LOCAL PRESS

Vucic: Discussion on long term relations between Serbs and Albanians (Tanjug)

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has stated following the meeting with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, with mediation of EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, that they had opened today talks on long term relations between the Serbs and Albanians. The Serbian President also opened during the meeting the issue of the arrest of Bogdan Mitrovic in Suva Reka. From concrete issues that have been part of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, they confirmed the agreement on the judiciary, the announced opening of the bridge on the Ibar River by the end of the year and they acknowledged that Pristina has not made any progress regarding the formation of the Community of Serb Municipalities, Vucic told journalists in Brussels. He pointed out that the resolution of historical relations between the Serbs and Albanian would mean a great deal for both Belgrade and Pristina, and that these talks would continue, although, he stressed, nobody is too big of an optimist. Still, Vucic said, we see a small chance for resolving the historical issue between the Serbs and Albanians and we need to use it. “It’s worth trying for the sake of the future,” said Vucic. He said that they had also examined overall regional issues.

In a statement issued after the meeting, Federica Mogherini said that Vucic and Thaci followed up on their commitment from the last meeting on 3 July where they agreed to start working on a new phase of the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina for normalization of relations and reconciliation, adding, work on this will continue in the coming weeks. “Both sides today agreed the final steps for the implementation of the justice agreement reached within the EU facilitated dialogue. The presidents confirmed that the agreement will be fully implemented on October 17, 2017. On that day, judges, prosecutors and judicial staff will be integrated into the Kosovo judiciary. The integration of the judicial personnel will allow for justice to be delivered across Kosovo and, in particular, in Mitrovica region,” the statement said, and concluded: “The high representative welcomed the renewed commitment by both presidents to the process. She reiterated that the EU and she personally is fully committed to the European Union perspective of Serbia, Kosovo and the entire region and that progress by both sides is firmly linked to progress in the dialogue.”

National dialogue on Kosovo: Still no concrete moves (Beta)

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic launched the idea of a so-called internal dialogue on Kosovo with two main objectives in mind – to secure at least a minimum of support from a portion of the opposition and the NGO sector for the moves he will likely have to make and to prevent anyone from the opposition side from using the dialogue to go on the offensive and disrupt his dominant position on the Serbian political scene. In both cases, Vucic is keeping the situation under control for the time being. Vucic, in fact, has a historic opportunity of lifting the weight of Kosovo off Serbia’s back, a problem it has not been able to solve for more than 30 years. Since taking office as president he has been focused on the Kosovo agenda, but is still acting very cautiously, fearing that voters might punish him for the “betrayal of Kosovo.” But he is certainly aware that big changes have occurred on the geostrategic plane and that insistence on the position that Kosovo must remain a part of Serbia leads nowhere and brings nothing. Brussels and Washington understand that the Serbian president is in a delicate position and are strongly urging him to act with more courage and determination. Thus they systematically tolerate his “mischief,” such as the increasingly evident devastation of the rule of law, rise of partocracy and intense pressure on the media. The opposition and Vucic’s other opponents fiercely criticize that approach by Brussels and Washington, believing that in this way matters from the sphere of human and civil rights, which are a very important part of European principles, are pushed under the rug. The main position of Brussels and Washington is probably that the majority supporting Vucic is intimately against the European Union and further concessions regarding Kosovo and that, accordingly, the expected results cannot be achieved without strong campaigns and neglecting the rule of law. In short, the crucial step concerning Kosovo cannot be taken without the help of the nationalistic portion of the population, and that portion is under Vucic’s strong influence and at this time he is the only one who can effectively control it.

