OPINION

Date of adoption: 13 December 2013

Case No. 146/09

Ljubica BULJEVIĆ

against

UNMIK

The Human Rights Advisory Panel, on 13 December 2013, with the following members taking part:

Mr Marek NOWICKI, Presiding Member
Ms Christine CHINKIN
Ms Françoise TULKENS

Assisted by

Mr Andrey Antonov, Executive Officer

Having considered the aforementioned complaint, introduced pursuant to Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel,

Having deliberated, including through electronic means, in accordance with Rule 13 § 2 of its Rules of Procedure, makes the following findings and recommendations:

I. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PANEL

1. The complaint was introduced on 1 April 2009 and registered on 30 April 2009.

2. On 13 January 2010, the Panel requested additional information from the complainant. On 30 November 2010, the Panel reiterated its request.
3. On 7 December 2010, the complainant provided her response.

4. On 27 May 2011, the complaint was communicated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)¹, for UNMIK’s comments on the admissibility of the complaint.

5. On 11 July 2011, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s response.

6. On 27 October 2011, the Panel declared the complaint admissible.

7. On 28 October 2011, the Panel forwarded its decision to the SRSG requesting UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, as well as copies of the investigative files relevant to the case.

8. On 16 August 2013, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, together with the relevant documentation.

9. On 6 December 2013, the Panel requested UNMIK to confirm of the disclosure of files concerning the case could be considered final. On the same day, UNMIK provided its response.

II. THE FACTS

A. General background²

10. The events at issue took place in the territory of Kosovo after the establishment in June 1999 of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

11. The armed conflict during 1998 and 1999 between the Serbian forces on one side and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Kosovo Albanian armed groups on the other is well documented. Following the failure of international efforts to resolve the conflict, on 23 March 1999, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced the commencement of air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air strikes began on 24 March 1999 and ended on 8 June 1999 when the FRY agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. On 9 June 1999, the International Security Force (KFOR), the FRY and the Republic of Serbia signed a “Military Technical Agreement” by which they agreed on FRY withdrawal from Kosovo and the presence of an international security force following an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution.

¹ A list of abbreviations and acronyms contained in the text can be found in the attached Annex.

12. On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council decided upon the deployment of international security and civil presences - KFOR and UNMIK respectively - in the territory of Kosovo. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999), the UN was vested with full legislative and executive powers for the interim administration of Kosovo, including the administration of justice. KFOR was tasked with establishing “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety” and temporarily ensuring “public safety and order” until the international civil presence could take over responsibility for this task. UNMIK comprised four main components or pillars led by the United Nations (civil administration), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian assistance, which was phased out in June 2000), the OSCE (institution building) and the EU (reconstruction and economic development). Each pillar was placed under the authority of the SRSG. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) mandated UNMIK to “promote and protect human rights” in Kosovo in accordance with internationally recognised human rights standards.

13. Estimates regarding the effect of the conflict on the displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population range from approximately 800,000 to 1.45 million. Following the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the majority of Kosovo Albanians who had fled, or had been forcibly expelled from their houses by the Serbian forces during the conflict, returned to Kosovo.

14. Meanwhile, members of the non-Albanian community – mainly but not exclusively Serbs, Roma and Slavic Muslims – as well as Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, became the target of widespread attacks by Kosovo Albanian armed groups. Current estimates relating to the number of Kosovo Serbs displaced fall within the region of 200,000 to 210,000. Whereas most Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians fled to Serbia proper and the neighbouring countries, those remaining behind became victims of systematic killings, abductions, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender based violence, beatings and harassment.

15. Although figures remain disputed, it is estimated that more than 15,000 deaths or disappearances occurred during and in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (1998-2000). More than 3,000 ethnic Albanians, and about 800 Serbs, Roma and members of other minority communities went missing during this period. More than half of the missing persons had been located and their mortal remains identified by the end of 2010, while 1,766 are listed as still missing by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as of October 2012.

16. As of July 1999, as part of the efforts to restore law enforcement in Kosovo within the framework of the rule of law, the SRSG urged UN member States to support the deployment within the civilian component of UNMIK of 4,718 international police personnel. UNMIK Police were tasked with advising KFOR on policing matters until they themselves had sufficient numbers to take full responsibility for law enforcement and to work towards the development of a Kosovo police service. By September 1999, approximately 1,100 international police officers had been deployed to UNMIK.

17. By December 2000, the deployment of UNMIK Police was almost complete with 4,400 personnel from 53 different countries, and UNMIK had assumed primacy in law
enforcement responsibility in all regions of Kosovo except for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. According to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, 351 kidnappings, 675 murders and 115 rapes had been reported to them in the period between June 1999 and December 2000.

18. Due to the collapse of the administration of justice in Kosovo, UNMIK established in June 1999 an Emergency Justice System. This was composed of a limited number of local judges and prosecutors and was operational until a regular justice system became operative in January 2000. In February 2000, UNMIK authorised the appointment of international judges and prosecutors, initially in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region and later across Kosovo, to strengthen the local justice system and to guarantee its impartiality. As of October 2002, the local justice system comprised 341 local and 24 international judges and prosecutors. In January 2003, the UN Secretary-General reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1244 (1999) defined the police and justice system in Kosovo at that moment as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable”.

19. In July 1999, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNMIK already considered the issue of missing persons as a particularly acute human rights concern in Kosovo. In November 1999, a Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was established within UNMIK Police, mandated to investigate with respect to either the possible location of missing persons and/or gravesites. The MPU, jointly with the Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) of UNMIK Police, and later a dedicated War Crimes Investigation Unit (WCIU), were responsible for the criminal aspects of missing persons cases in Kosovo. In May 2000, a Victim Recovery and Identification Commission (VRIC) chaired by UNMIK was created for the recovery, identification and disposition of mortal remains. As of June 2002, the newly established Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) in the UNMIK Department of Justice (DOJ) became the sole authority mandated to determine the whereabouts of missing persons, identify their mortal remains and return them to the family of the missing. Starting from 2001, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNMIK and the Sarajevo-based International Commission of Missing Persons (ICMP), supplemented by a further agreement in 2003, the identification of mortal remains was carried out by the ICMP through DNA testing.

20. On 9 December 2008, UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to police and justice in Kosovo ended with the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) assuming full operational control in the area of the rule of law, following the Statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44), welcoming the continued engagement of the European Union in Kosovo.

21. On the same date, UNMIK and EULEX signed a MoU on the modalities, and the respective rights and obligations arising from the transfer from UNMIK to EULEX of cases and the related files which involved on-going investigations, prosecutions and other activities undertaken by UNMIK International Prosecutors. Shortly thereafter, similar agreements were signed with regard to the files handled by international judges and UNMIK Police. All agreements obliged EULEX to provide to UNMIK access to the documents related to the actions previously undertaken by UNMIK authorities. Between 9 December 2008 and 30 March 2009, all criminal case files held by the UNMIK DOJ and UNMIK Police were supposed to be handed over to EULEX.
B. Circumstances surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević

22. The complainant is the sister Mr Mile Buljević, who was a refugee from Croatia and worked for the office of the Radio and Television of Serbia (RTS) in Prishtinë/Priština. She states that her brother was abducted on 25 June 1999. His whereabouts have remained unknown since that time.

23. The complainant clarifies that around noon on that day her brother was last seen by some family members when he headed towards the collective shelter for refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs), called “RTS’s barracks” in Prishtinë/Priština, where he and his family were temporarily sheltered. He wanted to collect their belongings and leave with his family to Croatia. The complainant further relates that according to an eye-witness, at around 12:30, in the proximity of that collective shelter Mr Buljević was stopped by some persons, who asked him to assist in uploading some goods into a truck. Shortly thereafter, a black “jeep” with three male and one female uniformed KLA members arrived. They severely assaulted the complainant’s brother. Then they put unconscious Mr Buljević and the eye-witness’s husband into the “jeep” and drove away. According to the same eye-witness, her husband was thrown out of the vehicle some fifty metres after, but Mr Buljević remained inside.

24. The complainant states that the aforementioned eye-witness and her husband immediately informed her other brother, Mr M.B. of the occurrence. She adds that the latter promptly reported the abduction to KFOR, and some time later to the ICRC, the Red Cross of Serbia and other organisations. The complainant also states that on an unspecified date she filed a criminal report with an international prosecutor of the Prishtinë/Priština District Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, according to the complainant, the authorities took no action in relation to her brother’s abduction and that neither she, nor other family members, have received any information with regard to his fate.

25. On 23 July 2001, the ICRC opened a tracing request with regard to Mr Mile Buljević; it remains open until now\(^3\). His name is also present in the list of missing persons that was forwarded by the ICRC to UNMIK on 12 October 2001, for whom the ICRC had collected ante-mortem data in Serbia proper, between 1 July and 20 September 2001, as well as in the database compiled by the UNMIK OMPF\(^4\). The entry in relation to Mr Mile Buljević in the online database maintained by the ICMP\(^5\) reads, in relevant fields: “Not Enough Reference Samples Collected” and “DNA match not found”.

