OPINION

Date of adoption: 23 January 2014

Case No. 277/09

Luka ANDELKOVIĆ

against

UNMIK

The Human Rights Advisory Panel, sitting on 23 January 2014, with the following members present:

Marek Nowicki, Presiding Member
Christine Chinkin
Françoise Tulkens

Assisted by

Andrey Antonov, Executive Officer

Having considered the aforementioned complaint, introduced pursuant to Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel,

Having deliberated, makes the following findings and recommendations:

I. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PANEL

1. The complaint was introduced on 1 April 2009 and registered on 30 April 2009.

2. On 29 December 2011, the complaint was communicated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)\(^1\), for UNMIK’s comments on its admissibility.

\(^1\) A list of abbreviations and acronyms contained in the text can be found in the attached Annex.
3. On 31 January 2012, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s response.

4. On 5 April 2012, the Panel declared the complaint admissible.

5. On 12 August 2012, the Panel forwarded its decision to the SRSG requesting UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, as well as copies of the investigative files relevant to the case.

6. On 26 March 2013, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, together with the relevant documentation.

7. On 18 December 2013, the Panel requested UNMIK to confirm whether the disclosure of files concerning the case could be considered final. On 23 December 2013, UNMIK provided its response.

II. THE FACTS

A. General background

8. The events at issue took place in the territory of Kosovo during the conflict and after the establishment in June 1999 of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

9. The armed conflict during 1998 and 1999 between the Serbian forces on one side and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Kosovo Albanian armed groups on the other is well documented. Following the failure of international efforts to resolve the conflict, on 23 March 1999, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced the commencement of air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air strikes began on 24 March 1999 and ended on 8 June 1999 when the FRY agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. On 9 June 1999, the International Security Force (KFOR), the FRY and the Republic of Serbia signed a “Military Technical Agreement” by which they agreed on FRY withdrawal from Kosovo and the presence of an international security force following an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution.

10. On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council decided upon the deployment of international security and civil presences - KFOR and UNMIK respectively - in the territory of Kosovo. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999), the UN was vested

---

with full legislative and executive powers for the interim administration of Kosovo, including the administration of justice. KFOR was tasked with establishing “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety” and temporarily ensuring “public safety and order” until the international civil presence could take over responsibility for this task. UNMIK comprised four main components or pillars led by the United Nations (civil administration), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian assistance, which was phased out in June 2000), the OSCE (institution building) and the EU (reconstruction and economic development). Each pillar was placed under the authority of the SRSG. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) mandated UNMIK to “promote and protect human rights” in Kosovo in accordance with internationally recognised human rights standards.

11. Estimates regarding the effect of the conflict on the displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population range from approximately 800,000 to 1.45 million. Following the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the majority of Kosovo Albanians who had fled, or had been forcibly expelled from their houses by the Serbian forces during the conflict, returned to Kosovo.

12. Meanwhile, members of the non-Albanian community – mainly but not exclusively Serbs, Roma and Slavic Muslims – as well as Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, became the target of widespread attacks by Kosovo Albanian armed groups. Current estimates relating to the number of Kosovo Serbs displaced fall within the region of 200,000 to 210,000. Whereas most Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albani ans fled to Serbia proper and the neighbouring countries, those remaining behind became victims of systematic killings, abductions, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender based violence, beatings and harassment.

13. Although figures remain disputed, it is estimated that more than 15,000 deaths or disappearances occurred during and in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (1998-2000). More than 3,000 ethnic Albanians, and about 800 Serbs, Roma and members of other minority communities went missing during this period. More than half of the missing persons had been located and their mortal remains identified by the end of 2010, while 1,766 are listed as still missing by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as of October 2012.

14. As of July 1999, as part of the efforts to restore law enforcement in Kosovo within the framework of the rule of law, the SRSG urged UN member States to support the deployment within the civilian component of UNMIK of 4,718 international police personnel. UNMIK Police were tasked with advising KFOR on policing matters until they themselves had sufficient numbers to take full responsibility for law enforcement and to work towards the development of a Kosovo police service. By September 1999, approximately 1,100 international police officers had been deployed to UNMIK.

15. By December 2000, the deployment of UNMIK Police was almost complete with 4,400 personnel from 53 different countries, and UNMIK had assumed primacy in law enforcement responsibility in all regions of Kosovo except for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. According to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, 351 kidnappings, 675 murders and 115 rapes had been reported to them in the period between June 1999 and December 2000.
16. Due to the collapse of the administration of justice in Kosovo, UNMIK established in June 1999 an Emergency Justice System. This was composed of a limited number of local judges and prosecutors and was operational until a regular justice system became operative in January 2000. In February 2000, UNMIK authorised the appointment of international judges and prosecutors, initially in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region and later across Kosovo, to strengthen the local justice system and to guarantee its impartiality. As of October 2002, the local justice system comprised 341 local and 24 international judges and prosecutors. In January 2003, the UN Secretary-General reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1244 (1999) defined the police and justice system in Kosovo at that moment as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable”.

17. In July 1999, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNMIK already considered the issue of missing persons as a particularly acute human rights concern in Kosovo. In November 1999, a Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was established within UNMIK Police, mandated to investigate with respect to either the possible location of missing persons and/or gravesites. The MPU, jointly with the Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) of UNMIK Police, and later a dedicated War Crimes Investigation Unit (WCIU), were responsible for the criminal aspects of missing persons cases in Kosovo. In May 2000, a Victim Recovery and Identification Commission (VIRC) chaired by UNMIK was created for the recovery, identification and disposition of mortal remains. As of June 2002, the newly established Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) in the UNMIK Department of Justice (DOJ) became the sole authority mandated to determine the whereabouts of missing persons, identify their mortal remains and return them to the family of the missing. Starting from 2001, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNMIK and the Sarajevo-based International Commission of Missing Persons (ICMP), supplemented by a further agreement in 2003, the identification of mortal remains was carried out by the ICMP through DNA testing.

18. On 9 December 2008, UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to police and justice in Kosovo ended with the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) assuming full operational control in the area of the rule of law, following the Statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44), welcoming the continued engagement of the European Union in Kosovo.

19. On the same date, UNMIK and EULEX signed a MoU on the modalities, and the respective rights and obligations arising from the transfer from UNMIK to EULEX of cases and the related files which involved on-going investigations, prosecutions and other activities undertaken by UNMIK International Prosecutors. Shortly thereafter, similar agreements were signed with regard to the files handled by international judges and UNMIK Police. All agreements obliged EULEX to provide to UNMIK access to the documents related to the actions previously undertaken by UNMIK authorities. Between 9 December 2008 and 30 March 2009, all criminal case files held by the UNMIK DOJ and UNMIK Police were supposed to be handed over to EULEX.