Dialogue

The dialogue on Kosovo has not been opened yet, despite claims by certain officials, including Prime Minister Ana Brnabic, that it has already begun. Sporadic statements by politicians and articles in various media can be treated only as preparation for the dialogue, certainly not as its start. Vucic said the dialogue would begin in September and that it was not known when it would end. One may conclude from that statement that Vucic will monitor the situation in the coming months and, depending on the needs and options, make decisions. Theoretically, after a series of talks with the parties, institutions and NGOs which agree to the dialogue, Vucic may conclude that there is no consensus and that no new policy on Kosovo can be defined. That, however, is highly unlikely given that he fully comprehends the current balance of power in the region and is aware that the balance, still being established, cannot be altered in a direction that would favor the radicalization of Serbia’s stance on Kosovo. Vucic is probably also thinking that his and the position of his Serbian Progressive Party on the international plane might not be so strong once serious headway is made in solving the Kosovo crisis. It is quite possible that the focus will afterward shift to demands related to strengthening the rule of law, reduction of parties’ influence on the executive and the increase of media freedoms, especially keeping in mind that those topics are being mentioned with increasing frequency during visits by European officials. The Serbian president, therefore, can “weigh” whether it is more politically lucrative to become less desirable in the eyes of Brussels and Washington because he has dropped the Kosovo agenda or because he has trouble with the functioning of the rule of law. It is clear that the latter option pays off much more in political terms, especially taking into account the fact that he has solidified his dominance on Serbia’s political scene. The chief problem in dealing with the aforementioned issues is the fact that the Serbian Progressive Party achieved its dominance precisely through the violation of norms of the rule of law and through pressure on the media and is maintaining it in the same way, which means habits would have to start changing.

Participants

The Serbian ruling coalition, essentially, is not hoping for greater involvement of the opposition and other opponents of the authorities in the dialogue on Kosovo. At the very start, when the idea of a dialogue was unveiled, the Serbian Progressive Party responded extremely harshly to any opinion coming from the opposition. Thus, for example, the announcement of the Democratic Party’s proposal for amendments to the Constitution (which do not directly pertain to Kosovo, rather to the functioning of the judicial system) was met with a press release saying that there was no need for the Democrats to ponder the Constitution or any other important subject. These and similar statements and press releases certainly cannot motivate anyone to get involved in the dialogue. On the contrary, they have a demotivating effect; thus it is highly unlikely that the biggest opposition parties will answer Vucic’s call. That will not be a problem for the ruling coalition, because any engagement of the opposition in a debate on an important topic automatically raises the opposition’s popularity. The involvement of Bosko Obradovic’s Dveri movement in the debate may be particularly unpleasant for the ruling group, since the party harbors a highly negative position on the idea of making compromises on Kosovo. A similar stance is advocated by the Serbian Radical Party, but the ruling bloc can control that party more easily than it can control Dveri. As it stands, Cedomir Jovanovic’s Liberal Democratic Party and Nenad Canak’s League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina will respond to the invitation for a dialogue. Both parties are fervently in favor of an agreement on Kosovo and concessions, which Vucic will certainly know how to use in defining the final proposals. Sasa Jankovic’s Movement of Free Citizens is expressly refusing any sort of communication with Vucic and the Democrats are also unlikely to take Vucic up on the dialogue. The dialogue will also involve institutions such as the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and Serbian Orthodox Church, and the invitation will also be extended to NGOs. Milan Antonijevic, the head of the YUCOM Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, has said he will accept the invitation and some other nongovernmental organizations are also likely to do so. All in all, Vucic will be able to include some important institutions and a portion of the opposition and NGO sector in the process, which will be quite sufficient for him to declare it successful and, at the same time, share the responsibility for the decisions that will formally stem from that dialogue. And these decisions appear inevitable and will be a result of growing pressure from the international community on Vucic to permanently solve the Kosovo problem.

New crisis in Serbian-Macedonian relations: A spy & diplomatic thriller (Beta)

