegovic stressed. He reminded that Covic and Dodik have a deal about foreign judges at B&H CC; Dodik has called the OSA an enemy institution without any arguments, while Radoncic’s statements regarding the OSA are groundless and unclear. Izetbegovic added that all this represents constant disputing of B&H institutions. He also said that coalition partners from the Alliance for Changes (SzP) were also invited to attend the meeting but since they said that they cannot come to Mostar this would not be the meeting in full composition.

B&H HoR removes Spiric from post of Chairman of Commission (BNTV)

The House of Representatives (HoR) of the B&H parliament held a session in Sarajevo on Wednesday, at which it discussed the removal of Nikola Spiric from the post of Chairman of the Parliament of B&H’s Joint Commission for Supervision of the Work of the Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) of B&H. When it comes to the initiative on removal of Spiric, Head of SDS Caucus in B&H HoR Aleksandra Pandurevic criticized the fact that Spiric abused his position and interrupted the session of the Joint Commission for Supervision of the Work of OSA, which was held in Sarajevo on Tuesday. According to Pandurevic, Spiric interrupted the session in order to avoid discussion on claims that he submitted OSA with false conclusions that the Joint Commission never adopted. She also added that SDS Caucus in B&H HoR demands that Spiric should be removed from the post of the Chairman of the Joint Commission and that Borislav Bojic (SDS) should replace him.

Zaev: The agreement for good neighborly relation with Bulgaria is in accordance with the national interest (Meta)

The agreement of good neighborly relations with Bulgaria is in accordance with national interest, and this big step is in the interests of the peoples of Macedonia and Bulgaria, and also it is a reflection on the new spirit of policy from a generation of politicians who build bridges, not crash them, bring citizens together, not divide them”, said Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in Parliament at the presentation of the agreement on good neighborly relations with Bulgaria. He said the agreement would be published on the government’s website and that everyone would be able to see it. “The agreement is a foundation for good neighborly relations and friendship, which will enable to connect the roads and gas infrastructure between the countries. It will improve the exchange of goods and services and capital investments. The trade exchange with Bulgaria now is 500-600 million euros, why not be one billion euros? Macedonia in Trieste received 70 million euros for the construction of Corridor 8”, Zaev said. He added that it is important that Bulgaria firmly supports Macedonia’s acceptance in the EU, without conditions, and it will transfer its experience in the process of European integration. Zaev said that the signing of this agreement means a finalization of the process which started in 2009, when the commissions of Macedonia and Bulgaria had ten meetings. He expects a constructive debate in Parliament, and expecting the opposition to participate in completing the process and to support the agreement. Asked by a journalist regarding the language on which the agreement will be signed, Zaev made it clear that he would be in two copies, in Macedonian and in Bulgarian language, and both sides will have to sign it.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS

The Croatian-Slovenian Spat Has Far-Reaching Implications For EU Unity (Orient Review, by Andrew Korybko, 24 July 2017)

What might simply be dismissed by many as an inconsequential and petty spat between two former Yugoslav Republics is actually shaping out to be a pivotal event that could determine the future trajectory of EU-Intermarium relations.

Slovenia and Croatia are two tiny countries that most Americans can’t locate on a map, though they’re becoming ever more important in the context of European geopolitics and relations between the blocs two increasingly divergent camps. Both states are EU and NATO members, and they closely coordinated with one another in seceding from Yugoslavia and sparking the deadly series of wars that was to follow in their wake. This makes it somewhat odd to the casual observer that these two previous comrades-in-arms are in a heated disagreement with one another over maritime rights and wine sales, but the fact of the matter is that Slovenia believes that its core national interests are threatened by its much larger Croatian neighbor in both disputes.