C. The investigation

26. In the present case, the Panel received from UNMIK “very limited” investigative documents previously held by the UNMIK Police WCIU and the UNMIK OMPF. When presenting the file to the Panel, in February 2013, UNMIK noted that more information, not contained in the presented documents, may exist in relation to this case. However, on 6 December 2013, it confirmed to the Panel that no more documents in relation to this case

---


\(^4\) The OMPF database is not open to public. The Panel accessed it with regard to this case on 10 December 2013.

have been obtained.

27. Concerning disclosure of information contained in the files, the Panel recalls that UNMIK has made them available under a pledge of confidentiality. In this regard, the Panel must clarify that although its assessment of the present case stems from a thorough examination of the available documentation, only limited information contained therein is disclosed. Hence a synopsis of relevant investigation steps taken by investigative authorities is provided in the paragraphs to follow.

28. The file contains an undated ICRC Victim Identification Form for Mr Mile Buljević, apparently completed by the ICRC between 1 July and 20 September 2001 (see § 25 above). Besides reflecting his personal details and ante-mortem description, this form provides names and contact details of Mr Mile Buljević’s brother, Mr S.B. (in a temporary centre for displaced persons in Serbia proper), and the complainant (her home address in Serbia proper and the telephone number). It is also reflected there that Mr M.J. was abducted together with Mr Mile Buljević, but that the former was “thrown out of the jeep”; the form also mentions that Mr M.J. is accommodate in another IDP centre in Serbia proper.

29. The file contains a one-page printout from the MPU database in relation to the case no. 2002-000374, generated on 25 November 2004, briefly reflecting Mr Mile Buljević’s personal details and the circumstances of his disappearance, including a reference to Mr M.J.; this entry in the MPU database was made on 15 May 2002. A copy of the MPU Case Continuation Report on case no. 2002-000374 has two entries, dated 15 and 16 May 2002, reflecting that the case details had been entered in the MPU database.

30. The next document in the file is an MPU Victim Identification Form, dated 30 November 2005, in relation to the complainant’s brother, which provides the same information as in the above-referred ICRC form.

31. The file further contains an MPU Ante-Mortem Investigation Report on the case no. 2002-000374 in relation to Mr Mile Buljević, also bearing a number 0853/INV/04. According to this report, the case was started on 1 December 2004 and completed on 24 December 2004. The fields “Data of the Witness” on the front page is empty; the field “Suspect” reads “NIL”.

32. The field “Summary of Information Received to Initiate the Investigation” of this report reads: “No sufficient data available in the Victim Identification Form”. The fields “Nature of Information” and “Background of the Case” both reflect that Mr Mile Buljević has been missing since 25 June 1999, that the case had been reported to the ICRC and registered under no. ICRC/BLG-800666-01, and that the MPU had opened a file no. 2002-000374. The field “Further Investigation” reads: “Investigation was aimed at to find out how the victim disappeared, what was the possible cause of his disappearance, who was engaged in the incident etc. The [investigator] tried to contact with the next-of-kin of the MP [missing person] but it was not possible. It is seen from the file that Buljevic Mile was taken together with [M.J.] but the latter was thrown out from the jeep. No witnesses available for this case at the moment. The case requires more investigation.” Nevertheless, this report ends with a conclusion: “After investigations, it’s impossible at this time to find an impartial witness.
No information leading to a possible MP’s location. This case should remain open pending within the WCU.” It is signed by an MPU investigator and approved by his supervisor.

33. Also in the file is a printout of the MPU database, generated on 25 December 2004, providing very brief details of the case no. 0853/INV/04, cross-linked to the case no. 2002-000374. Its field “Request Summary” reads: “There is a lack of information in the file” and the field “Results” reads “Pending.”

34. The file also contains two identical translations of the same complainant’s criminal report addressed to an international prosecutor at the Prishtinë/Priština District Public Prosecutor’s Office. The first translation has a handwritten mark “2005-00097” on top of the front page; the translator’s note at the “footer” part on each page indicates that the translation was created on 2 February 2005. The second translation is marked “CCIU Case No. 2000-00097” on top; this document was apparently created on 18 August 2005. Both documents provide a brief summary of Mr Mile Buljević’s abduction, but they have no reference to any witnesses.

35. The last document in the file resent to the Panel is the “Case Analysis Review Report” by UNMIK Police WCIU “Antemortem and Exhumation Section”, dated 5 September 2008. This report cross-references to the MPU cases nos 0853/INV/04 and 2002-000374, as well as to WCIU case no. 2005-00097. The current status of the case is marked as “pending” for a reason “waiting for further information”. The field “Comments of Reviewing Officer” mentions that “the [victim] was taken from a Pristina hotel with M.J. There are no further details and no witnesses have been found. Identification has not happened. The case may be kept pending”. The field “Blood Samples Collection for DNA” states “no information” and the case is categorised as “low” priority.

III. THE COMPLAINT

36. The complainant complains about UNMIK’s alleged failure to properly investigate the abduction and disappearance of her brother. In this regard the Panel deems that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

37. The complainant also complains about the mental pain and suffering allegedly caused to her by this situation. In this regard, the Panel deems that the complainant relies on Article 3 of the ECHR.

IV. THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR

1. The scope of the Panel’s review

38. In determining whether it considers that there has been a violation of Article 2 (procedural limb) of the ECHR, the Panel is mindful of the existing case-law, notably that of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Panel is also aware that the complaints
before it differ in some significant ways from those brought before that Court. First, the respondent is not a State but an interim international territorial administration mandated to exercise temporary responsibilities in Kosovo. No suspicion attaches to UNMIK with respect to the substantive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. Second, as in a limited number of cases before the European Court, those suspected of being responsible for the alleged killings and/or abductions are in all cases before the Panel non-state actors, mostly but not exclusively connected to the conflict. These are factors for the Panel to take into consideration as it assesses for the first time the procedural positive obligations of an intergovernmental organisation with respect to acts committed by third parties in a territory over which it has temporary legislative, executive and judicial control.

39. Before turning to the examination of the merits of the complaint, the Panel needs to clarify the scope of its review.

40. The Panel notes that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under the following human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocols thereto, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

41. The Panel also notes that Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel provides that the Panel “shall examine complaints from any person or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by UNMIK of (their) human rights”. It follows that only acts or omissions attributable to UNMIK fall within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Panel. In this respect, it should be noted, as stated above, that as of 9 December 2008, UNMIK no longer exercises executive authority over the Kosovo judiciary and law enforcement machinery. Therefore UNMIK bears no responsibility for any violation of human rights allegedly committed by those bodies. Insofar as the complainant complains about acts that occurred after that date, they fall outside the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Panel.

42. Likewise, the Panel emphasises that, as far as its jurisdiction ratione materiae is concerned, as follows from Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, it can only examine complaints relating to an alleged violation of human rights. This means that it can only review acts or omissions complained of for their compatibility with the international human rights instruments referred to above (see § 31). In the particular case of killings and disappearances in life-threatening circumstances, it is not the Panel’s role to replace the competent authorities in the investigation of the case. Its task is limited to examining the effectiveness of the criminal investigation into such killings and disappearances, in the light of the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 of the ECHR.

43. The Panel further notes that Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 provides that the Panel shall have jurisdiction over complaints relating to alleged violations of human rights
“that had occurred not earlier than 23 April 2005 or arising from facts which occurred prior to this date where these facts give rise to a continuing violation of human rights”. It follows that events that took place before 23 April 2005 generally fall outside the jurisdiction *ratione temporis* of the Panel. However, to the extent that such events gave rise to a continuing situation, the Panel has jurisdiction to examine complaints relating to that situation (see European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Grand Chamber [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, nos. 16064/90 and others, judgment of 18 September 2009, §§ 147-149; ECtHR, *Cyprus v. Turkey* [GC] no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 136, ECHR 2001-IV).

2. The Parties’ submissions

44. The complainant in substance alleges violations concerning the lack of an adequate criminal investigation into the abduction and disappearance of her brother. The complainant also states that she was not informed as to whether an investigation was conducted at all, and what the outcome was.

45. In his comments on the merits of the complaint under Article 2, the SRSG accepts that Mr Mile Buljević disappeared in life threatening circumstances. He notes that “in June 1999, the security situation in post-conflict Kosovo remained tense, KFOR was still in the process of reaching sufficient strength to maintain public safety and law and order and there were a number of serious criminal incidents targeting Kosovo-Serbs, including abductions and killings.”