B. Circumstances surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković

20. The complainant is the son of Mr Stajko Anđelković. The complainant states that on 5 May 1999 at around 18:00 his father was abducted by KLA members in the Zojiq/Zojić village, Prizren municipality, during an orchestrated KLA assault on that village. In the same event, a
complainant’s relative, Mr D.T., was injured. Since that time the whereabouts of Mr Stajko Andelković have remained unknown.

21. The complainant states that the abduction of his father was reported to the ICRC and the Yugoslav Red Cross. He also states that the matter was reported to the International Public Prosecutor in Prishtinë/Priština, but presents no specific details. The complainant provided the Panel with a copy of a letter by which the ICRC invited him to visit their office in Belgrade on 12 February 2001, to look at the collection of photographs of the personal items and artifacts, which had been found during exhumations in Kosovo in the year of 2000.

22. A certificate, dated 31 July 2001, presented by the complainant, confirms that on 28 June 1999 the Yugoslav Red Cross had opened a tracing request in relation to Mr Stajko Andelković. The ICRC tracing request for the complainant’s father remains open. His name is also present in the list of missing persons that was forwarded by the ICRC to UNMIK on 12 October 2001, for whom the ICRC had collected ante-mortem data in Serbia proper, between 1 July and 20 September 2001, as well as in the database compiled by the UNMIK OMPF. The entry in relation to Mr Stajko Andelković in the online database maintained by the ICMP reads, in relevant fields: “Sufficient Reference Samples Collected” and “DNA match not found”.

C. The investigation

23. In the present case, the Panel received from UNMIK only limited investigative documents previously held by the UNMIK Police WCIU and the UNMIK OMPF. When presenting the file to the Panel, March 2013, the SRSG noted that more information in relation to this case, not contained in the presented documents, may exist. However, on 23 December 2013, UNMIK confirmed to the Panel that no more relevant documents have been obtained.

24. Concerning disclosure of information contained in the files, the Panel recalls that UNMIK has made them available under a pledge of confidentiality. In this regard, the Panel must clarify that although its assessment of the present case stems from a thorough examination of the available documentation, only limited information contained therein is disclosed. Hence a synopsis of relevant investigation steps taken by investigative authorities is provided in the paragraphs to follow.

25. The OMPF file contains only an undated ICRC Victim Identification Form for Mr Stajko Andelković, apparently completed by the ICRC between 1 July and 20 September 2001 (see § 20 above). Besides Mr Stajko Andelković’s personal details and ante-mortem description, it provides information on his two sisters: the name, address and telephone number of Ms N.A., as well as the name and address of Ms S.A.; also attached is a photograph of him.

26. The WCIU file contains a printout from the MPU database on the case no. 0425/INV/04, cross-linked to the case no. 2001-000595, generated on 11 March 2004. In the field “Request Summary” it reads: “Lack of information in the file”, the field “Invest. Notes” states that

---


4 The OMPF database is not open to public. The Panel accessed it with regard to this case on 22 January 2014.

there was “[n]o progress as no contact made with any witness”, and the field “Results” reads “Pending.”

27. An MPU Ante-Mortem Investigation Report on the MPU case no. 2001-000595 in relation to the disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković, also bears the number 0425/INV/04. This report was started on 12 March 2005 and completed on the same day. The field “Witness” has the name of Mr Stajko Anđelković’s sister, Ms S.A; the field “Suspect” reads “NIL”.

28. This report has very brief information on the disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković: “ANDJELKOVIC Stajko was missing since 05/05/1999. He was detained in his house, no further information.” The field “Further Investigation” states that the only witness was not contacted because her telephone number in Serbia proper was not known to the investigator. The field “Witness Interviewed” reads “None”. At the conclusion of this report, the investigator stated that “after investigation, it’s impossible at this time to find an impartial witness around the place of event. No information leading to a possible [missing person’s] location. This case should remain open pending within the WCU.” There is no signature of an MPU supervising officer in the designated field at the end of the report. The status of the case is put as “inactive”.

29. Another printout from the MPU database on the case no. 0425/INV/04, cross-linked to the case no. 2001-000595, dated 26 November 2004, provides very brief ante-mortem description of Mr Stajko Andelkovic, as well as the date and the location of his disappearance. It shows that the information was put in the database on 28 February 2001.

30. The next in the file is an undated investigator’s handwritten note with ante-mortem details of Mr Stajko Andelkovic and the address and the telephone number of the complainant.

31. The last document in the investigative file is the complainant’s criminal report addressed to the international prosecutor at the Prizren District Public Prosecutor’s Office. Its English translation has a handwritten mark “2005-00049” on top of the front page; the translator’s note at the “footer” part indicates that the translation was created on 3 September 2005.

III. THE COMPLAINT

32. The complainant complains about UNMIK’s alleged failure to properly investigate the abduction and disappearance of his father. In this regard the Panel deems that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

33. The complainant also complains about the mental pain and suffering allegedly caused to him by this situation. In this regard, the Panel deems that the complainant relies on Article 3 of the ECHR.

IV. THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR
1. The scope of the Panel’s review

34. In determining whether it considers that there has been a violation of Article 2 (procedural limb) of the ECHR, the Panel is mindful of the existing case-law, notably that of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Panel is also aware that the complaints before it differ in some significant ways from those brought before that Court. First, the respondent is not a State but an interim international territorial administration mandated to exercise temporary responsibilities in Kosovo. No suspicion attaches to UNMIK with respect to the substantive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. Second, as in a limited number of cases before the European Court, those suspected of being responsible for the alleged killings and/or abductions are in all cases before the Panel non-state actors, mostly but not exclusively connected to the conflict. These are factors for the Panel to take into consideration as it assesses the procedural positive obligations of an intergovernmental organisation with respect to acts committed by third parties in a territory over which it has temporary legislative, executive and judicial control.

35. Before turning to the examination of the merits of the complaint, the Panel needs to clarify the scope of its review.

36. The Panel notes that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under the following human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocols thereto, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

37. The Panel also notes that Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel provides that the Panel “shall examine complaints from any person or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by UNMIK of (their) human rights”. It follows that only acts or omissions attributable to UNMIK fall within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Panel. In this respect, it should be noted, as stated above, that as of 9 December 2008, UNMIK no longer exercises executive authority over the Kosovo judiciary and law enforcement machinery. Therefore UNMIK bears no responsibility for any violation of human rights allegedly committed by those bodies. Insofar as the complainant complains about acts that occurred after that date, they fall outside the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Panel.