Balkan Bickering

The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a non-binding decision late last month in Slovenia’s favor which granted Ljubljana a thin maritime corridor in the Gulf of Piran to international waters in the central section of the Adriatic Sea. Croatia immediately rejected the ruling on the grounds that Zagreb believes that the legal process was flawed due to the controversial interaction between a Slovenian judge on the panel and Ljubljana in 2015, a scandal which prompted Croatia to withdraw from the arbitration and insist on bilateral talks to settle this spat. Obviously, much smaller Slovenia would be incapable of squeezing any concessions from Croatia on its own, hence why it internationalized the border problem in the first place; likewise, Croatia was opposed to this because it seems to have rightly predicted that the international body would side with Slovenia. Slovenia, with its narrow stretch of coastline, stands to reap disproportionate benefits after the court’s ruling and sees the matter as an issue of grand strategic importance. Croatia, however, already controls a broad swath of the Adriatic Sea and won’t receive any significant advantage to its economy or geopolitical standing through the addition of a few dozen more kilometers of maritime territory. It would, however, be able to retain a symbolic semblance of control over its smaller northern neighbor, which could be one of the driving motivations behind Zagreb’s perplexing position on this issue. Another possible explanation could be that Croatia seeks to uphold the sanctity of national sovereignty in dealing with issues on a bilateral basis and not deferring to international third parties for final judgement. Whatever the true reason may be, it’s likely that Croatia will seek to push the latter as its tacit or official standpoint in order to boost its soft power appeal within the Intermarium, which will be discussed at length later on in this analysis. Pertaining to the second pressing issue of discord between Slovenia and Croatia, Ljubljana just announced that it will take Brussels to court because of its willingness to allow Zagreb to pass off Slovenia’s protected Teran wine designation as Croatia’s own. The product is a national export of Slovenia, and Ljubljana believes Zagreb’s de-facto expropriation of it will have major consequences for the much smaller Slovene economy. The reason why Slovenia is suing the EU and not Croatia, however, is because Brussels has no problem with Zagreb stealing Ljubljana’s rights to this wine due to the exploitation of several legal loopholes that Slovenia says it wasn’t aware of prior to Croatia’s 2013 accession to the bloc. This developing case therefore isn’t just about two seemingly irrelevant countries arguing over a bottle of wine, but about the EU’s power to deceive member states by cutting deals behind their back. Furthermore, the pair of issues currently roiling Croatian-Slovenian relations – the Gulf of Piran maritime dispute and the Teran wine controversy – interestingly places both countries in different positions vis-à-vis the EU. Slovenia wants the bloc to back it up by forcing Croatia to recognize the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling while simultaneously suing the EU for disingenuously favoring Croatia as regards the secret legal workarounds that allow Zagreb to sell Teran wine as its own. Accordingly, Croatia is opposed to the EU’s intervention in what it believes to be a strictly bilateral border issue with Slovenia, while ironically wanting the bloc to support it in a similarly bilateral economic one. The double standards of both Balkan countries are glaring and speak to their opportunistic nature to exploit the EU and then hypocritically rail against it whenever it’s convenient.

The Shadow Of The Three Seas Initiative

The pair of problems unfolding between Slovenia and Croatia is taking place in the context of a continentally revolutionary proposal called the “Three Seas Initiative”, which was analyzed by the author in a recent article for the Centre for Global Research about the “Geostrategic Insights Into the Joint Polish-Croatian ‘Three Seas Initiative’”. The general idea is that Poland has once more resurrected its long-held dream of uniting the “Intermarium” states between the Baltic and Black Seas, except this time it innovatively decided to expand it to include the Adriatic by bringing Croatia and Slovenia on board. The aforementioned article explains how this revived proposal essentially calls for closer strategic coordination between three extant interest groups/blocs within the EU and a pair of two “balancers”. In pertinence to Croatia and Slovenia, both states are party to the Three Seas Initiative, which gives the Intermarium a stake in the resolution of their bilateral problems. Zagreb is part of the historical Hungarian sphere of influence that the author terms as “St. Stephen’s Space” while Ljubljana is one of the “balancer” states that has excellent relations with the US, EU, and even Russia, which thus allows the Intermarium to straddle between the three without appearing overly antagonistic to any of them. Each of these two countries is important to the Three Seas Initiative for their own reasons, but what really interests the Intermarium is how Croatia and Slovenia are experiencing their own relative falling outs with the EU, however hypocritical and characterized by shameless double standards they may be. Although the Intermarium is officially “neutral”, it’s recognized as having a decisively anti-Brussels purpose in the sense of furthering its leading Polish and Hungarian members’ vision to reform the EU into a more decentralized union like the one described by the author in last summer’s analysis for The Duran about the “Post-Brexit EU: Between Regional Breakdown And Full-Blown Dictatorship”. The EU’s joint Franco-German hegemons want to centralize the bloc to the point of turning it into a full-blown dictatorship as a means of countering the regional breakdown the Polish-Hungarian alliance is advancing. Both camps are scrambling for organizational allies to help promote their respective agendas within the EU, which explains why Warsaw prudently crafted its new Intermarium project to be as inclusive as possible in successfully gathering together 12 states across Central and Eastern Europe. Poland’s ambitious plans to assemble and keep together a grand coalition to reform the EU could be offset by the developing rift between the Intermarium’s two West Balkan members, though it could also give the Three Seas Initiative a renewed sense of urgency and strategic importance if events play out in the right direction. Depending on what happens, the Intermarium will either be strengthened or weakened by the outcome of the two Croatian-Slovenian disputes and Brussels’ role in handling each of them, which will consequently impact on the balance of power between the Intermarium and the Franco-German duopoly in determining the prospects of the EU’s intra-organizational future. In other words, the EU will either move further along the path of reform and decentralization or will double down even more on its dictatorial tendencies.