46. The SRSG accepts UNMIK’s responsibility to conduct an investigation in the case of Mr Mile Buljević under Article 2 of the ECHR, procedural part. In the words of the SRSG, “the essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life, as defined by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo of 25 July 1999 and subsequently, by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo of 12 December 1999, as amended.”

47. The SRSG notes that “the procedural element of Article 2 is essentially two-fold: (i) an obligation to determine through investigation the fate and/or whereabouts of the missing person; and (ii) an obligation to conduct an investigation capable of determining whether the death was caused unlawfully and leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the disappearance and/or death of the victim.”

48. The SRSG further observes that when determining applications under Article 2, procedural part, consideration must be given to not imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden on UNMIK. In this regard, the SRSG recalls the judgment of 15 February 2011 rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in the case *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, stating at paragraph 70:

“The Court takes into account the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the first ten years following the war. In such a post-conflict situation, what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and context. In this connection, the Court notes that more than 100,000 people were killed, almost 30,000 people went missing and more than two million people were
displaced during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inevitably choices had to be made in terms of post-war priorities and resources.”

49. In the view of the SRSG, in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, UNMIK was faced with a similar situation as the one in Bosnia. Many of those persons who were unaccounted for were abducted, killed and buried in unmarked graves inside or outside Kosovo, which made very difficult locating and recovering their mortal remains.

50. In June 2002, UNMIK created the OMPF with the mandate to determine the fate of the missing; however its work was faced with many challenges at the beginning of the operations, due to the work previously done mostly by actors independent from UNMIK. In particular, the SRSG states that the collection of evidence of war crimes began with the arrival of NATO in 1999 with independent teams from several countries operating under the loose coordination of the ICTY. A lack of standard operating procedures or centralisation led to problems with the evidence gathered in this phase. In 2000, the ICTY launched a large, centralised forensic operation, based at the Rahovec/Orahovac mortuary, with standard operating procedures for all forensic teams except the British one, which operated independently out of Prishtinë/Pristina. The SRSG states that, in the effort to demonstrate that crimes were systematic and widespread, the ICTY teams conducted autopsies on as many bodies as possible, carrying out little or no identification work; moreover, unidentified bodies exhumed in 1999 were reburied in locations still unknown to the OMPF. After the ICTY closed their operation in 2000, the UNMIK Police MPU continued small-scale investigations on missing persons “ex-officio, without any broader prosecutorial strategy”. As a consequence, a large amount of unstructured information was collected.

51. The SRSG states that locating and identifying the missing in the context described above is a very difficult and time-consuming task. He further states that the number of missing persons recovered and identified by OMPF is “testament to the vigour of its work between 2002-2008” and that “more bodies continued to be located in burial sites and more identifications and returns to family members are taking place, often based on information contained in UNMIK-OMPF files”. The SRSG continues that therefore “it is apparent that the process for establishing a system capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law has been an understandably incremental one” in Kosovo as reflected in the Palić case referred to above. The SRSG further notes that this process was “reliant on a number of actors rather than just UNMIK, for example the International Commission on Missing Persons, the International Committee of the Red Cross and local missing persons organisations.”

52. The SRSG further argues that fundamental to conducting effective investigations “is a professional, well trained and well resourced police force” and that “[s]uch a force did not exist in Kosovo in 1999 and had to be established from scratch and progressively developed.” In the policing vacuum following the end of the conflict, UNMIK had to build a new Kosovo Police Service, a long and challenging task, which, according to the SRSG, is still in progress. The SRSG also states that UNMIK Police faced numerous challenges in exercising law enforcement functions gradually transferred to it by KFOR in 1999 - 2000. In this regard, he refers to the UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000 describing the situation as follows:
“UNMIK Police had to deal with in the aftermath of war, with dead bodies and the looted and burned houses. Ethnic violence flared through illegal evictions, forcible takeovers of properties, the burning of houses and physical violence against communities all over Kosovo. Tempers and tensions were running high amongst all ethnic groups, exacerbated by reports of missing and dead persons. It became imperative for UNMIK Police to establish order and to quickly construct a framework to register and investigate crimes.

All of this had to be done with limited physical and human resources. Being the first executive mission in the history of the UN, the concept, planning and implementation was being developed on the ground. With 20 different contributory nationalities at the beginning, it was a very challenging task for police managers to establish common practices for optimum results in a high-risk environment.”

53. The SRSG states that UNMIK international police officers working on cases of missing persons had to adjust to conducting investigations in a foreign territory and country, with limited support from the still developing Kosovo Police. He further states that these investigators were often faced with situations where individuals holding relevant knowledge on the whereabouts and fate of missing persons did not want to disclose this information. According to the SRSG, all these constraints inhibited the ability of the UNMIK Police to conduct investigations according to the standards that may be expected from States with more established institutions and which are not faced with the high number of cases of this nature associated with a post-conflict situation.

54. With regard to the part of the investigations aimed at establishing the fate of Mr Mile Buljević, the SRSG considers that the matter was reported to UNMIK Police some time in 2000 (judging by the case number 2000-00097, see § 34 above). The SRSG continues that “a number of additional pieces of information on the alleged abduction of Mr. Buljević are to be found in different documents, either submitted by the Complainant to the [Panel] or provided by EULEX, produced at different dates and often without clear cross-references which may possibly provide a coherent picture of the … incident, as necessary for a prompt and effective Police investigation in this matter.”

55. The SRSG further notes that the complainant’s submission to the Panel, dated 7 December 2010, does not name Mr M.J., although she refers to a person being also abducted but shortly thereafter “thrown out” of the vehicle by the persons who eventually took away Mr Mile Buljević. This is despite the fact that the ICRC Victim Identification Form refers to Mr M.J. by name. The SRSG likewise refers to the MPU Ante-Mortem Investigation Report (mentioned in §§ 29 - 32 above) and the WCIU Case Analysis Review Report (§ 35 above).

56. The SRSG stresses “[a] poor degree of cooperation of the victim’s family with UNMIK’s investigator” and asserts that Mr Mile Buljević’s family members may have never approached UNMIK directly, but their reports instead had reached UNMIK presumably through KFOR, the ICRC or other organisations. In the SRSG’s view, it is also not clear “who exactly reported to which institution immediately after the incident and how much relevant information was provided to KFOR, to the ICRC and to UNMIK since the very beginning.” According to the SRSG, the fact that Mr M.J. and his wife may not have
provided their contact details to KFOR and the ICRC when they reported the abduction of Mr Mile Buljević, may explain why UNMIK never interviewed them as eye-witnesses.

57. The SRSG further contests whether the complainant’s criminal report to the international prosecutor was actually ever received by UNMIK authorities, as “this document was submitted by the Complainant to the HRAP on plain paper and without a stamp of a receiving judicial authority”. He also notes that the level of detail in relation to the abduction provided by the complainant in her submission to the Panel is very poor and that she had disclosed additional relevant details to the Panel only in December 2010.

58. The SRSG concludes that “the file … indicates that during the period under review by the [Panel], the information available to UNMIK police was not only second-hand but also clearly insufficient to develop any investigative leads which UNMIK Police could concretely follow up.” He also notes that “without witnesses coming forward or physical evidence being discovered, police investigations inevitably stall because of a lack of evidence.”

59. In the SRSG’s opinion, in this case UNMIK acted in accordance with the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the ECHR, “by opening and pursuing an investigation to determine whether there was an unlawful disappearance, and to identify and punish individual(s) responsible for the disappearance … of Mr. Buljević.” Thus, according to the SRSG, there has been no violation of Article 2.

60. The SRSG also informed the Panel that he might make further comments on this matter, “[a]s there is a possibility that additional and conclusive information exists”, beyond the documents presented to the Panel. However, no further communication in this regard, other than confirmation of the full disclosure of the investigative files, has been received to date.

3. The Panel’s assessment

61. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural obligation stemming from the right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in that UNMIK Police did not conduct an effective investigation into Mr Mile Buljević’s abduction and disappearance.

a) Submission of relevant files

62. At Panel’s request, on 16 August 2013, the SRSG provided copies of the “very limited” documents related to this investigation, which UNMIK was able to recover. As mentioned above (see § 60), the SRSG also noted that more information, not contained in the presented documents, may exist in relation to this case. On 16 September 2013, UNMIK confirmed to the Panel that no more files have been located, thus the disclosure may be considered complete (see § 9 above).

63. The Panel notes that Section 15 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 states that the Panel may request the submission from UNMIK of any documents and that the SRSG shall cooperate with the Panel and provide the necessary assistance including, in particular, in the release of documents and information relevant to the complaint. The Panel in this regard refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that inferences shall be
drawn from the conduct of the respondent party during the proceedings, including from its failure “to submit information in their hands without a satisfactory explanation” (see ECtHR, Çelikbilek v. Turkey, no. 27693/95, judgment of 31 May 2005, § 56).