38. Likewise, the Panel emphasises that, as far as its jurisdiction ratione materiae is concerned, as follows from Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, it can only examine complaints relating to an alleged violation of human rights. This means that it can only review acts or omissions complained of for their compatibility with the international human rights instruments referred to above (see § 36). In the particular case of killings and disappearances in life-threatening circumstances, it is not the Panel’s role to replace the competent authorities in the investigation of the case. Its task is limited to examining the
effectiveness of the criminal investigation into such killings and disappearances, in the light of the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 of the ECHR.

39. The Panel further notes that Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 provides that the Panel shall have jurisdiction over complaints relating to alleged violations of human rights “that had occurred not earlier than 23 April 2005 or arising from facts which occurred prior to this date where these facts give rise to a continuing violation of human rights”. It follows that events that took place before 23 April 2005 generally fall outside the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Panel. However, to the extent that such events gave rise to a continuing situation, the Panel has jurisdiction to examine complaints relating to that situation (see European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Grand Chamber [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, nos. 16064/90 and others, judgment of 18 September 2009, §§ 147-149; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey [GC] no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 136, ECHR 2001-IV).

2. The Parties’ submissions

40. The complainant in substance alleges violations concerning the lack of an adequate criminal investigation into the abduction and disappearance of his father. The complainant also states that he was not informed as to whether an investigation was conducted at all, and what the outcome was.

41. In his comments on the merits of the complaint under Article 2, the SRSG accepts that Mr Stajko Andelković disappeared in life threatening circumstances. He notes that in May 1999, when he had disappeared, “the security situation in Kosovo was extremely tense, and there was a high level of violence all over Kosovo, due to the ongoing armed conflict. […] in June 1999, the security situation in post-conflict Kosovo remained tense. KFOR was still in process of reaching sufficient strength to maintain public safety and law and order and there were a number of serious criminal incidents targeting Kosovo-Serbs, including abductions and killings.”

42. The SRSG accepts UNMIK’s responsibility to conduct an investigation in the case of Mr Stajko Andelković under Article 2 of the ECHR, procedural part. In the words of the SRSG, “the essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life, as defined by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo of 25 July 1999 and subsequently, by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo of 12 December 1999, as amended.”

43. The SRSG considers that such an obligation is two-fold, including an obligation to determine through investigation the fate and/or whereabouts of the missing person; and an obligation to conduct an investigation capable of determining whether the death was caused unlawfully and leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the disappearance and/or death of the missing person.

44. The SRSG further observes that when determining applications under Article 2, procedural part, consideration must be given to not imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden on UNMIK. In this regard, the SRSG recalls the judgment of 15 February 2011 rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in the case Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating at paragraph 70:
“The Court takes into account the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the first ten years following the war. In such a post-conflict situation, what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and context. In this connection, the Court notes that more than 100,000 people were killed, almost 30,000 people went missing and more than two million people were displaced during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inevitably choices had to be made in terms of post-war priorities and resources.”

45. In the view of the SRSG, in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, UNMIK was faced with a similar situation as the one in Bosnia. Many of those persons who were unaccounted for were abducted, killed and buried in unmarked graves inside or outside Kosovo, which made very difficult locating and recovering their mortal remains.

46. In June 2002, UNMIK created the OMPF with the mandate to determine the fate of the missing; however its work was faced with many challenges at the beginning of the operations, due to the work previously done mostly by actors independent from UNMIK. In particular, the SRSG states that the collection of evidence of war crimes began with the arrival of NATO in 1999 with independent teams from several countries operating under the loose coordination of the ICTY. A lack of standard operating procedures or centralisation led to problems with the evidence gathered in this phase. In 2000, the ICTY launched a large, centralised forensic operation, based at the Rahovec/Orahovac mortuary, with standard operating procedures for all forensic teams except the British one, which operated independently out of Pristina. The SRSG states that, in the effort to demonstrate that crimes were systematic and widespread, the ICTY teams conducted autopsies on as many bodies as possible, carrying out little or no identification work; moreover, unidentified bodies exhumed in 1999 were reburied in locations still unknown to the OMPF. After the ICTY closed their operation in 2000, the UNMIK Police MPU continued small-scale investigations on missing persons “ex-officio, without any broader prosecutorial strategy”. As a consequence, a large amount of unstructured information was collected.

47. The SRSG states that locating and identifying the missing in the context described above is a very difficult and time-consuming task. He further states that the number of missing persons recovered and identified by OMPF is “testament to the vigour of its work between 2002-2008” and that “[m]ore bodies have been located in burial sites and more identifications and returns to family members are taking place, often based on information contained in OMPF files”. The SRSG continues that therefore “it is apparent that the process for establishing a system capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law has been an understandably incremental one” in Kosovo as reflected in the Palić case referred to above. The SRSG further notes that this process was “reliant on a number of actors rather than just UNMIK, for example the International Commission on Missing Persons, the International Committee of the Red Cross and local missing persons organisations.”

48. The SRSG further argues that fundamental to conducting effective investigations “is a professional, well trained and well resourced police force” and that “[s]uch a force did not exist in Kosovo in 1999 and had to be established from scratch and progressively developed.” In the policing vacuum following the end of the conflict, UNMIK had to build a new Kosovo Police Service, a long and challenging task, which, according to the SRSG, is
still in progress. The SRSG also states that UNMIK Police faced numerous challenges in exercising law enforcement functions gradually transferred to it by KFOR in 1999 - 2000. In this regard, he refers to the UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000 describing the situation as follows:

“UNMIK Police had to deal with in the aftermath of war, with dead bodies and the looted and burned houses. Ethnic violence flared through illegal evictions, forcible takeovers of properties, the burning of houses and physical violence against communities all over Kosovo. Tempers and tensions were running high amongst all ethnic groups, exacerbated by reports of missing and dead persons. It became imperative for UNMIK Police to establish order and to quickly construct a framework to register and investigate crimes.

All of this had to be done with limited physical and human resources. Being the first executive mission in the history of the UN, the concept, planning and implementation was being developed on the ground. With 20 different contributory nationalities at the beginning, it was a very challenging task for police managers to establish common practices for optimum results in a high-risk environment.”

49. The SRSG states that UNMIK international police officers working on cases of missing persons had to adjust to conducting investigations in a foreign territory and country, with limited support from the still developing Kosovo Police. He further states that these investigators were often faced with situations where individuals holding relevant knowledge on the whereabouts and fate of missing persons did not want to disclose this information. According to the SRSG, all these constraints inhibited the ability of the UNMIK Police to conduct investigations according to the standards that may be expected from States with more established institutions and which are not faced with the high number of cases of this nature associated with a post-conflict situation.