Serbia’s decision to recall all staff from its embassy in Macedonia came out of the blue, but the mini crisis ended quickly, so quickly in fact, that as European Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn put it, Brussels didn’t get a chance to react. A mere 48 hours passed between the tabloid headlines that Macedonia had been bracing for a war against Serbia and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s initiative for the two governments to hold a joint session. The motives behind the Serbian decision remain obscure, but in retrospect it all seems like a storm in a teacup. Clearly Serbia felt an urge to demonstrate its discontent, replaced quickly by a commitment to a more conciliatory regional policy. Macedonia offered no countermeasures, and Brussels was very happy that the crisis ended so swiftly, leaving no serious consequences in its wake. The report that Serbia had decided to pull the staff from the embassy in Skopje was published late in the evening on Aug. 20, after which tensions flared between Belgrade and Skopje. Serbia alleged “aggressive intelligence activities” against national interests and the embassy staff, involving “a foreign factor.” Having refused to unveil any other details, Serbia left plenty of room for doubt as to the actual reasons behind the move, letting different conspiracy theories and weird tales of backstabbing circulate wildly. The decision to withdraw all diplomatic staff from Macedonia coincided with the country’s plan to support Kosovo’s move to join the U.N. Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which had clearly made Serbia very angry and strongly critical of the Macedonian agenda. Nearly all comments from the ruling coalition as to the latest fall-out with Macedonia placed a heavy emphasis on Skopje’s intention to support Kosovo’s new bid for UNESCO membership.

Background

The Serbian-Macedonian relationship has worsened visibly over the past 12 months, all the more so after the country’s conservative prime minister, Nikola Gruevski of VMRO-DPMNE, stepped down. In the events following a vote in which Gruevski had lost a majority, the more vocal part of the Serbian public and the media close to the authorities sided with Gruevski, presenting a Social Democrat leader, Zoran Zaev, as a politician determined to come to power by force, in cahoots with Albanian parties, which Belgrade didn’t what to happen. The arguments against Zaev were generated from his alliance with Macedonian Albanian political groups and an agreement on a new power structure, bound to change the existing political arrangements. Aside from defining the rights of ethnic Albanians, the new ruling coalition is determined to propel the country into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Macedonia’s NATO membership has been on hold for nearly ten years, over a name dispute with Greece. The new ruling coalition has been portrayed as Serbia’s enemy, supporting Kosovo’s membership of the U.N. cultural agency and Interpol. It appears that the Serbian public and politicians alike have conveniently forgotten that it was precisely the Gruevski cabinet that recognized Kosovo as an independent state, involving the very same Albanian politicians who participated in an Albanian armed rebellion in Macedonia. Simply said, it was a campaign based on the belief that it’s better for Serbia if Zoran Zaev and his Albanian political supporters didn’t come to power. Before the latest dispute, the Belgrade-Skopje relations had been challenged by Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, who said in an interview with BETA earlier this year that Serbia had made a mistake when it recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, and that it would use the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia in all multilateral contacts in the future. Yet the comment didn’t create a crisis.

Spy Conspiracies and UNESCO

Neither the “intelligence activities against Serbia” nor Skopje’s support to Kosovo in a vote on UNESCO membership could possibly justify a reaction as strong as a recall of entire diplomatic staff. Keeping watch on foreign diplomats is fairly regular in any state. If an embassy staffer gets involved in an incident, it’s usually hushed up, the ambassador is called in for consultations or a diplomatic note sent. The day after the Serbian diplomatic staff had been pulled from the embassy in Skopje, President Vucic said the decision was based on evidence of very aggressive intelligence activities against Serbia’s bodies and institutions, as provided by the relevant authorities, involving also “the influence of a foreign factor.” This was not the first time Vucic referred to a foreign factor, never making it clear whether it was the West, which would certainly bring into question the purpose of Serbia’s EU accession, or Russia, which would challenge the country’s relations with Moscow, very important at home. In the same comment, the Serbian president said that Serbia would protect its interests, and wait and see how Skopje would react if Albania attempted to bring Kosovo into the U.N. cultural organization. A contact between Vucic and Zaev was announced the next day, and the Serbian president said in an interview with the Serbian Broadcasting Corporation (RTS) that the ambassadorial recall was a way for Serbia to say, “We know what you are doing, please stop. We wish you all the best, even though you’ve recognized (an independent) Kosovo, and plan to support Kosovo’s UNESCO membership.” By the end of the week things went back to normal, as if relations between Belgrade and Skopje hadn’t been threatened at all. Vucic said the situation would be resolved soon, and that the embassy staff would be back in Skopje in September. He spoke on the phone with Zaev the next day, and the two officials agreed that bilateral differences should be solved in a dialogue, while the two states should develop their friendly relations, and that “in good faith and in a friendly fashion they should protect the rights and interests of diplomatic and consular representative offices in their territories.” At the end of the week, the Serbian and Macedonian foreign ministers, Ivica Dacic and Nikola Dimitrov, met, and the Serbian minister said he had notified his Macedonian counterpart of the reports of aggressive intelligence actions against Serbian general interests, but that he didn’t want the situation to be abused, because Macedonia was a friendly country. Minister Dacic explained that the decision to withdraw the embassy staff for consultations in Belgrade was a reaction to the reports. The Serbian and Macedonian prime ministers met at a conference in Drac, and the Serbian PM, Ana Brnabic, said that Macedonia would refrain from voting in Kosovo’s new attempt at UNESCO membership. In the meantime, the entire diplomatic staff, save the ambassador, returned to Skopje.