64. The Panel also notes that the proper maintenance of investigative files concerning crimes such as killings and disappearances, from the opening of the investigations to their handing over, is crucial to the continuation of such investigations and failure to do so could thus raise per se issues under Article 2.

65. The Panel has no reason to doubt that UNMIK undertook all efforts in order to obtain the relevant investigative documents. However, UNMIK has not provided any explanation as to why the documentation may be incomplete, nor with respect to which parts.

66. The Panel itself is not in the position to verify the completeness of the investigative files received. The Panel will therefore assess the merits of the complaint on the basis of documents made available (in this sense, see ECtHR, Tsechoyev v. Russia, no. 39358/05, judgment of 15 March 2011, § 146).

b) General principles concerning the obligation to conduct an effective investigation under Article 2

67. The Panel notes that the positive obligation to investigate disappearances is widely accepted in international human rights law since at least the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velásquez-Rodríguez (see Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4). The positive obligation has also been stated by the HRC as stemming from Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment) and Article 9 (right to liberty and security of person), read in conjunction with Article 2(3) (right to an effective remedy) of the ICCPR (see HRC, General Comment No. 6, 30 April 1982, § 4; HRC, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, §§ 8 and 18, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13; see also, among others, HRC, Mohamed El Awani, v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, communication no. 1295/2004, views of 11 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004). The obligation to investigate disappearances and killings is also asserted in the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (A/Res/47/133, 18 December 1992), and further detailed in UN guidelines such as the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1991) and the “Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries into Allegations of Massacres” (1995). The importance of the obligation is confirmed by the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2006, which entered into force on 23 December 2010.

68. In order to address the complainant’s allegations, the Panel refers, in particular, to the well-established case-law of the European Court on Human Rights on the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court has held that “[The] obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed (see, mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27
September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324; and ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, § 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; see also ECtHR, Jasinsky v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, judgment of 21 December 2010, § 71). The duty to conduct such an investigation arises in all cases of killing and other suspicious death, whether the perpetrators were private persons or State agents or are unknown (see ECtHR, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, judgment of 5 November 2009, § 191).

69. The European Court has also stated that the procedural obligation to provide some form of effective official investigation exists also when an individual has gone missing in life-threatening circumstances and is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the disappearance was caused by an agent of the State (see ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 43 above, at § 136).

70. The authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention, and they cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedure (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkân and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, judgment of 6 April 2004, § 310; see also ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, § 210).

71. Setting out the standards of an effective investigation, the Court has stated that “beside being independent, accessible to the victim’s family, carried out with reasonable promptness and expedition, affording a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation and its results, the investigation must also be effective in the sense that is capable of leading to a determination of whether the death was caused unlawfully and if so, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 43 above, at § 191; see also ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, judgment of 15 February 2011, § 63). This is not an obligation of results but of means. The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkân and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 312; and Isayeva v. Russia, cited above, § 212).

72. In particular, the investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible (see ECtHR, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, cited in § 68 above, at § 201). Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. They must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of the investigation work (see ECtHR, Velcea and Mazărev. Romania, no. 64301/01, judgment of 1 December 2009, § 105).

73. Even with regard to persons disappeared and later found dead, which is not the situation in the present case, the Court has stated that the procedures of exhuming and identifying
mortal remains do not exhaust the obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court holds that “the procedural obligation arising from a disappearance will generally remain as long as the whereabouts and fate of the person are unaccounted for, and it is thus of a continuing nature” (ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 71 above, at § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 43 above, at § 148, Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944/06 and others, judgment of 18 December 2012, § 122). However, the Court also stresses that this procedural obligation “does not come to an end even on discovery of the body ... This only casts light on one aspect of the fate of the missing person and the obligation to account for the disappearance and death, as well as to identify and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally remain” (ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 145). While the location and the subsequent identification of the mortal remains of the victim may in themselves be significant achievements, the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to exist (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, § 64).

74. On the requirement of public scrutiny, the Court has further stated that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim's next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited in § 70 above, at §§ 311-314; ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, cited in § 70 above, at §§ 211-214 and the cases cited therein; ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 2011, no. 55721/07, § 167, ECHR 2011).

75. The Court has also underlined the great importance of an effective investigation in establishing the truth of what transpired, not only for the families of victims, but also for other victims of similar crimes, as well as the general public, who have the right to know what occurred (ECtHR [GC], El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 39630/09, judgment of 13 December 2012, § 191). The United Nations also recognises the importance of the right to truth. In the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, “the right to truth implies knowing the full and complete truth about the violations and the events that transpired, their specific circumstances and who participated in them. In the case of missing persons … it also implies the right to know the fate and whereabouts of the victim” (see Report of the UN Secretary-General, Missing Persons, UN Document A/67/267, 8 August 2012, § 5; see also UN Human Rights Council, Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12: Right to the Truth, 24 September 2008 and 12 October 2009; see also the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for gross and systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorist initiatives; UN Document A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013).

c) Applicability of Article 2 to the Kosovo context

76. The Panel is conscious that the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević took place shortly after the deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the armed conflict, when crime, violence and insecurity were rife.
77. On his part, the SRSG does not contest that UNMIK had a duty to investigate the present case under ECHR Article 2. However, according to the SRSG, the unique circumstances pertaining to the Kosovo context and to UNMIK’s deployment in the first phase of its mission shall be taken into account when assessing whether this investigation is in compliance with Article 2 of the ECHR. In substance, the SRSG argues that it is not possible to apply to UNMIK the same standards applicable to a State in a normal situation.

78. The Panel considers that this raises two main questions: first, whether the standards of Article 2 continue to apply in situation of conflict or generalised violence and, second, whether such standards shall be considered fully applicable to UNMIK.

79. As regards the applicability of Article 2 to UNMIK, the Panel recalls that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under certain international human rights instruments, including the ECHR. In this respect, the Panel has already found that it is true that UNMIK’s interim character and related difficulties must be duly taken into account with regard to a number of situations, but under no circumstances could these elements be taken as a justification for diminishing standards of respect for human rights, which were duly incorporated into UNMIK’s mandate (see HRAP, Milogorić and Others, nos. 38/08 and others, opinion of 24 March 2011, § 44; Berisha and Others, nos. 27/08 and others, opinion of 23 February 2011, § 25; Lalić and Others, nos. 09/08 and others, opinion of 9 June 2012, § 22).

80. Concerning the applicability of Article 2 to situations of conflict or generalised violence, the Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has established the applicability of Article 2 to post-conflict situations, including in countries of the former Yugoslavia (see, among other examples, ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 71 above, and ECtHR, Jularić v. Croatia, no. 20106/06, judgment of 20 January 2011). The Court has further held that that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in “difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict” (see ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited in § 74 above, at § 164; see also ECtHR, Güleç v. Turkey, judgment of 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 70 above, at §§ 85-90, 309-320 and 326-330; Isayeva v. Russia, cited in § 70 above, at §§ 180 and 210; ECtHR, Kanlibaş v. Turkey, no. 32444/96, judgment of 8 December 2005, §§ 39-51).

81. The Court has acknowledged that “where the death [and disappearances] to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and […] concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed” (see, ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 164; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, judgment of 27 July 2006, § 121). Nonetheless, the Court has held that “the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged

82. Similarly, the HRC has held that the right to life, including its procedural guarantees, shall be considered as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (see, HRC, General Comment No. 6, cited in § 67 above, at § 1; HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation*, communication no. 1447/2006, views of 22 April 2009, § 11.2, CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006). Further, the HRC has stated the applicability of Article 2 (3), 6 and 7 of the ICCPR with specific reference to UNMIK’s obligation to conduct proper investigations on disappearances and abductions in Kosovo (see HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 14 August 2006, §§ 12-13, CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1).

83. The Panel appreciates the difficulties encountered by UNMIK during the first phase of its deployment. The Panel notes that the appropriate importance attached to the issue of missing persons in Kosovo meant that UNMIK had to take into account both the humanitarian and criminal dimensions of the situation. In particular, the Panel considers that the importance attached to the criminal investigations and the difficulties in Kosovo that limited the abilities of investigating authorities to conduct such investigations, as described by the SRSG, made it crucial that UNMIK establish from the outset an environment conducive to the performance of meaningful investigations. This would involve putting in place a system that would include such elements as the allocation of overall responsibility for the supervision and monitoring of progress in investigations, provision for the regular review of the status of investigations, and a process for the proper handover of cases between different officers or units of UNMIK Police. Such a system should also take account of the protection needs of victims and witnesses (see, *mutatis mutandis*, ECtHR, *R.R. and Others v. Hungary*, no. 19400/11, judgment of 4 December 2012, §§ 28-32), as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations (see ECtHR [GC], *Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan*, no. 40167/06, decision of 14 December 2011, § 145; and ECtHR [GC], *Chiragov and Others v. Armenia*, no. 13216/05, decision of 14 December 2011, § 146). While understanding that the deployment and the organisation of the police and justice apparatus occurred gradually, the Panel deems that this process was completed in 2003 when the police and justice system in Kosovo was described as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” by the UN Secretary-General (see § 17 above).