50. With regard to the part of the investigations aimed at establishing the fate Mr Stajko Andelković, judging by the limited available documents, the SRSG only notes with certainty that the case was reviewed by UNMIK Police on 12 March 2005 (see §§ 27 - 28 above). The SRSG continues that “there was no information at that time that could shed light to a possible location of Mr. Stajko Andelković.”

51. In relation to the authorities’ actions towards identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice, the SRSG notes that an investigation was opened by UNMIK Police. However, in March 2005 “it was not possible to contact the listed witness, [Ms. S.A.], due to a lack of contact details in the file (see § 28 above). Nevertheless, the police kept the case “open and pending … presumably to be considered further should additional witnesses come forward or additional information become available.”

52. The SRSG concludes that, based on the available documents, “it is evident that UNMIK Police did open and pursue an investigation into the whereabouts of Mr Stajko Andelković; however … without witnesses coming forward or physical evidence being discovered, police investigations inevitably stall because of a lack of evidence.”

53. In the SRSG’s opinion, in this case “UNMIK police did conduct investigative efforts in accordance with the procedural requirements of Article 2 [of the] ECHR, aiming at bring the perpetrators to justice. Thus, according to the SRSG, there has been no violation of Article 2.
54. The SRSG also informed the Panel that he might make further comments on this matter, 
“[a]s there is a possibility that additional and conclusive information exists”, beyond the 
documents presented to the Panel. However, no further communication in this regard, other 
than confirmation of the full disclosure of the investigative files, has been received to date.

3. The Panel’s assessment

55. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural obligation 
stemming from the right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in that UNMIK Police did not conduct an effective investigation into 
Mr Stajko Andelković’s abduction and disappearance.

a) Submission of relevant files

56. At Panel’s request, on 16 August 2013, the SRSG provided copies of the “very limited” 
documents related to this investigation, which UNMIK was able to recover. As mentioned 
above (see § 54), the SRSG also noted that more information, not contained in the presented 
documents, may exist in relation to this case. On 23 December 2013, UNMIK confirmed to 
the Panel that no more files have been located, thus the disclosure may be considered 
complete (see § 7 above).

57. The Panel notes that Section 15 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 states that the Panel may 
request the submission from UNMIK of any documents and that the SRSG shall cooperate 
with the Panel and provide the necessary assistance including, in particular, in the release of 
documents and information relevant to the complaint. The Panel in this regard refers to the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that inferences shall be drawn from the 
conduct of the respondent party during the proceedings, including from its failure “to submit 
information in their hands without a satisfactory explanation” (see ECtHR, Çelikbilek v. 
Turkey, no. 27693/95, judgment of 31 May 2005, § 56).

58. The Panel also notes that the proper maintenance of investigative files concerning crimes 
such as killings and disappearances, from the opening of the investigations to their handing 
over, is crucial to the continuation of such investigations and failure to do so could thus raise 
per se issues under Article 2.

59. The Panel has no reason to doubt that UNMIK undertook all efforts in order to obtain the 
relevant investigative documents. However, UNMIK has not provided any explanation as to 
why the documentation may be incomplete, nor with respect to which parts.

60. The Panel itself is not in the position to verify the completeness of the investigative files 
received. The Panel will therefore assess the merits of the complaint on the basis of 
documents made available (in this sense, see ECtHR, Tsechoyev v. Russia, no. 39358/05, 
judgment of 15 March 2011, § 146).

b) General principles concerning the obligation to conduct an effective investigation under 
Article 2
61. The Panel notes that the positive obligation to investigate disappearances is widely accepted in international human rights law since at least the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velásquez-Rodríguez (see Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4). The positive obligation has also been stated by the HRC as stemming from Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment) and Article 9 (right to liberty and security of person), read in conjunction with Article 2(3) (right to an effective remedy) of the ICCPR (see HRC, General Comment No. 6, 30 April 1982, § 4; HRC, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, §§ 8 and 18, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13; see also, among others, HRC, Mohamed El Awani, v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, communication no. 1295/2004, views of 11 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004). The obligation to investigate disappearances and killings is also asserted in the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (A/Res/47/133, 18 December 1992), and further detailed in UN guidelines such as the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1991) and the “Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries into Allegations of Massacres” (1995). The importance of the obligation is confirmed by the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2006, which entered into force on 23 December 2010.

62. In order to address the complainant’s allegations, the Panel refers, in particular, to the well-established case-law of the European Court on Human Rights on the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court has held that “[T]he obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed (see, mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324; and ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, § 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; see also ECtHR, Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, judgment of 21 December 2010, § 71). The duty to conduct such an investigation arises in all cases of killing and other suspicious death, whether the perpetrators were private persons or State agents or are unknown (see ECtHR, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, judgment of 5 November 2009, § 191).

63. The European Court has also stated that the procedural obligation to provide some form of effective official investigation exists also when an individual has gone missing in life-threatening circumstances and is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the disappearance was caused by an agent of the State (see ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 39 above, at § 136).

64. The authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention, and they cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedure (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, judgment of 6 April 2004, § 310; see also ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, § 210).

65. Setting out the standards of an effective investigation, the Court has stated that “beside being independent, accessible to the victim’s family, carried out with reasonable promptness and expedition, affording a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation and its
results, the investigation must also be effective in the sense that is capable of leading to a determination of whether the death was caused unlawfully and if so, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 39 above, at § 191; see also ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, judgment of 15 February 2011, § 63). This is not an obligation of results but of means. The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 312; and Isayeva v. Russia, cited above, § 212).

66. In particular, the investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible (see ECtHR, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, cited in § 62 above, at § 201). Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. They must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of the investigation work (see ECtHR, Velcea and Mazărev. Romania, no. 64301/01, judgment of 1 December 2009, § 105).

67. Even with regard to persons disappeared and later found dead, which is not the situation in the present case, the Court has stated that the procedures of exhuming and identifying mortal remains do not exhaust the obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court holds that “the procedural obligation arising from a disappearance will generally remain as long as the whereabouts and fate of the person are unaccounted for, and it is thus of a continuing nature” (ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 65 above, at § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 39 above, at § 148, Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944/06 and others, judgment of 18 December 2012, § 122). However, the Court also stresses that this procedural obligation “does not come to an end even on discovery of the body .... This only casts light on one aspect of the fate of the missing person and the obligation to account for the disappearance and death, as well as to identify and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally remain” (ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], Varnava and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 145). While the location and the subsequent identification of the mortal remains of the victim may in themselves be significant achievements, the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to exist (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, § 64).