Spy

The intelligence and diplomatic controversy might remove from Macedonia a security consultant at the Serbian embassy, a Security and Information Agency officer, Goran Zivaljevic, and, possibly, the people close to him. Zivaljevic came into the spotlight when on April 27 he was spotted in the Macedonian parliament building during a raid by VMRO-DPMNE, following a decision by a Social Democrat parliamentary majority to elect Talat Xhaferi as Macedonia’s new speaker. Regional and Macedonian media published the Macedonian security agency’s reports saying that Zivaljevic had actively promoted a pro-Russian policy by the former prime minister, Gruevski and efforts against Macedonia’s membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. “Our findings indicate that intelligence officer Goran Zivaljevic used intelligence methods in Macedonia, which exceed the framework of a diplomatic status…bringing up the legitimacy and legality of his actions,” the documents say. The Macedonian intelligence agency has also said that a Macedonian MP from the Democratic Party of the Serbs, Ivan Stoilkovic, and a Serbian Progressive Party MP, journalist Miroslav Lazanski, had a hand in the affair, too.

In a statement following the decision to recall the embassy staff, Zivaljevic said that the Macedonian authorities had approved his presence in the parliament building, when the riots left more than 100 people injured, including Zaev and the Alliance for Albanians leader. Vucic also said that the Serbian intelligence officer had their approval, but Skopje denied it quickly.

Zivaljevic insisted that the approval had come from a security advisor to the Macedonian president, Sinisa Aleksovski, which the Office of the President, Djordje Ivanov, denied. The Macedonian security agency said that the Serbian intelligence officer had never asked the Macedonian authorities for a permit, but only notified them of his activities subsequently. The agency also says that Aleksovski wasn’t in charge of allowing the presence of foreign representatives in the parliament at all. An important detail in the diplomatic incident might be an investigation into Zivaljevic’s actions, which might involve none other than the Macedonian president, coming from the VMRO-DPMNE, who tried to prevent a parliamentary majority to be formed around the Social Democrat leader, Zoran Zaev. Five days after the incident, the news came that the Macedonian Prosecutor for Organized Crime might open an investigation into Ivanov’s involvement into the April 27 events at the Macedonian parliament. In this context, the prosecutor might also place Aleksovski and Zivaljevic under investigation. The move to withdraw the entire embassy staff and replace some of the staffers might eliminate witnesses in the investigation that might reach the president. After all, this is not the first time Zivaljevic has to leave a country. Before he joined the diplomatic mission in Skopje, Zivaljevic had been a diplomat in Croatia, in 2014, but the Croatian intelligence service complained to their Serbian counterparts about his work, and he was recalled.

REGIONAL PRESS

Osmanovic to Croatian Minister Butkovic: There are legal obstacles to construction of the Peljesac Bridge (klix.ba)

With regards to announcement of start of construction of the Peljesac Bridge, Minister of Civil Affairs of B&H Adil Osmanovic sent Croatian Minister of Maritime, Transport and Infrastructure Oleg Butkovic a letter, informing him there are legal obstacles to construction of the bridge. The letter has also been sent to EC President Jean-Claude Juncker, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, European Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn, High Representative Valentin Inzko and Head of the EU Delegation to B&H Lars-Gunnar Wigemark. According to Osmanovic, in case your Butkovic’s Ministry, in other words Croatian authorities continue with activities aimed at construction of the Peljesac Bridge, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of B&H will be forced to start activities aimed at B&H leaving the Agreement on State Border Between Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will declare sovereign rights of B&H in line with the UN’s Convention on Law on the Sea.