84. The Panel further notes that its task is not to review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations *in abstracto*, but only in relation to their specific application to the particular circumstances of a situation subject of a complaint before it (see, ECtHR, *Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom*, judgment of 29 November 1988, § 53, Series A no. 145-B). The Panel thus agrees with the SRSG that the nature and degree of scrutiny to determine whether the effectiveness of the investigation satisfies the minimum threshold depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For...
these reasons, the Panel considers that it will establish with regard to each case if all reasonable steps were taken to conduct an effective investigation as prescribed by Article 2, having regard to the realities of the investigative work in Kosovo.

85. Lastly, in response to the SRSG’s objection that Article 2 must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, either in the context of policing activities or that of priorities and resources, the Panel takes into account that the European Court has established that what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and contexts (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 71 above, at § 70; Brecknell v. The United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, judgment of 27 November 2007, § 62).

d) Compliance with Article 2 in the present case

86. Turning to the particulars of this case, the Panel notes the complainant’s statement that the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević was reported promptly to KFOR and later to the ICRC and other organisations.

87. In this regard, the SRSG, judging by the case number 2000-00097 affixed to the complainant’s criminal report to the international prosecutor, asserts that UNMIK became aware of this some time in 2000 (see § 54 above). Being unable to verify this fact, the Panel considers that certainly by October 2001, UNMIK was made aware about Mr Mile Buljević’s disappearance by the ICRC (see § 25 above) and that by May 2002 UNMIK Police had registered a case in this regard (see § 29 above).

88. The purpose of this investigation was to discover the truth about the events leading to the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević, to establish his fate and to identify the perpetrators. To fulfil these purposes, those conducting the investigation were required to seek, collect and preserve evidentiary material; to identify possible witnesses and to obtain their statements; to identify the perpetrator(s) and bring them before a competent court established by law.

89. The Panel recalls that in order to be effective, the investigative actions must be conducted promptly and expeditiously, with the authorities taking all reasonable steps and following obvious lines of enquiry to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence etc. The investigation must also ensure a sufficient element of public scrutiny and be reasonably accessible to the victim’s family. The investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. In addition, the investigation should be periodically reviewed, in order to ensure that all available information is considered. As the obligation to investigate is not an obligation of results but of means, in assessing the investigation’s effectiveness, the circumstances of the particular case and the practical realities of the investigative work must be taken into consideration (see §§ 71 - 72 above).

90. The Panel notes that there were obvious shortcomings in the conduct of the investigation from its inception. However, in light of the considerations developed above concerning its limited temporal jurisdiction (see § 43 above), the Panel recalls that it is competent ratione temporis to evaluate the compliance of the investigation with Article 2 of the ECHR only for the period after 23 April 2005, while taking into consideration the state of the case at
that date (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 71 above, at § 70). The period under review ends on 9 December 2008, with EULEX taking over responsibility in the area of administration of justice (see § 20 above).

91. The Panel notes in this regard that according to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, the complete executive policing powers in the Prishtinë/Priština region, including criminal investigations, were under the full control of UNMIK Police from 19 September 1999. Therefore, it was UNMIK’s responsibility to ensure, first, that the investigation is conducted expeditiously and efficiently; second, that all relevant investigative material is properly handed over to the authority taking over responsibility for the investigation (EULEX); and third, that the investigative files could be traced and retrieved, should a need for that arise at any later stage.

92. Having noted the SRSG’s assertion that the file submitted to the Panel may be incomplete, and the lack of further explanation in relation to this (see § 60 above), the Panel assumes that UNMIK cannot guarantee whether the file presented to the Panel is complete or not. In case it is not complete, it would indicate that one of the following situations may have occurred: no proper investigation was carried out; the file was not accurately and fully handed over to EULEX; or UNMIK failed to retrieve the complete file from the current custodian. The Panel has already noted above that it has no reason to doubt UNMIK’s good faith in seeking to provide the complete investigative file for its review (see § 65 above). However, the Panel considers that whichever of these potential explanations is applicable, it would indicate a failure directly attributable to UNMIK, either when it was exercising its executive functions, or in its current capacity.

93. With regard to the first part of the procedural obligation, that is establishing the fate of Mr Mile Buljević, the Panel notes that his whereabouts remain unknown. The Panel notes that ante-mortem information concerning the complainant’s missing brother had been gathered by the ICRC, between 1 June and 20 September 2001 (see § 25 above). However, according to the relevant entry in the ICMP database, sufficient DNA reference samples that would make identification possible have not been collected (ibid.).

94. In this respect, the Panel notes that the collection of the DNA samples is of itself an essential action that secures the necessary material for any future comparative examination and possible identification of located mortal remains. However, in this case, first, such samples have still not been collected, fourteen years after Mr Mile Buljević was allegedly abducted, and, second, there is no explanation offered by the authorities as to why this has not been done. The Panel further notes that nine years of this period (1999-2008) fall under the period when UNMIK exercised full authority over Kosovo and that the period of inaction starting from 23 April 2005, until the end of UNMIK’s executive mandate in the field of justice, falls within the Panel’s temporal jurisdiction (see § 43 above).

95. It is widely accepted that the only way to have a certain identification of mortal remains after such a long period of time would be through comparison of samples of DNA material. Thus, the collection of sufficient samples from the next-of-kin of a missing person becomes imperative, and without this the chances to establish the identity of mortal remains, if found, are very slim. Therefore, since the ongoing failure to collect such samples seriously undermines the possibility of identifying Mr Mile Buljević’s mortal remains (in case they have been or will be found), the Panel considers that the first part of the procedural
obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR is not satisfied (compare with the Panel’s approach in the case P.S., no. 48/09, opinion of 31 October 2013, § 95).

96. The Panel will now turn to the investigation carried out by UNMIK Police with the aim of identification of perpetrators and bringing them to justice, that is the second element of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR.

97. As regards the requirements of promptness and expedition, the Panel is mindful that in any investigation, and particularly in an investigation of a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances, the initial stage is of the utmost importance, and it serves two main purposes: to identify the direction of the investigation and ensure preservation and collection of evidence for future possible court proceedings (see the Panel’s position on a similar matter expressed in the case X., nos. 326/09 and others, opinion of 6 June 2013, § 81).

98. In this respect the Panel recalls the complainant’s statement that her brother’s abduction and disappearance was immediately reported to KFOR by another brother (see § 24 above). As established above, UNMIK became aware of the disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević by October 2001 and the investigation into the matter was opened by UNMIK Police by May 2002 (see § 87 above). However, no immediate action by UNMIK Police whatsoever, except for probably making an initial assessment of the information, registering of the case and entering the information into the database, is reflected in the investigative file. Thus, in the Panel’s view, this investigation obviously failed to fulfill the requirements of promptness and expeditiousness.

99. With respect to the SRSG’s statement relating to the probable lack of a prompt and direct report to UNMIK authorities (see § 56 above), the Panel notes that according to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, the first two UNMIK Police officers had arrived in Kosovo on 13 June 1999, “as a part of the advance team of civilian staff”. According to the same report, “the first [larger] group of 27 international civilian police … arrived … on 27 June 1999 and were deployed on 3 July 1999 to five locations within Kosovo.” As it was obviously not possible to report anything to UNMIK police on the date when Mr Mile Buljević was abducted, the complainant’s other brother reported the matter to KFOR.

100. Mr Mile Buljević’s brother and the eye-witnesses (Mr M.J. and his wife) apparently left Kosovo shortly thereafter and became displaced persons in Serbia proper, as is seen from the ICRC Victim Identification Form (see § 28 above). In this respect, the Panel recalls the need to take into account the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations (see § 83 above). Thus, in the Panel’s view, it was for UNMIK to reach out to them, and not for them to come back to Kosovo, from where they left for security reasons, to try to find out what had happened to their relative or to the investigation.

101. The Panel notes that it is not clear whether KFOR had passed to UNMIK Police the necessary information to initiate a meaningful investigation in September 1999, when had assumed the complete executive policing powers in Prishtinë/Priština region (see § 91 above). However, as it was shown above, by May 2002 UNMIK Police possessed all the necessary information (see §§ 28 and 87 above). In any event, the first and the only substantive action by UNMIK Police in this case, although not properly recorded and obviously not successful, was an attempt to contact an unidentified next-of-kin of Mr
Buljević, which was reportedly undertaken in December 2004 (see § 32 above), which is two and a half years after the case had been opened. Thus, in Panel’s view, there is an obvious failure of the requirements to conduct an investigation promptly and expeditiously.