68. On the requirement of public scrutiny, the Court has further stated that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim's next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited in § 64 above, at §§ 311-314; ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, cited in § 64 above, at §§ 211-214 and the cases cited therein; ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 2011, no. 55721/07, § 167, ECHR 2011).
69. The Court has also underlined the great importance of an effective investigation in establishing the truth of what transpired, not only for the families of victims, but also for other victims of similar crimes, as well as the general public, who have the right to know what occurred (ECTHR [GC], El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 39630/09, judgment of 13 December 2012, § 191). The United Nations also recognises the importance of the right to truth. In the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, “the right to truth implies knowing the full and complete truth about the violations and the events that transpired, their specific circumstances and who participated in them. In the case of missing persons … it also implies the right to know the fate and whereabouts of the victim” (see Report of the UN Secretary-General, Missing Persons, UN Document A/67/267, 8 August 2012, § 5; see also UN Human Rights Council, Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12: Right to the Truth, 24 September 2008 and 12 October 2009; see also the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for gross and systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorist initiatives; UN Document A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013).

c) Applicability of Article 2 to the Kosovo context

70. The Panel is conscious that Mr Stajko Andelković had disappeared shortly before the deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo, during the armed conflict, when crime, violence and insecurity were rife.

71. On his part, the SRSG does not contest that, from its deployment in Kosovo in June 1999, UNMIK had a duty to investigate the present case under ECHR Article 2. However, according to the SRSG, the unique circumstances pertaining to the Kosovo context and to UNMIK’s deployment in the first phase of its mission shall be taken into account when assessing whether this investigation is in compliance with Article 2 of the ECHR. In substance, the SRSG argues that it is not possible to apply to UNMIK the same standards applicable to a State in a normal situation.

72. The Panel considers that this raises two main questions: first, whether the standards of Article 2 continue to apply in situation of conflict or generalised violence and, second, whether such standards shall be considered fully applicable to UNMIK.

73. As regards the applicability of Article 2 to UNMIK, the Panel recalls that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under certain international human rights instruments, including the ECHR. In this respect, the Panel has already found that it is true that UNMIK’s interim character and related difficulties must be duly taken into account with regard to a number of situations, but under no circumstances could these elements be taken as a justification for diminishing standards of respect for human rights, which were duly incorporated into UNMIK’s mandate (see HRAP, Milogorić and Others, nos. 38/08 and others, opinion of 24 March 2011, § 44; Berisha and Others, nos. 27/08 and others, opinion
of 23 February 2011, § 25; Lalić and Others, nos. 09/08 and others, opinion of 9 June 2012, § 22).

74. Concerning the applicability of Article 2 to situations of conflict or generalised violence, the Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has established the applicability of Article 2 to post-conflict situations, including in countries of the former Yugoslavia (see, among other examples, ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 65 above, and ECtHR, Jularić v. Croatia, no. 20106/06, judgment of 20 January 2011). The Court has further held that that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in “difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict” (see ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited in § 68 above, at § 164; see also ECtHR, Gülteç v. Turkey, judgment of 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 64 above, at §§ 85-90, 309-320 and 326-330; Isayeva v. Russia, cited in § 64 above, at §§ 180 and 210; ECtHR, Kanliibaş v. Turkey, no. 32444/96, judgment of 8 December 2005, §§ 39-51).

75. The Court has acknowledged that “where the death [and disappearances] to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and […] concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed” (see, ECtHR [GC], Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 164; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, judgment of 27 July 2006, § 121). Nonetheless, the Court has held that “the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see, amongst many other examples, ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, cited in § 62 above, at §§ 86 - 92; ECtHR, Ergi v Turkey, cited above, §§ 82 - 85; ECtHR [GC], Tanrikulu v. Turkey, no. 23763/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, §§ 101-110, ECHR 1999-IV; ECtHR, Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 156-166; ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, cited above, §§ 215 - 224; ECtHR, Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/00 and others, judgment of 26 July 2007, §§ 158 - 165).

76. Similarly, the HRC has held that the right to life, including its procedural guarantees, shall be considered as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (see, HRC, General Comment No. 6, cited in § 61 above, at § 1; HRC, Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation, communication no. 1447/2006, views of 22 April 2009, § 11.2, CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006). Further, the HRC has stated the applicability of Article 2 (3), 6 and 7 of the ICCPR with specific reference to UNMIK’s obligation to conduct proper investigations on disappearances and abductions in Kosovo (see HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 14 August 2006, §§ 12-13, CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1).

77. The Panel appreciates the difficulties encountered by UNMIK during the first phase of its deployment. The Panel notes that the appropriate importance attached to the issue of missing persons in Kosovo meant that UNMIK had to take into account both the humanitarian and criminal dimensions of the situation. In particular, the Panel considers that the importance attached to the criminal investigations and the difficulties in Kosovo that limited the abilities of investigating authorities to conduct such investigations, as described by the SRSG, made it
crucial that UNMIK establish from the outset an environment conducive to the performance of meaningful investigations. This would involve putting in place a system that would include such elements as the allocation of overall responsibility for the supervision and monitoring of progress in investigations, provision for the regular review of the status of investigations, and a process for the proper handover of cases between different officers or units of UNMIK Police. Such a system should also take account of the protection needs of victims and witnesses (see, mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, R.R. and Others v. Hungary, no. 19400/11, judgment of 4 December 2012, §§ 28-32), as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations (see ECtHR [GC], Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, no. 40167/06, decision of 14 December 2011, § 145; and ECtHR [GC], Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, no. 13216/05, decision of 14 December 2011, § 146). While understanding that the deployment and the organisation of the police and justice apparatus occurred gradually, the Panel deems that this process was completed in 2003 when the police and justice system in Kosovo was described as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” by the UN Secretary-General (see § 15 above).

78. The Panel further notes that its task is not to review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations in abstracto, but only in relation to their specific application to the particular circumstances of a situation subject of a complaint before it (see, ECtHR, Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, § 53, Series A no. 145-B). The Panel thus agrees with the SRSG that the nature and degree of scrutiny to determine whether the effectiveness of the investigation satisfies the minimum threshold depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it will establish with regard to each case if all reasonable steps were taken to conduct an effective investigation as prescribed by Article 2, having regard to the realities of the investigative work in Kosovo.

79. Lastly, in response to the SRSG’s objection that Article 2 must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, either in the context of policing activities or that of priorities and resources, the Panel takes into account that the European Court has established that what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and contexts (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 65 above, at § 70; Brecknell v. The United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, judgment of 27 November 2007, § 62).

d) Compliance with Article 2 in the present case

80. Turning to the particulars of this case, the Panel first notes the complainant’s statement that the alleged abduction and disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković was reported to the ICRC, the Yugoslav Red Cross and an International Public Prosecutor (see § 21 above). Being unable to verify this fact, the Panel considers that certainly by October 2001, UNMIK was made aware about Mr Stajko Andelković’s disappearance by the ICRC (see § 22 above) and that by the end of the year of 2001, UNMIK Police had registered a case in this regard (see § 26 above).