Pendes, Jelec meet EUFOR Operation Commander Everard (Oslobodjenje)

B&H Defense Minister Marina Pendes with her associates and Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of B&H Anto Jelec with his deputies met with EUFOR Operation Commander General Sir James Everard, who is also NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Pendes pointed out significant progress in the process of registration of prospective military locations and she said that the Ministry expects these efforts to be recognized by B&H’s friends and partners so that the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) can be activated as soon as possible. Everard praised the efforts in defense reform process, expressing hope that those processes will continue and expressing full support of the EUFOR to that.

SIPA arrests Wahhabi movement member, directly linked to recently deported Jasmin Hadzic; Wahhabi movement member arrested in Gacko too (TV1/ATV)

Members of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) B&H arrested on Wednesday a Wahhabi movement member in Sarajevo settlement Buca Potok. The person was arrested under suspicion of terrorism. TV1 learns that a house of Jasmin Hadzic, who was recently deported from Austria where he spent last three months, was raided and that the operation was conducted at order of the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of B&H. Spokesperson for B&H Prosecutor’s Office Boris Grubesic said that the raids are aimed at finding illegal weapon, ammunition or explosive devices, and that certain persons will be summoned for interrogation. Namely, the Prosecutor’s Office has information that the persons who were arrested and the raided locations are directly linked to the person who was recently deported from Austria to B&H. B&H Security Minister Dragan Mektic commented that fight against terrorism, extremism and all sorts of terrorist threats will be the main priority of work, in terms of protection of citizens and property in B&H. He announced new operations like the ones carried out on Wednesday.

Trebinje police arrested one Fikret Karkelja on Wednesday and found a larger amount of weapons after raiding premises he uses. Karkelja has been known to the police for affiliation with a certain Wahhabi movement. Karkelja, aged 41, was arrested in Mjedenik village near Gacko, where he has been living for several years in a house owned by someone else. Chief of Trebinje Police Administration Zarko Laketa stated that Karkelja was brought in Trebinje Police Administration where he is going to be interrogated and kept for the next 24 hours. Karkelja is originally from Foca with registered place of residence in Sarajevo, but he has been living in Mjedenik for the past five or six years.

Tudjman: Islamic terrorism started in B&H (N1/Globus)

Professor Miroslav Tudjman, an MP in the Croatian parliament (HDZ of Croatia) and son of late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated that current Islamic terrorism started in B&H during the 1990s, with Alija Izetbegovic’s mujahedeen. Tudjman said that what happens in Europe today started in B&H, with around 50 ritual beheading, and added that brigades of RB&H Army had Arabic insignia, and they were composed of local Muslims and active believers. This statement caused a series of reactions, and many deem that Tudjman only wants to divert attention from the role of Croatia during the war in B&H.

B&H Presidency member Bakir Izetbegovic, a son of Alija Izetbegovic, told N1 that his father was not a commander and did not know any details, apart from being the supreme commander as B&H Presidency Chair. He acknowledged that Mujahedeen were not expelled from B&H, but added that his father was not happy because they were there. Izetbegovic said that war crimes were committed by all sides in the war, but added that none of them can be compared to the joint criminal enterprise, in which Franjo Tudjman took part. He noted that on several occasions, Alija Izetbegovic said that B&H does not need fighters, but weapons.

Wartime member of B&H Presidency Miro Lazovic said that Mujahedeen units were not a part of regular units in B&H. He said that it is well known that Croatia allowed mujahedeen to reach B&H, in order to compromise RB&H Army.