102. Assessing this investigation against the need to take reasonable investigative steps and to follow the obvious lines of enquiry to obtain evidence, the Panel takes into account that a properly maintained investigative file should have included records of all investigative actions and particularly of the interviews with the complainant, suspects and all potential witnesses to the disappearance. In all cases, such interviews should take place as soon as possible and should be recorded and retained in the case file⁶.

103. The Panel notes in this context that the investigative file loosely reflects a single attempt by UNMIK Police to contact a victim’s next-of-kin in order to obtain additional information, not even explaining which one and through which means (see § 32 above). In this respect, the Panel considers that this attempted contact with potential witnesses, more than five years after the abduction, was obviously belated and not even properly recorded. The Panel also notes with concern that the complainant still resides at the same address and keeps the same mobile phone number, as recorded in the ICRC Victim Identification Form (see § 28 above), which UNMIK Police received by May 2002. UNMIK Police had her contact details in November 2004, as they are fully set out in the MPU Victim Identification Form (see § 30 above).

104. This is especially important in view of the fact that the complainant knew of two eye-witnesses to the abduction and could have helped the police to locate them. On the other hand, as Mr M.J. was apparently accommodated in an IDP centre, he could have been located through the Serbian state institutions in charge of the registration and assistance to displaced persons.

105. The above observations respond to the SRSG’s arguments that UNMIK had probably not contacted and interviewed the witnesses because the latter failed to provide their contact details to the KFOR and the ICRC, when they reported the abduction, and on the poor level of cooperation of the victim’s family with UNMIK authorities (see § 56 above). The Panel rejects those arguments as unsubstantiated.

106. The police likewise never tried to identify the place where the abduction of Mr Mile Buljević took place, at least formally, to better understand the circumstances of the possible crime under investigation, which is a basic step in cases with so little evidence. The Panel also takes into account that in order to be adequate, the investigation into such grave crimes should also have included at least an interview with the complainant and a witness known to her, identifying and interviewing individuals residing at or located in the area of the alleged crime, especially those who were present there at the time of the abduction and who thus may have witnessed something (“canvassing” the area), as well as persons who knew the victims, as they might have knowledge of possible motives.

107. In addition, knowing that the victim had worked for a Serbian TV service, the chances of finding people who knew him personally appear to have been high and the RTS media

---

archives would most probably contain photo and video footage which could have helped in searching for him, or in his identification. However, none of these actions appear to have been undertaken.

108. With respect to the SRSG’s argument that UNMIK opened and pursued an investigation to determine whether there was an unlawful disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević and to identify and bring to justice those responsible (see § 60 above), the Panel notes that as shown above, the file does not reflect any substantive action in pursuit of those goals.

109. The Panel likewise recalls the SRSG’s argument that “without witnesses coming forward or physical evidence being discovered, police investigations inevitably stall because of lack of evidence” (see § 58 above). In this regard, the Panel must note that almost any investigation at its initial stage lacks a significant amount of information. Finding the necessary information to fill those gaps is the main goal of any investigative activity. Therefore, a lack of information should not be used as an argument to defend inaction by the investigative authorities. The file, as made available to the Panel, does not show any such activity. Thus, it appears that, instead of actively searching for information and leads, UNMIK Police simply waited for further information to appear by itself. In this situation it may have led to the loss of potential evidence (see e.g. HRAP, P.S., cited in § 95 above, at § 107).

110. In the Panel’s view, it is because of the lack of information at the initial stage that this case was made “open pending”, i.e. without any action by the MPU (see § 32 above). The Panel recalls in this regard its position in relation to the categorisation of cases into “active” and “inactive”, that any “categorisation of an investigation should take place only after the minimum possible investigative actions have been undertaken and obtainable information has been collected and analysed” (see e.g. HRAP, B.A., no. 52/09, opinion of 14 February 2013, § 82). In this case, such prioritisation should not have been made at the earliest stages, before the complainant and the witnesses had been interviewed about the circumstances of the disappearance, especially as it had occurred in obviously life-threatening circumstances, and all obtainable evidence had been collected.

111. The Panel notes in this context that if not worked upon, developed, corroborated by other evidence and put in a proper form, any information by itself, however good it might be in relation to a crime under investigation, does not solve it. In order to be accepted in court, information must become evidence, which can only happen through investigative actions undertaken in compliance with the applicable rules of criminal procedure. In this case, the Police appear to have never undertaken any action in this direction (see e.g. HRAP, Todorovski, case no. 81/09, opinion of 31 October 2013, § 116).

112. With regard to the SRSG’s argument that the complainant only disclosed some relevant information in her additional submission to the Panel in December 2010 (see § 57), the Panel notes that, first, most of that information was already in the investigative file and, second, it could have been easily obtained from the complainant, should any UNMIK Police have contacted her for it.

113. Coming to the period within its jurisdiction, starting from 23 April 2005, the Panel notes that after that critical date the failure to conduct the necessary investigative actions persisted, thus, in accordance with the continuing obligation to investigate (see § 73
above), bringing the assessment of the whole investigation within the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction.

114. In addition, the Panel considers that, as the mortal remains of Mr Mile Buljević had not been located and those responsible for the crime had not been identified, UNMIK Police was obliged to use the means at their disposal to regularly review the progress of the investigation to ensure that nothing had been overlooked and any new evidence had been considered, as well as to inform their relatives regarding the progress of this investigation.

115. The Panel understands from the file, that this investigation was reviewed by UNMIK Police twice: in December 2004 (see §§ 30 - 31 above) and in September 2008 (§ 35 above). As mentioned above, during the first review the MPU investigator failed to contact an unidentified victim’s next-of-kin, although the complainant’s proper address and telephone number were in the police file (see § 103). Without giving any reason for that, the same investigator concluded that in this case it was “impossible at this time to find an impartial witness” and de facto discontinued the investigation. The second review, in September 2008, was even less thorough, as the investigator even got the circumstances of the Mr Mile Buljević’s abduction wrong.

116. Therefore, in the Panel’s opinion, there was no adequate and thorough review of this case. Both case reviews appear to have been undertaken as mere formalities; as police failed to identify obvious gaps in the investigative process, relied upon unconfirmed or nonexistent facts, carried over the mistakes made by previous investigator(s) and even made new ones.

117. The apparent lack of any immediate reaction from UNMIK Police, and of any adequate action at later stages, may have suggested to perpetrators that the authorities were either not able, or not willing to investigate such criminal acts. Such an attitude of the authorities towards the gravest crimes in any society, and especially in post-conflict circumstances, inevitably creates a culture of impunity among the criminals and can only lead to a worsening of the situation. The problems which UNMIK had encountered at the beginning of its mission, which were discussed above, do not justify such inaction, either at the outset or subsequently.

118. The Panel is also aware that the duty to investigate is not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, such an investigation must be undertaken in a serious manner and not be a mere formality. The Panel considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, not all reasonable steps were taken by UNMIK towards locating the missing persons, identifying the perpetrators and to bring them to justice. In this sense the Panel considers that the investigation was not adequate and did not comply with the requirements of promptness, expedition and effectiveness (see § 89 above), as required by Article 2.

119. As concerns the requirement of public scrutiny, the Panel recalls that Article 2 also requires the victim’s next-of-kin to be involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.

120. As was shown above, the investigative file reflects only one, failed, attempt to contact Mr Mile Buljević’s next-of-kin, in December 2004 (see § 101). The only contact with the complainant and her other brother was made by ICRC staff, between July and September
2001 (see §§ 25 and 28 above). This should particularly be assessed in light of the fact that, at least from October 2001, UNMIK was informed about the alleged abduction and disappearance of the complainant’s brother in obviously life-threatening circumstances and that the investigation was lacking information. However, nothing was done in order to rectify these information gaps in the years to come. Likewise, the file indicates no action by international prosecutors with regard to the complainant’s criminal report, which was received and translated by UNMIK August 2005 (see § 34 above). The Panel therefore considers that the investigation was not open to any public scrutiny, as required by Article 2 of the ECHR.

121. Finally, the Panel recalls the SRSG’s own expressed dissatisfaction regarding the way information is presented in the available file, as pieces of information are found in different documents, either submitted by the complainant or provided by EULEX, produced at different dates and often without clear cross-references, which could have possibly provided a complete view of the incident (see § 54 above). Fully sharing the SRSG’s concern, the Panel, however, finds that in view of the circumstances of the present case, such a lack of structure and analysis of the scarce information available in the investigative file was not a cause of the failure of UNMIK Police to investigate this matter, but quite clearly the result of this failure.

122. In light of the deficiencies and shortcomings described above, the Panel concludes that UNMIK failed to carry out an effective investigation into the abduction and disappearance Mr Mile Buljević. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2, procedural limb, of the ECHR.

B. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the ECHR

123. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes, in substance, a violation of the right to be free from inhumane or degrading treatment, guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR.

1. The scope of the Panel’s review

124. The Panel will consider the allegations under Article 3 of the ECHR, applying the same scope of review as was set out with regard to Article 2 (see §§ 38 - 43 above).

125. The Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has found on many occasions that a situation of enforced disappearance gives rise to a violation of Article 3 in respect of close relatives of the victim. It emphasises that, concerning Article 3, “the essence of such a violation does not so much lie in the fact of the ‘disappearance’ of the family member but rather concerns the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention” (see, e.g., ECtHR [GC], Çakici v. Turkey, no. 23657/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, § 98, ECHR, 1999-IV; ECtHR [GC], Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 156, ECHR, 2001-IV; ECtHR, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, judgment of 18 June 2002, § 358; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, cited in § 81 above, at § 139; ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 71 above, at § 74; ECtHR, Alpatu Israilova v. Russia, no. 15438/05, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 69; see also HRAP, Zdravković, no. 46/08, decision of 17 April 2009, § 41). “It is especially in respect of the latter that a relative may claim directly to be a victim of the authorities’
conduct” (see, among others, ECtHR, *Er and Others v. Turkey*, no. 23016/04, judgment of 31 July 2012, § 94).

126. Lastly, where mental suffering caused by the authorities’ reactions to the disappearance is at stake, the alleged violation is contrary to the substantive element of Article 3 of the ECHR, not its procedural element, as is the case with regard to Article 2 (ECtHR, *Gelayevy v. Russia*, no. 20216/07, judgment of 15 July 2010, §§ 147-148).

2. The Parties’ submissions

127. The complainant alleges that the lack of information and certainty surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević, particularly because of UNMIK’s failure to properly investigate their disappearance, caused mental suffering to her and her family.

128. Commenting on this part of the complaint, the SRSG rejects the allegations. He underlines that there is no documents on record to indicate that the complainant or any other close relative made at any time inquiries with UNMIK MPU or WCIU. In turn, according to the SRSG, “UNMIK remained seized of the case … and tried to pursue investigations on the basis of very poor information.”

129. Further, the SRSG stresses, first, that the complainant did not witness the disappearance, neither was she in close proximity to the location at the time it occurred, and, second, that there were neither assertions made by her of any bad faith on the part of UNMIK personnel involved with the matter, nor evidence of any disregard for the seriousness of the matter or the emotions of the complainant and her family emanating from the disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević.

130. The SRSG concludes that the understandable and apparent mental anguish and suffering of the complainant cannot be attributed to UNMIK, but it is “rather a result of inherent suffering caused by the disappearance of a close family member.” Thus, according to the SRSG, the complainant’s suffering lacks a character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to the relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation.

131. Therefore, the SRSG requests the Panel to reject this part of the complaint, as there has not been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

3. The Panel’s assessment

a) General principles concerning the obligation under Article 3

132. Like Article 2, Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values in democratic societies (ECtHR, *Talat Tepe v. Turkey*, no. 31247/96, 21 December 2004, § 47; ECtHR [GC], *Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, no. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, *ECHR*, 2004-VII, § 424). As confirmed by the absolute nature conferred on it by Article 15 § 2 of the ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment still applies even in most difficult circumstances.
133. Setting out the general principles applicable to situations where violations of the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR are alleged, the Panel notes that the phenomenon of disappearance constitutes a complex form of human rights violation that must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion (see IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, cited in § 67 above, at § 150).

134. The Panel observes that the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR differs from the procedural obligation on the authorities under Article 2. Whereas the latter requires the authorities to take specific legal action capable of leading to identification and punishment of those responsible, the former is more general and humanitarian and relates to their reaction to the plight of the relatives of those who have disappeared or died.

135. The HRC has also recognised disappearances as a serious violation of human rights. In its decision of 21 July 1983, in the case Quinteros v. Uruguay, it stated that disappearances constitute serious violations of the rights of the disappeared person’s relatives, who suffer from deep anguish which persists for as long as the uncertainty concerning the fate of their loved one continues, often for many years (see HRC, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 138 (1990), § 14). Moreover, in its decision of 15 July 1994 in the case Mojica v. Dominican Republic, the HRC has deemed that “the disappearance of persons is inseparably linked to treatment that amounts to a violation of article 7 [of the Covenant]”, also prohibiting torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment (see HRC, Communication No. 449/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (1994), § 5.7).

136. With respect to the question whether a member of the family of a disappeared person can be considered the victim of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the Panel refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and to its own case law. The European Court accepts that this may be the case, depending on the existence of “special factors which give the suffering of the [family member] a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation”. The Court further holds that “relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie, the particular circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question, the involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person and the way in which the authorities responded to those enquiries” (see ECtHR, Basayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 15441/05 and 20731/04, judgment of 28 May 2009, § 159; ECtHR, Er and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 125 above, at § 94).

137. The Panel takes note that, when assessing the emotional suffering of the victims, the European Court also considers the following circumstances: the length of the disappearance itself and of the period with no information on the fate of the missing person and on the investigation undertaken by the authorities; the delay in initiation of criminal investigation into the disappearance; the absence of any “meaningful” action by the authorities, despite the fact that the complainants approached them to report the disappearance of their relative and to share with them the information they had; lack of any plausible explanation or information as to the fate of their missing relatives despite personal or written inquiries with official bodies (see, among others, ECtHR, Er and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 96; ECtHR, Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, no. 48804/99, judgment of 24 January 2008, § 97). Another factor leading to a finding of violation of
Article 3 of the ECHR is the continuous nature of the psychological suffering of relatives of a victim of a disappearance (ECtHR, Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005/08, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 201).

138. The HRC has also considered the issue and recognised family members of disappeared or missing persons as victims of a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant: parents (Boucherf v. Algeria, Communication No. 1196/2003, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.7, CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003), children (Zarzi v. Algeria, Communication No. 1780/2008, views of 22 March 2011, § 7.6, CCPR/C/101/D/1780/2008), siblings (El Abani v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 1640/2007, views of 26 July 2010, § 7.5, CCPR/C/99/D/1640/2007), spouses (Bousroual v. Algeria, Communication No. 992/2001, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.8, CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001), aunts and uncles (Benaniza v. Algeria, views of 26 July 2010, § 9.4, CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007) (Bashasha v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, views of 20 October 2010, § 7.2, CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008). It justifies this broad understanding of victim status by the suffering and distress that is caused to family members by the disappearance of an individual, which is often exacerbated by the authorities’ insufficient efforts to investigate the disappearance in order to establish the fate of the victim and to bring perpetrators to justice (Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 1751/2008, views of 25 October 2010, § 7.5, CCPR/C/100/D/1751/2008). In the case Amirov v. Russian Federation the Committee observed that “[w]ithout wishing to spell out all the circumstances of indirect victimisation, the Committee considers that the failure of a State party responsibly to discharge its obligations to investigate and clarify the circumstances of the harm suffered by the direct victim will be usually be a factor. Additional factors may be necessary. In the present case, the Committee notes the horrific conditions in which the author came to find his wife's mutilated remains (…), followed by the dilatory, sporadic measures undertaken to investigate the circumstances that have lead to the above findings of violations of articles 6 and 7, read together with article 2, paragraph 3. The Committee considers that, taken together, the circumstances require the Committee to conclude that the author's own rights under article 7 have also been violated” (HRC, Amirov v. Russian Federation, cited in § 82 above, at § 11.7).

139. The Panel also takes into account that according to the European Court, the analysis of the authorities’ reaction should not be confined to any specific manifestation of the authorities’ attitudes, isolated incidents or procedural acts; on the contrary, in the Court’s view, an assessment of the way in which the authorities of the respondent State reacted to the applicants’ enquiries should be global and continuous (see ECtHR, Aciş v. Turkey, no. 7050/05, judgment of 1 February 2011, § 45).

140. In this respect, it is the position of the European Court that findings under the procedural limb of Article 2 would also be of direct relevance in considering the existence of a violation of Article 3 (see ECtHR, Basayeva and Others v. Russia, cited in § 136 above, at § 109; ECtHR, Gelayev v. Russia, cited in § 126 above, at § 147; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, cited in § 81 above, at § 140).

141. The Panel observes that the European Court has already found violations of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to disappearances in which the State itself was found to be responsible for the abduction (see ECtHR, Luhayev and Others v. Russia, no. 69480/01, judgment of 9 November 2006, §§ 117-118; ECtHR, Kukayev v. Russia, no. 29361/02,
judgment of 15 November 2007, §§ 107-110). However, in contrast, in the case under the Panel’s consideration, in no way is UNMIK implicated in the actual disappearance and UNMIK cannot be held responsible for the applicant’s mental distress caused by the commission of the crime itself.