81. The purpose of this investigation was to discover the truth about the events leading to the disappearance of the complainant’s father, to establish his fate and to identify the perpetrators. To fulfil these purposes, those conducting the investigation were required to seek, collect and preserve evidentiary material; to identify possible witnesses and to obtain
their statements; to identify the perpetrator(s) and bring them before a competent court established by law.

82. The Panel recalls that in order to be effective, the investigative actions must be conducted promptly and expeditiously, with the authorities taking all reasonable steps and following obvious lines of enquiry to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence etc. The investigation must also ensure a sufficient element of public scrutiny and be reasonably accessible to the victim’s family. The investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. In addition, the investigation should be periodically reviewed, in order to ensure that all available information is considered. As the obligation to investigate is not an obligation of results but of means, in assessing the investigation’s effectiveness, the circumstances of the particular case and the practical realities of the investigative work must be taken into consideration (see §§ 64 - 65 above).

83. The Panel notes that there were obvious shortcomings in the conduct of the investigation from its inception. However, in light of the considerations developed above concerning its limited temporal jurisdiction (see § 39 above), the Panel recalls that it is competent ratione temporis to evaluate the compliance of the investigation with Article 2 of the ECHR only for the period after 23 April 2005, while taking into consideration the state of the case at that date (see ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 65 above, at § 70). The period under review ends on 9 December 2008, with EULEX taking over responsibility in the area of administration of justice (see § 18 above).

84. The Panel notes in this regard that according to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, the complete executive policing powers in Prizren region, including criminal investigations, were under the full control of UNMIK Police from 27 October 1999. Therefore, it was UNMIK’s responsibility to ensure, first, that the investigation is conducted expeditiously and efficiently; second, that all relevant investigative material is properly handed over to the authority taking over responsibility for the investigation (EULEX); and third, that the investigative files could be traced and retrieved, should a need for that arise at any later stage.

85. Having noted the SRSG’s assertion that the file submitted to the Panel may be incomplete, and the lack of further explanation in relation to this (see § 54 and 59 above), the Panel assumes that UNMIK cannot guarantee whether the file presented to the Panel is complete or not. In case it is not complete, it would indicate that one of the following situations may have occurred: no proper investigation was carried out; the file was not accurately and fully handed over to EULEX; or UNMIK failed to retrieve the complete file from the current custodian. The Panel has already noted above that it has no reason to doubt UNMIK’s good faith in seeking to provide the complete investigative file for its review (see § 59 above). However, the Panel considers that whichever of these potential explanations is applicable, it would indicate a failure directly attributable to UNMIK, either when it was exercising its executive functions, or in its current capacity.

86. With regard to the first part of the procedural obligation, that is establishing the fate of Mr Stajko Andelković, the Panel notes that their whereabouts remain unknown. The Panel notes that ante-mortem information concerning the complainant’s missing relatives had been gathered by the ICRC, between 1 June and 20 September 2001 and that the ICMP database
confirms that the DNA samples had been collected, but it is not clear when, from or by whom (see § 22 above).

87. In this respect, the Panel notes that the collection of the DNA samples is of itself an essential action that secures the necessary material for any future comparative examination and possible identification of located mortal remains. However, as in this case no such identification has yet occurred, the Panel will turn to the investigation carried out by UNMIK Police with the aim of identification of perpetrators and bringing them to justice, that is the second element of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR.

88. As regards the requirements of promptness and expedition, the Panel is mindful that in any investigation, and particularly in an investigation of a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances, the initial stage is of the utmost importance, and it serves two main purposes: to identify the direction of the investigation and ensure preservation and collection of evidence for future possible court proceedings (compare with the Panel’s position in the case X., nos. 326/09 and others, opinion of 6 June 2013, § 81).

89. In this respect the Panel recalls that UNMIK became aware of the disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković by October 2001 and the investigation into the matter was opened by UNMIK Police by the end of 2001 (see § 80 above). However, no immediate action by UNMIK Police whatsoever, except for probably making an initial assessment of the information, registering of the case and entering the information into the database, is reflected in the investigative file. Thus, in the Panel’s view, this investigation obviously failed to fulfill the requirements of promptness and expeditiousness.

90. The Panel notes that the ICRC Victim Identification Form for Mr Stajko Anđelković contains contact information for two sisters of the victim; including the addresses for both, Ms N.A. and Ms S.A. and a phone number for Ms N.A. only. This means that by the end of 2001 UNMIK Police possessed all the necessary information (see §§ 25 and 80 above). The reasons why there was no attempt to contact these two potential witnesses until March 2005 are not clear to the Panel.

91. Likewise, this investigation had failed in the requirement to take reasonable investigative steps and to follow the obvious lines of enquiry to obtain evidence. A properly maintained investigative file should have included records of all investigative actions and particularly of the interviews with the complainant, suspects and all potential witnesses to the disappearance. In all cases, such interviews should take place as soon as possible and should be recorded and retained in the case file.

92. The Panel notes in this context that the investigative file loosely reflects the above-mentioned single attempt by UNMIK Police to contact a victim’s relative in order to obtain additional information. In Panel’s view, first, such a contact with potential witnesses, almost seven years after the disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković and four and a half years after the case had been opened, was obviously belated and not even properly recorded.

93. Second, the Panel notes that the MPU investigator who reviewed the case in March 2005 decided to contact Ms S.A., for whom no contact telephone number was given in that ICRC

---

for, but not Ms N.A., whose phone number was available (see §§ 25, 27 and 28 above). It appears to the Panel that the investigator had disregarded the information which could lead to a potential witness. This is despite that there were other ways of locating both witnesses at their addresses which were available to the police from the inception of this investigation, in particular through the Serbian authorities.

94. In addition, the Panel notes the complainant’s statement that another relative of his, Mr D.T. was injured during that KLA assault on Zojiq/Zojić village on 5 March 1999 (see § 20 above). As he had apparently survived that attack, he could have been a valuable source of first-hand evidence as an eye-witness. However, as the police had failed to contact any relatives of Mr Stajko Andelković, this potential lead to the perpetrators had never been discovered.