Pivot Potential

There are three scenarios that could predictably unfold as regards the resolution of the Croatian-Slovenian spats and the EU’s role in shaping their outcome, and each of these will have their own effect on the bloc’s overall unity. The presumption is that the Gulf of Piran issue is much more important to both countries than the Teran wine one, and the forecasting exercise below proceeds from the possible positions that Brussels may take regarding the former:

Pro-Slovenia:

If the EU sides with Slovenia against Croatia, then this could set into motion a fast-moving process by which Zagreb becomes “isolated” from the EU if it doesn’t abide by the bloc’s decision. This could set Croatia on the way to becoming another “black sheep” in the EU just like its fellow Intermarium members of Poland and Hungary are regarding their resistance to the resettlement of illegal migrants/”refugees” and Warsaw’s refusal to bend to Brussel’s judicial demands concerning its Supreme Court. Understanding that would be in league with other “EU bad boys” if it defies the EU and/or the Franco-German duopoly, Croatia might wisely seek to exploit its position by emphasizing the previously mentioned interpretation that the border dispute with Slovenia is a strictly bilateral affair and not one in which  Brussels has any business getting involved. This stance would instantly appeal to Poland and Hungary and probably cause them to come out in vocal support for Croatia, which would then strengthen the Intermarium by reinforcing the strategic convergence between the Warsaw-led Neo-Commonwealth and the Budapest-backed St. Stephen’s Space (the latter of which includes Croatia). However, Slovenia might not take too kindly to the two most influential members of the Three Seas Initiative sharply criticizing any actions or statements that the EU makes in Ljubljana’s favor regarding its maritime dispute with Croatia, and might resultantly withdraw its support for the Intermarium. If this happens, then it would diminish the “neutrality” of the Polish-Hungarian initiative by removing one of its two “balancing” actors which allowed it to retain a pretense of impartiality towards Russia. This scenario is very likely and would be negative for Russia and the EU, but positive for the Intermarium.

Pro-Croatia:

The state of affairs would be markedly different if the EU takes Croatia’s side of Slovenia’s, however, as this would undermine the anti-Brussels and pro-reform capabilities of the Intermarium. Croatia would experience delight at the EU’s decision to stay away from this bilateral spat, and Zagreb would lose much of whatever suspicion it may have previously held against the bloc. This in turn would diminish the attractiveness of the Intermarium’s agenda to change the internal workings and power arrangements within the EU, thereby striking a blow to its Polish and Hungarian leaders’ vision of using the platform as a regional counterbalance to the Franco-German duopoly in Western Europe. This doesn’t mean that they surely won’t try, but just that one of its most important geopolitical pillars – St. Stephen’s Space – won’t be anywhere as cohesively integrated on the ideological level as they would prefer. Slovenia, in the face of what it would consider as Brussels’ betrayal, could take action to deepen its integration with the Intermarium in protest, but it wouldn’t be able to compensate for the strategic damage that Croatia’s apathy to the initiative would result in following the EU’s pro-Zagreb actions. Furthermore, while Poland and Hungary would surely be pleased if Slovenia echoes their regular bouts of Brussels bashing, there wouldn’t be much in Ljubljana’s rhetoric for them to embrace aside from the symbolism of yet another EU member openly lambasting the bloc. In fact, Warsaw and Budapest would probably be proud of Brussels if it refrains from getting involved in enforcing the International Court of Arbitration’s non-binding decision against Zagreb and might even seek to take credit for, as they might frame it, setting the “principled precedent” for forcing Brussels to “back down”. This scenario is unlikely but would be positive for Russian and EU interests, though negative for the Intermarium’s.