A call no one responds to (CDM)

United opposition represents a mission impossible on the Montenegrin political scene, so the Democratic Front (DF) will remain empty-handed in its synchronized action attempt. “Three opposition parties rejected DF’s initiative the same day the political alliance announced its call. Thus, it was formally demonstrated that no united opposition run in the upcoming elections is possible. Such a thing was expected after numerous accusations among the opposition in the previous period,” the director of the Civic Alliance (GA) Boris Raonic told CdM. Now when the state of relations within the opposition are known, Raonic believes that they should work on establishing communication and trust in order to facilitate cooperation in some other election cycles. “The opposition will have several presidential candidates, who will lead campaigns in the local elections in 13 municipalities scheduled for the spring of 2019. As part of this campaign, DF will, of course, launch a series of new protests. Socio-economic situation and a bad image created by the Special state Prosecutor’s Office (SDT) will contribute to the cause. But I do not expect that there will be mass protests,” Raonic told CdM. As a reminder, the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro was first to respond to DF’s initiative to unite the opposition and come out with a single candidates list and one presidential candidate at the next elections.

Deputy leader of SDP Almir Rebronja, said that because of the large and fundamental differences between SDP and DF, cooperation is not possible. The Democrats do not want even to communicate with DF. “It is extremely hypocritical to invite those who you referred to as sects, criminals, deceivers and collaborators of the regime until recently. We are continuing knocking down DPS politically and working hard on the ground. Therefore, so we are not interested in the activities of the DF’s leaders,” they said.

SNP leader Vladimir Jokovic points out that the opposition needs to find the strength to bring together behind a common presidential candidate whom everyone would support, and that the potential candidate has a great chance to beat any representative of the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, as Jokovic pointed out, the success of the Democratic Front’s call for the joint running in the elections has been called into question at the very beginning as some parliamentary parties have already declared themselves not to support such an initiative.

URA Civic movement also believes that a common opposition candidate would be the most serious opponent to the DPS’s presidential candidate. However, the movement emphasises that it is almost impossible to speak about common lists without overcoming numerous issues between the two poles of the opposition political scene. And when DF became aware of the failure of its initiative, DF gave in and announced that it was ready to accept other proposals. One thing is certain – the stories about opposition’s united running in the upcoming elections are predestined to failure, and this is clear to everyone, except – the opposition.

Kotzias in an official visit in Skopje with meetings with the state leadership and the political parties (Meta)

The Head of the Greek diplomacy, Nikos Kotzias is on a one-day visit to Macedonia, during which he will have one to one meetings with state leadership representatives. Kotzias, who arrived in Macedonia by car, firstly will meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikola Dimitrov, after which both will have a press conference. After the meeting with Dimitrov, the Greek Minister will meet with President Gjorge Ivanov, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and the VP Bujar Osmani, including representatives of various political parties. The name dispute is not on the Kotzias agenda, but the implementation of the measures for building trust and the conclusions from the last meeting between both ministries’ working groups, that took place yesterday in Athens.

CIA report for Albania: Active point of drug trafficking (ADN)

The Central Intelligence Agency in USA (CIA) labels Albania as an active transshipment point of drug trafficking for Southwest Asia to Balkans and Europe.  CIA underlines that there is an increase of cannabis plantations and even of the Albanians trafficking organization in Europe.

“Increasingly active transshipment for Southwest Asia opiates, hashish and cannabis transiting the Balkan route and to a lesser extent, cocaine from South America destined for Western Europe; limited opium and expanding cannabis production; ethnic Albanian drug trafficking organization active and expanding in Europe; vulnerable to money laundering associated with regional trafficking in narcotics, arms, contraband and illegal aliens.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS

Croatia Fascist Slogan Threatens to Topple Govt (BIRN, by Sven Milekic, 31 August 2017)

The slogan of the Croatian WWII fascist Ustasa movement, ‘Za dom spremni’, remains so politically toxic that a dispute over a plaque bearing the words could bring down the country’s governing coalition.

Croatia’s coalition government, led by the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, is once again facing a potential break-up, this time because of a plaque with the words ‘Za dom spremni’ (‘Ready for the Home(land)’), a slogan used by the Croatian WWII fascist Ustasa movement.