95. The police likewise never tried to identify the location where the alleged abduction of Mr Stajko Andelković took place, at least formally, to better understand the circumstances of the possible crime under investigation, which is a basic step in cases with so little evidence. The Panel also takes into account that in order to be adequate, the investigation into such grave crimes should also have included at least an interview with the known potential witness, identifying and interviewing individuals residing at or located in the area of the alleged crime, especially those who were present there at the time of the alleged abduction and who thus may have witnessed something (“canvassing” the area), as well as persons who knew the victims, as they might have knowledge of possible motives. However, none of these actions appear to have been undertaken.

96. With respect to the SRSG’s argument that UNMIK opened and pursued an investigation to determine whether there was an unlawful disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković and to identify and bring to justice those responsible (see § 51 above), the Panel notes that as shown above, the file does not reflect any substantive action in pursuit of those goals.

97. The Panel likewise recalls the SRSG’s argument that “without witnesses coming forward or physical evidence being discovered, police investigations inevitably stall because of lack of evidence” (see § 52 above). In this regard, the Panel must note that almost any investigation at its initial stage lacks a significant amount of information. Finding the necessary information to fill those gaps is the main goal of any investigative activity. Therefore, a lack of information should not be used as an argument to defend inaction by the investigative authorities. The file, as made available to the Panel, does not show any such activity. Thus, it appears that, instead of actively searching for information and leads, UNMIK Police simply waited for further information to appear by itself. In this situation it may have led to the loss of potential evidence (see e.g. HRAP, P.S., no. 48/09, opinion of 31 October 2013, § 107).

98. In the Panel’s view, it is because of the lack of information at the initial stage that this case was made “pending” or “inactive”, i.e. without any action by the police (see §§ 26, 28 above). The Panel recalls in this regard its position in relation to the categorisation of cases into “active” and “inactive”, that any “categorisation of an investigation should take place only after the minimum possible investigative actions have been undertaken and obtainable information has been collected and analysed” (see e.g. HRAP, B.A., no. 52/09, opinion of 14 February 2013, § 82). In this case, such prioritisation should not have been made at the earliest stages, before the complainant and the witnesses had been interviewed about the
circumstances of the disappearance, especially as it had occurred in obviously life-threatening circumstances, and all obtainable evidence had been collected.

99. The Panel notes in this context that if not worked upon, developed, corroborated by other evidence and put in a proper form, any information by itself, however good it might be in relation to a crime under investigation, does not solve it. In order to be accepted in court, information must become evidence, which can only happen through investigative actions undertaken in compliance with the applicable rules of criminal procedure. In this case, UNMIK Police appear to have never undertaken any action in this direction (see e.g. HRAP, Todorovski, case no. 81/09, opinion of 31 October 2013, § 116).

100. Coming to the period within its jurisdiction, starting from 23 April 2005, the Panel notes that after that critical date the failure to conduct the necessary investigative actions persisted, thus, in accordance with the continuing obligation to investigate (see § 67 above), bringing the assessment of the whole investigation within the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction.

101. In addition, the Panel considers that, as the mortal remains of Mr Stajko Andelković had not been located and those responsible for the crime had not been identified, UNMIK Police was obliged to use the means at their disposal to regularly review the progress of the investigation to ensure that nothing had been overlooked and any new evidence had been considered, as well as to inform their relatives regarding the progress of this investigation.

102. The Panel understands from the file, that this investigation was reviewed by UNMIK Police once, in March 2005 (see §§ 27 - 28 above). As previously mentioned, during this review the MPU investigator used the lack of contact telephone for one of potential witnesses as a reason to de facto close the investigation, while disregarding the available lead to another witness and not trying to use other means of contacting both potential (see § 93).

103. Moreover, without giving any reason for that, the same investigator concluded that “after investigation, it’s impossible at this time to find an impartial witness around the place of event. No information leading to a possible [missing person’s] location” (see § 28 above). This is in the situation when no investigation was carried out, the scene of the alleged abduction was not even found and the available leads have not been followed. In the Panel’s view, the fact that such groundless findings and recommendations of the reviewing officer were accepted and acted upon by the MPU may be indicative of a lack of internal review and quality control mechanism within that investigative unit.

104. The Panel can not overlook the fact that the complainant’s criminal report addressed to the international prosecutor at the Prizren District Public Prosecutor’s Office was received by UNMIK August 2005 (see § 31 above). It would be reasonable to expect that such a report should have triggered a prosecutor’s review of the investigative file. That, in the Panel’s view, may have resulted in additional actions recommended, so the case would not have stayed inactive for years to come (compare with the Panel’s position in the case Stojković, no. 87/09, opinion of 13 December 2013, § 160). However, the file as presented to the Panel reflects no reaction of the international prosecutor to that criminal report.

105. Therefore, in the Panel’s opinion, there was no adequate and thorough review of this case. Instead, the case review appears to have been undertaken as a mere formality, as police
failed to identify obvious gaps in the investigative process, relied upon unconfirmed or nonexistent facts, disregarded the available information, carried over the mistakes made by previous investigator(s).

106. The apparent lack of any immediate reaction from UNMIK Police, and of any adequate action at later stages, may have suggested to perpetrators that the authorities were either not able, or not willing to investigate such criminal acts. Such an attitude of the authorities towards the gravest crimes in any society, and especially in post-conflict circumstances, inevitably creates a culture of impunity among the criminals and can only lead to a worsening of the situation. The problems which UNMIK had encountered at the beginning of its mission, which were discussed above, do not justify such inaction, either at the outset or subsequently.

107. The Panel is also aware that the duty to investigate is not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, such an investigation must be undertaken in a serious manner and not be a mere formality. The Panel considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, not all reasonable steps were taken by UNMIK towards locating the missing persons, identifying the perpetrators and to bring them to justice. In this sense the Panel considers that the investigation was not adequate and did not comply with the requirements of promptness, expedition and effectiveness (see § 82 above), as required by Article 2.

108. As concerns the requirement of public scrutiny, the Panel recalls that Article 2 also requires the victim’s next-of-kin to be involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.

109. As was shown above, the investigative file reflects only one, failed, attempt to contact Mr Stajko Anđelković’s sister, in March 2005 (see § 92). The only contact with the victim’s two sisters was made by ICRC staff, between July and September 2001 (see §§ 22 and 25 above). The Panel therefore considers that the investigation was not open to any public scrutiny, as required by Article 2 of the ECHR.

110. Finally, the Panel recalls the SRSG’s own expressed dissatisfaction regarding the way information is presented in the available file, as pieces of information are found in different documents, either submitted by the complainant or provided by EULEX to UNMIK, produced at different dates and often without clear cross-references, which could have possibly provided a complete view of the incident (see § 50 above). Fully sharing the SRSG’s concern, the Panel, however, finds that in view of the circumstances of the present case, such a lack of structure and analysis of the scarce information available in the investigative file was not a cause of the failure of UNMIK Police to investigate this matter, but quite clearly the result of this failure.