142. The Panel is mindful that in the absence of a finding of State responsibility for the disappearance, the European Court has ruled that it is not persuaded that the authorities’ conduct, albeit negligent to the extent that it has breached Article 2 in its procedural aspect, could have in itself caused the applicant mental distress in excess of the minimum level of severity, which is necessary in order to consider treatment as falling within the scope of Article 3 (see, among others, ECtHR, Tovsultanova v. Russia, no. 26974/06, judgment of 17 June 2010, § 104; ECtHR, Shafiyeva v. Russia, no. 49379/09, judgment of 3 May 2012, § 103).

**b) Applicability of Article 3 to the Kosovo context**

143. With regard to the applicability of the above standards to the Kosovo context, the Panel first refers to its view on the same issue with regard to Article 2, developed above (see §§ 76 - 85 above).

144. The Panel reiterates that a normally functioning law enforcement system should take into account the protection needs of victims and witnesses, as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations. The Panel has already considered the fact that by 2003 the police and justice system in Kosovo was described by the UN Secretary-General as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” (see § 18 above).

145. The Panel again notes that it will not review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations *in abstracto*, but only in relation to their specific application to the complaint before it, considering the particular circumstances of the case.

146. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it has to establish with regard to each case whether the attitude and reactions of UNMIK authorities to the disappearance itself and to the complainants’ quest for information with regard to the fate of their relatives and the criminal investigation, would amount to a violation of the obligation under Article 3, having regard to the realities in Kosovo at the relevant time.

**c) Compliance with Article 3 in the present case**

147. Against this background, the Panel discerns a number of factors in the present case which, taken together, raise the question of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

148. The Panel notes the proximity of the family ties between the complainant and Mr Mile Buljević, as he is her brother.

149. The Panel recalls the failure established above in relation to the procedural obligation under Article 2, despite the fact that UNMIK Police had the minimum necessary information to pursue investigation from the outset. The Panel further notes that the complainant was never contacted by UNMIK authorities at all, including for the purpose of gathering further information on the disappearance, providing an update in the
investigation, and involving her in the process of identification of Mr Mile Buljević. In this respect, the Panel reiterates that from the standpoint of Article 3 it may examine UNMIK’s reactions and attitudes to the complainant in their entirety.

150. As was shown above with regard to Article 2, no investigation, even a bare minimum, was conducted in this case. The complainant was never formally interviewed by either UNMIK Police or prosecutors; the ante-mortem data present in the investigative file was collected by the ICRC. Instead of investigating, the police was simply waiting for information to appear by itself. In this respect, the Panel considers that the SRSG’s comment that UNMIK remained seized of the case of Mr Mile Buljević and tried to pursue investigations (see § 128 above), used in relation to Article 3, does not reflect the reality of this investigation.

151. Also, while assessing the investigative process in this case against the requirements set forth under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the ECHR, the Panel has already rejected the SRSG’s arguments that the failure to contact and interview the complainant and other family members may have been caused by the lack of contact details and their lack of cooperation (see § 105). Drawing inferences from UNMIK’s failure to provide a plausible explanation for the absence of any contact with the complainant, the Panel considers that this situation, which continued into the period of the Panel’s temporal jurisdiction, caused grave uncertainty to the complainant and her family about Mr Mile Buljević’s fate and the status of the investigation. In addition, it seems to the Panel not fully appropriate to implicitly attribute this failure to the victim’s family.

152. In view of the above, the Panel concludes that the complainant has suffered severe distress and anguish for a prolonged and continuing period of time on account of the way the authorities of UNMIK have dealt with the case and as a result of her inability to find out what happened to her brother. In this respect, it is obvious that, in any situation, the pain of a sister who has to live in uncertainty about the fate of a close member of the family must be unbearable.

153. For the aforementioned reasons, the Panel concludes that, by its behaviour, UNMIK contributed to the complainant’s distress and mental suffering in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS

154. In light of the Panel’s findings in this case, the Panel is of the opinion that some form of reparation is necessary.

155. The Panel notes that enforced disappearances constitute serious violations of human rights which shall be investigated and prosecuted under any circumstances. The Panel also notes that UNMIK as the territorial administration of Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 had the primary responsibility to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević, and that its failure to do so constitutes a further serious violation of the rights of the victim and his next-of-kin, in particular the right to have the truth of the matter determined.
156. The Panel notes the SRSG’s own concerns that the inadequate resources, especially at the outset of UNMIK’s mission, made compliance with UNMIK’s human rights obligations difficult to achieve.

157. It would normally be for UNMIK to take the appropriate measures in order to put an end to the violation noted and to redress as far as possible the effects thereof. However, as the Panel noted above (see § 18), UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to the administration of justice in Kosovo ended on 9 December 2008, with EULEX assuming full operational control in the area of rule of law. UNMIK therefore is no longer in a position to take measures that will have a direct impact on the investigations that are still pending before EULEX or local authorities. Likewise, following the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on 17 February 2008 and subsequently, the entry into force of the Kosovo Constitution on 15 June 2008, UNMIK ceased to perform executive functions in Kosovo, this fact limiting its ability to provide full and effective reparation of the violation committed, as required by established principles of international human rights law.

158. The Panel considers that this factual situation does not relieve UNMIK from its obligation to redress as far as possible the effects of the violations for which it is responsible.

With respect to the complainant and the case the Panel considers appropriate that UNMIK:

- In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on situations of limited State jurisdiction (see ECtHR [GC], Ilăscu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, ECHR, 2004-VII, § 333; ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufidhi v. United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, judgment of 2 March 2010, § 171; ECtHR [GC]), Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, judgment of 19 October 2012, § 109), must endeavour, with all the diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis EULEX and the Kosovo authorities, to obtain assurances that the investigations concerning the case at issue will be continued in compliance with the requirements of an effective investigation as envisaged by Article 2, that the circumstances surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević will be established and that perpetrators will be brought to justice. The complainant and/or other next-of-kin shall be informed of such proceedings and relevant documents shall be disclosed to them, as necessary;

- Publicly acknowledges, within a reasonable time, responsibility with respect to UNMIK’s failure to adequately investigate abduction and disappearance of Mr Mile Buljević, as well as the distress and mental suffering subsequently incurred, and makes a public apology to the complainant and her family in this regard;

- Takes appropriate steps towards payment of adequate compensation to the complainant for the moral damage suffered due to UNMIK’s failure to conduct an effective investigation as well as for distress and mental suffering incurred by the complainant as a consequence of UNMIK’s behaviour.

The Panel also considers appropriate that UNMIK:
- In line with the UN General Assembly Resolution on “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (A/Res/60/147, 21 March 2006), takes appropriate steps, through other UN affiliated entities operating in Kosovo, local bodies and non-governmental organisations, for the realisation of a full and comprehensive reparation programme, including restitution compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, for the victims from all communities of serious violations of human rights which occurred during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict;

- Takes appropriate steps before competent bodies of the United Nations, including the UN Secretary-General, towards the allocation of adequate human and financial resources to ensure that international human rights standards are upheld at all times by the United Nations, including when performing administrative and executive functions over a territory, and to make provision for effective and independent monitoring;

FOR THESE REASONS,

The Panel, unanimously,

1. FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

2. FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

3. RECOMMENDS THAT UNMIK:

a. URGES EULEX AND OTHER COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF MR MILE BULJEVIĆ IS CONTINUED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THAT THE PERPETRATORS ARE Brought TO JUSTICE;

b. PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S BROTHER, AS WELL AS FOR DISTRESS AND MENTAL SUFFERING INCURRED, AND MAKES A PUBLIC APOLOGY TO THE COMPLAINANT AND HER FAMILY;

c. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS PAYMENT OF ADEQUATE COMPENSATION OF THE COMPLAINANT FOR MORAL DAMAGE IN RELATION TO THE FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 AND ARTICLE 3 OF THE ECHR.
d. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF A FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMME;

e. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A GUARANTEE OF NON REPETITION;

f. TAKES IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL AND TO INFORM THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PANEL ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS CASE.

Andrey ANTONOV  
Executive Officer  

Marek NOWICKI  
Presiding Member
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CCIU - Central Criminal Investigation Unit
CCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
DOJ - Department of Justice
DPPO - District Public Prosecutor’s Office
ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights
ECTHR - European Court of Human Rights
EU – European Union
EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HRAP - Human Rights Advisory Panel
HRC – United Nation Human Rights Committee
IACTHR – Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICMP - International Commission of Missing Persons
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
IDP - Internally Displaced Person
KFOR - International Security Force (commonly known as Kosovo Force)
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
MPU - Missing Persons Unit
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OMPF - Office on Missing Persons and Forensics
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RIU - Regional Investigation Unit
SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN - United Nations
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
VRIC - Victim Recovery and Identification Commission
WCIU - War Crimes Investigation Unit