The plaque was unveiled in November in the town of Jasenovac, near the location of the biggest Ustasa concentration camp, commemorating 11 deceased members of the Croatian Defence Forces, HOS, a wartime paramilitary unit and party militia of the far-right Croatian Party of Rights. It immediately caused negative reactions, not only from the opposition but also from the HDZ’s partner, the Independent Democratic Serb Party, SDSS. The Ustasa killed over 83,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma and anti-fascists at the Jasenovac camp between 1941 and 1945. The initial problem was that the slogan appears on the plaque as part of the officially-registered coat of arms of a war veterans’ organisation from the HOS, which was set up at the beginning of the Croatian conflict in 1991 and fought against rebel Croatian Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s Army before being integrated into the Croatian Army in 1992. The Association of HOS Volunteers in the City of Zagreb was registered by Zagreb’s office for general administration and by the State Administration Ministry in 1998, with the words ‘Za dom spremni’ in its official coat of arms. The use of the slogan is not prohibited in Croatia, although various courts have established that it represents the Ustasa regime, and it is sometimes chanted at right-wing events and football matches. Last December, after the dispute over the Jasenovac plaque hit the media, Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic said that the government would pass legislation to regulate the issue. Plenkovic then announced that a special council, made up of experts, would be set up to come up with legislation regulating the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes. To fulfil the task, the government set the Council for Dealing with Consequences of the Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes in March – although its members did not agree that it will discuss the ‘Za dom spremni’ issue. Meanwhile the liberal Croatian People’s Party, HNS, said in June when it joined the HDZ’s coalition government that the plaque would be removed within a month – a deadline which expired in late July. At that point, Plenkovic said that the government was waiting for a solution from the State Administration Ministry.

Legitimate insignia?

The issue erupted again on Saturday when the HDZ’s Justice Minister Drazen Bosnjakovic said in an interview for daily Vecernji list that the plaque “won’t be removed before March”.

Bosnjakovic’s statement caused sharp reactions from the Serb SDSS and the liberal HNS, which insisted that the government resolves the issue within a month. The governing coalition, which is constantly hovering just above the minimum majority of 76 MPs in parliament, cannot stay in power without support from the HNS’s five HNS MPs, as well as the three SDSS lawmakers and five other ethnic minority MPs who act in an informal bloc with the SDSS. Plenkovic repeated on Tuesday that the government is working on the issue while bearing in mind its duty of respect towards the Jasenovac victims and the 11 fallen HOS members commemorated by the plaque.

“We’re looking for a solution where the content on the plaque won’t offend anyone’s feelings, and we will find the solution very quickly,” he said. Zvone Curkovic, the former HOS commander in the eastern town of Vukovar, told public broadcaster HRT on Tuesday that the coat of arms is “legitimate insignia” recognised by the state, but that in the case of Jasenovac, an exception should be made. “My personal position on the memorial plaque in Jasenovac is that the HOS needs to make a gesture and, only in Jasenovac, remove the insignia ‘Za dom spremni’ from that plaque… out of respect for the innocent victims [of the camp], no matter how many there were,” Curkovic said. But Milijan Brkic, vice-chair of parliament and deputy president of the HDZ, said on Monday that “the HOS’s plaque was installed legally”. Brkic insisted that it is “a wartime coat of arms of a legal unit from the Homeland War” – Croatia’s official name for the 1990s war. He said that HOS veterans have as little in common with fascism as those who advocate the removal of the plaque have “with Croats”. “They [who advocate the removal of the plaque] never even wanted Croatia; not only that did they not want it, they worked against its freedom and independence,” Brkic said. Meanwhile the president of the network of HOS associations, Borislav Barisic, said on Monday that the HOS could not be described as “fascist and Ustasa” because it was formed in 1991, long after the WWII-era regime ceased to exist.

Barisic called on Plenkovic to protect the HOS associations or they would have to resort to calling for referendums or take their grievances to international courts. Djuro Glogoski, head of the Association of 100 Per Cent Disabled War Veterans, who led a year-and-half-long protest in 2014-16 for more rights for ex-soldiers, warned meanwhile that veterans’ organisations have “options B and C in mind” if Plenkovic does not do something – a hint at renewed direct action.