“Neutral”:

It’s not known exactly how this could play out, but there’s a conceivable chance that the EU might make an attempt to be “neutral” by “balancing” its interests between Croatia and Slovenia, but inadvertently behaving in such a clumsy and ill-thought-out way that it ends up angering both of them and accomplishing none of the lofty goals that it intended to do. This outcome would be totally counterproductive to its interests by driving both states deeper into the Intermarium’s embrace for separate reasons, potentially because they would each feel slighted in their own way based on how Brussels dealt with the Gulf of Piran and Teran wine issues. The Intermarium would happily welcome this development because it would serve as a convincing ‘proof of concept’ for the Polish-Hungarian initiative by showcasing the reason why Central and Eastern Europe needs to band together to reform the EU. Russia, being suspicious about the long-term geostrategic goal of the Three Seas Initiative and uncertain about the success that its more “mild” members will have in restraining the rabidly Russophobic ones, would probably have no clearly defined interest as of now in terms of this particular scenario, though the same can’t be said for the EU, which stands to experience a double whammy of strategic losses if Croatia and Slovenia “defect” even more to the Intermarium. Poland and Hungary would be elated because their joint dream of restoring the historic Polish-Hungarian Strategic Partnership in modern-day conditions and with game-changing implications would become more viable than ever before, bestowing them with a boost of confidence in believing that their long-heralded vision of a Central European “renaissance” is right around the corner. For these reasons, this scenario is probable despite it being difficult to accurately ascertain its prospects. If fulfilled, it would work to benefit of the Intermarium’s grand strategic interests while contrarily harming the EU’s, but the effect that it would have on Russia is mixed and incapable of being forecasted at this time.

Concluding Thoughts

On the surface of things, the bickering between two tiny Balkan countries over maritime territory and wine sales doesn’t seem like all that big of a deal in the larger context of European and global geopolitics, but upon further examination, the case can solidly be made that the resolution of the Croatian-Slovenian spat will have profound consequences on the ideological-strategic balance of power within the EU. Depending on Brussels’ role in determining the outcome of these two increasingly bitter disagreements, the Polish-Hungarian Intermarium of “EuroRealist” (“Euroskeptic”) interests will either be weakened or strengthened, which would then impact on the odds that the Central and Eastern European countries gathered together in the Three Seas Initiative can succeed in reforming the EU along the lines of their decentralized regionally-focused vision. Whether or not the Intermarium ultimately achieves its goal is another matter, but it’s this indirect and sequentially related dynamic which imparts the Croatian-Slovenian disputes with far-reaching importance and makes them worthy of monitoring as bellwethers of the EU’s possible future.

The author writes for this publication in a private capacity which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution.

Change of guard atop ‘disastrous’ Balkan state (Politico, by Valerie Hopkins, 27 July 2017)

New PM Zoran Zaev wants to get Macedonia back on track for NATO and EU membership.

SKOPJE, Macedonia — Even by regional standards, Macedonia’s new Prime Minister Zoran Zaev has a daunting to-do list. Like most of its Balkan neighbors, the country of around 2 million people is among Europe’s poorest and suffers from deeply entrenched organized crime, widespread corruption and weak rule of law. But Zaev, a 42-year-old businessman who has never held high office, also faces challenges unique to Macedonia. These include a dispute with neighboring Greece over the country’s name that has blocked its path to the EU and NATO, disagreements with Bulgaria over history and language, tenuous relations between the two largest ethnic groups and a public administration stuffed with officials loyal to the last government. “Politicians in the past have shown that they abuse the system,” Zaev told POLITICO in his office in the capital, Skopje, sitting in front of a floor-to-ceiling pastoral painting of four maidens at a water fountain — a leftover from his predecessor’s neoclassical makeover of the building. “I am hoping we will organize society in a different way, with more democracy, more freedom, and more justice.” Zaev, who served three terms as mayor of the eastern city of Strumica, will need a lot more than hope to make progress. But he has already shown considerable perseverance to get this far. He came to power after a protracted political crisis culminated in April with supporters of the old nationalist-led government storming the parliament and attacking lawmakers, including Zaev, who was left with blood streaming down his face from a head wound. The violence prompted a change of course by President Gjorge Ivanov, who had refused for months to appoint Zaev prime minister even though he had put together a majority coalition after a parliamentary election. Ivanov had cited fears that Zaev would make too many concessions to Macedonia’s ethnic Albanian minority but he finally let the Social Democrat leader form a government in May. Zaev himself triggered the crisis — the worst since Macedonia narrowly avoided all-out civil war in 2001 — when he released wiretapped recordings in 2015 that he said were made by state intelligence officials. The wiretaps contained apparent evidence of high-level officials discussing election tampering, corruption, and even a murder cover-up. Thousands of people staged street protests, outraged by the revelations and by the fact the government had been tapping more than 20,000 phone lines. “The political crisis showed the disastrous state of our society,” Zaev said. “There are no more secrets in our society. Everybody knows the weaknesses in the judiciary, in state institutions, in the security system, in media … all these checks and balances — every normal country has it. We don’t really have it.”