Sympathies for the Ustasa

Since they were established, both the HOS and its political parent, the far-right Croatian Party of Rights, have shared certain symbols with the Ustasa movement. As well as adopting ‘Za dom spremni’, they occasionally displayed photos of Ustasa leader Ante Pavelic in prominent places at their headquarters. The acronym HOS itself is the same as the acronym of the Croatian Armed Forces – the name of the armed forces of the Ustasa-led, WWII-era Independent State of Croatia, NDH, an ally of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. HOS units were or still are named after prominent Ustasa commanders such as Jure Francetic or Rafael Boban, and on certain occasions, they sang Ustasa songs. In 1992, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, a historian by profession, expressed his dissatisfaction with the HOS’s fascination with the Ustasa, which he saw as bad for Croatia’s international image. “I know that among these young men there were Croatian fanatics, people who had Croatian ideals, but it surprises me that they are ‘falling’ for those who dress them in black shirts and fascist insignia from the World War II they lost,” Tudjman said. “Where would Germany be if it continued the blackshirt traditions? This was one of the major obstacles for Croatia’s international recognition,” he added. Despite some claims to the contrary from far-right circles, ‘Za dom spremni’ was coined by the Ustasa movement in the 1930s, while it was active abroad, outside the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In an interview conducted in 1957 but only published in Croat diaspora newspaper Croatian Guard in 1968, Pavelic said he wanted a slogan with a “militaristic meaning”. He described how he was partly inspired by how the 11th-century Croatian king Petar Kresimir IV had used the word ‘ready’. “Ready for what? For the thing which is the most sacred among earthly things: for home! A home is not just a homeland but a hearth, so its meaning is as twice as strong. This term is used throughout all of our history, and is also present in our patriotic poetry,” Pavelic said.

No specific ban

Unlike German law, which bans the use of specific Nazi symbols and slogans such as ‘Sieg Heil’, Croatian legislation does not say precisely what is not allowed. Article 325 of the Croatian Criminal Code specifies that people who “call for hatred or violence to be directed against groups… because of their racial, religious, national or ethnic affiliation” can be punished with a three-year prison sentence, while organisers of hate-mongering groups can receive up to six years in prison. Article 325 also says that people who “publicly approve of, deny or significantly belittle criminal acts of genocide, acts of aggression, crimes against humanity or war crimes” can also receive up to three years in prison. However, hardly anyone chanting ‘Za dom spremni’ or displaying Ustasa insignia is prosecuted according to Article 325. Like Croatian football player Josip ‘Joe’ Simunic – who chanted ‘Za dom spremni’ along with thousands of spectators at an international match in Zagreb in 2013 – people are usually charged under misdemeanour legislation and given fines. Despite the lack of specifics in the law, many legal experts and politicians claim that anti-fascism is enshrined in the constitution and therefore displays of support for the Ustasa can be prosecuted. According to the constitution’s preamble, the country is founded upon the actions of Croatia’s Anti-Fascist Council in its opposition to the establishment of the Ustasa-run NDH in 1941. With this in mind, in 2004, Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader ordered the removal of a memorial dedicated to Ustasa commander Francetic in the town of Slunj. Sanader said it was “contrary to the historical foundations of the constitution of the Republic of Croatia and [harms] the reputation and interests of the Republic of Croatia”. Meanwhile the Croatian Ombudsman’ office said in February this year that the ‘Za dom spremni’ slogan contravenes the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European Convention on Human Rights and Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The Ombudsman’s office also cited a number of verdicts in which courts convicted people for using ‘Za dom spremni’ and defined it as “the official greeting of the Ustasa regime and the totalitarian NDH regime”. Therefore, the Ombudsman’s office claimed, there is existing jurisprudence for such prosecutions. It also emphasised that some of these verdicts were confirmed by the Constitutional Court. It also pointed to a conclusion made by Croatia’s parliamentary committee for the constitution, parliamentary rules of procedure and political system, which said that the plaque in Jasenovac “offends victims of the Ustasa camp and all victims of the Ustasa regime”.

However, in another example of the rival interpretations which have driven the dispute about the slogan, a magistrate’s court in the town of Knin acquitted someone in 2011 for chanting ‘Za dom spremni’, claiming that it was a phrase known “throughout all of Croatia’s history”.