Name claim

Zaev, an economist by training, has put forward a series of reforms to strengthen Macedonia’s democratic institutions, which international organizations, including the EU, say were severely undermined during the decade-long rule of the previous prime minister, Nikola Gruevski.

The reforms are also meant to allow Macedonia to open EU accession negotiations after nine months. Western powers clearly wish Zaev well. One Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, called the new premier “the best chance this country has ever had.” To achieve his goals, however, Zaev will need to solve a problem that has dogged Macedonia ever since it broke away from collapsing communist Yugoslavia in 1991 — Greece’s objection to the country’s name. As a region of northern Greece is called Macedonia, Athens argues that Skopje’s use of the name implies a claim on its territory. Greeks are also angry that Skopje lays claim to figures such as Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, historically considered part of Greek culture. Gruevski’s government chose to defy Athens by ordering a huge makeover of Skopje with neoclassical facades and naming chunks of infrastructure such as the main airport and a highway after Alexander the Great. Zaev says he is ready to make concessions if Athens is ready to drop its opposition to Macedonia’s membership of the EU and NATO. “If the Greek side is really prepared to help us, we are prepared to think about everything that will be helpful,” he said. “I am not fixed on any issue so everything is possible.” Zaev also wants to improve relations with Bulgaria by signing a “friendship agreement” when Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov visits early next month. Macedonia and Bulgaria share linguistic and cultural similarities but also hold differing views of their history and language. Bulgaria does not recognize the Macedonian language, viewing it as a dialect of Bulgarian, and the countries’ historical records differ over whether ancient leaders were ethnically Bulgarian or Macedonian. The government has presented a draft of the accord to a closed session of parliament, but not yet to the public — an illustration of the tension between Zaev’s desire to make quick progress and his pledge to make politics more transparent. Zaev said the agreement would not damage the country in any way but make Bulgaria “more dedicated” to friendship. This would make Sofia a staunch advocate for Macedonia when Bulgaria assumes the presidency of the Council of the EU in January 2018, he argued. “Accepting common history in the agreement is no danger for any country and no danger for us,” he said.

Hurdles at home

Things are hardly more straightforward on the domestic front. Zaev said that, upon assuming office, his government found almost a billion euros in previously unreported debt and many of his staff’s offices had been stripped of computers, tables and chairs. In parliament, VMRO-DPMNE, the former governing party, has split its 51 MPs into 10 parliamentary groups in order to obstruct debate over reforms such as a new budget and the appointment of a chief prosecutor.

The fate of a special prosecutor’s office, set up to investigate the wiretap revelations as part of an EU-brokered effort to end the political crisis back in 2015, also hangs in the balance. Meanwhile, Zaev is facing pressure from coalition partners who represent the ethnic Albanian minority — estimated to make up around a quarter of the population — to fulfill a pledge increase the official use of the Albanian language. The new prime minister must also try to free state institutions from the control of officials who got their jobs thanks to their close links to VMRO-DPMNE, while at the same time resisting the temptation to replace them with his own party cronies. “The new government has the task of reforming, or separating the party from the state in both the judiciary and the administration, which is not easy considering that the public sector is the biggest employer in the country,” said Simonida Kacarska, director of the Skopje-based European Policy Institute think tank. Nikola Poposki, a VMRO-DPMNE MP who served previously as foreign minister, cautioned that Zaev had “overpromised” and faced a big challenge to “adjust the expectations of voters” in a highly polarized political environment. But for now, Zaev is choosing to look on the bright side. He hailed the fact that Macedonia managed to reach an agreement with Bulgaria on its own, without mediation from outsiders, which has been the norm in recent decades in the Balkans. “We are very proud … that we will send a message to the world,” he said. “There is a capacity of politicians, when they want to, to find a solution for those kinds of sensitive problems.”