111. In light of the deficiencies and shortcomings described above, the Panel concludes that UNMIK failed to carry out an effective investigation into the abduction and disappearance of Mr Stajko Anđelković. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2, procedural limb, of the ECHR.
B. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the ECHR

112. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes, in substance, a violation of the right to be free from inhumane or degrading treatment, guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR.

1. The scope of the Panel’s review

113. The Panel will consider the allegations under Article 3 of the ECHR, applying the same scope of review as was set out with regard to Article 2 (see §§ 34 - 39 above).

114. The Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has found on many occasions that a situation of enforced disappearance gives rise to a violation of Article 3 in respect of close relatives of the victim. It emphasises that, concerning Article 3, “the essence of such a violation does not so much lie in the fact of the ‘disappearance’ of the family member but rather concerns the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention” (see, e.g., ECtHR [GC], Çakici v. Turkey, no. 23657/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, § 98, ECHR, 1999-IV; ECtHR [GC], Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 156, ECHR, 2001-IV; ECtHR, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, judgment of 18 June 2002, § 358; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, cited in § 75 above, at § 139; ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in § 65 above, at § 74; ECtHR, Alpatu Israilova v. Russia, no. 15438/05, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 69; see also HRAP, Zdravković, no. 46/08, decision of 17 April 2009, § 41). “It is especially in respect of the latter that a relative may claim directly to be a victim of the authorities’ conduct” (see, among others, ECtHR, Er and Others v. Turkey, no. 23016/04, judgment of 31 July 2012, § 94).

115. Lastly, where mental suffering caused by the authorities’ reactions to the disappearance is at stake, the alleged violation is contrary to the substantive element of Article 3 of the ECHR, not its procedural element, as is the case with regard to Article 2 (ECtHR, Gelayevy v. Russia, no. 20216/07, judgment of 15 July 2010, §§ 147-148).

2. The Parties’ submissions

116. The complainant alleges that the lack of information and certainty surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković, and particularly the lack of proper investigation by UNMIK, caused mental suffering to himself and his family.

117. Commenting on this part of the complaint, the SRSG rejects the allegations. He stresses, first, that the complainant did not witness the disappearance, neither was he in close proximity to the location at the time it occurred, and, second, that there were neither assertions made by him of any bad faith on the part of UNMIK personnel involved with the matter, nor evidence of any disregard for the seriousness of the matter or the emotions of the complainant and his family emanating from the disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković.

118. The SRSG concludes that the understandable and apparent mental anguish and suffering of the complainant cannot be attributed to UNMIK, but it is “rather a result of inherent suffering caused by the disappearance of a close family member.” Thus, according to the SRSG, the complainant’s suffering lacks a “character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation.”
Therefore, the SRSG requests the Panel to reject this part of the complaint, as there has not been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

3. The Panel’s assessment

a) General principles concerning the obligation under Article 3

120. Like Article 2, Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values in democratic societies (ECtHR, *Talat Tepe v. Turkey*, no. 31247/96, 21 December 2004, § 47; ECtHR [GC], *Ilașcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, no. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, *ECHR*, 2004-VII, § 424). As confirmed by the absolute nature conferred on it by Article 15 § 2 of the ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment still applies even in most difficult circumstances.

121. Setting out the general principles applicable to situations where violations of the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR are alleged, the Panel notes that the phenomenon of disappearance constitutes a complex form of human rights violation that must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion (see IACtHR, *Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras*, cited in § 61 above, at § 150)

122. The Panel observes that the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR differs from the procedural obligation on the authorities under Article 2. Whereas the latter requires the authorities to take specific legal action capable of leading to identification and punishment of those responsible, the former is more general and humanitarian and relates to their reaction to the plight of the relatives of those who have disappeared or died.

123. The HRC has also recognised disappearances as a serious violation of human rights. In its decision of 21 July 1983, in the case *Quinteros v. Uruguay*, it stated that disappearances constitute serious violations of the rights of the disappeared person’s relatives, who suffer from deep anguish which persists for as long as the uncertainty concerning the fate of their loved one continues, often for many years (see HRC, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 138 (1990), § 14). Moreover, in its decision of 15 July 1994 in the case *Mojica v. Dominican Republic*, the HRC has deemed that “the disappearance of persons is inseparably linked to treatment that amounts to a violation of article 7 [of the Covenant]”, also prohibiting torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment (see HRC, Communication No. 449/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (1994), § 5.7).

124. With respect to the question whether a member of the family of a disappeared person can be considered the victim of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the Panel refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and to its own case law. The European Court accepts that this may be the case, depending on the existence of “special factors which give the suffering of the [family member] a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation”. The Court further holds that “relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie, the particular circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question, the involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person and the way in which the authorities responded to those enquiries” (see ECtHR, *Basayeva and Others v.*
Russia, nos. 15441/05 and 20731/04, judgment of 28 May 2009, § 159; ECtHR, Er and Others v. Turkey, cited in § 114 above, at § 94).

125. The Panel takes note that, when assessing the emotional suffering of the victims, the European Court also considers the following circumstances: the length of the disappearance itself and of the period with no information on the fate of the missing person and on the investigation undertaken by the authorities; the delay in initiation of criminal investigation into the disappearance; the absence of any “meaningful” action by the authorities, despite the fact that the complainants approached them to report the disappearance of their relative and to share with them the information they had; lack of any plausible explanation or information as to the fate of their missing relatives despite personal or written inquiries with official bodies (see, among others, ECtHR, Er and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 96; ECtHR, Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, no. 48804/99, judgment of 24 January 2008, § 97). Another factor leading to a finding of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR is the continuous nature of the psychological suffering of relatives of a victim of a disappearance (ECtHR, Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005/08, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 201).

126. The HRC has also considered the issue and recognised family members of disappeared or missing persons as victims of a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant: parents (Boucherf v. Algeria, Communication No. 1196/2003, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.7, CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003), children (Zarzi v. Algeria, Communication No. 1780/2008, views of 22 March 2011, § 7.6, CCPR/C/101/D/1780/2008), siblings (El Abani v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 1640/2007, views of 26 July 2010, § 7.5, CCPR/C/99/D/1640/2007), spouses (Bousroual v. Algeria, Communication No. 992/2001, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.8, CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001), aunts and uncles (Benaniza v Algeria, views of 26 July 2010, § 9.4, CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007) (Bashasha v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, views of 20 October 2010, § 7.2, CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008). It justifies this broad understanding of victim status by the suffering and distress that is caused to family members by the disappearance of an individual, which is often exacerbated by the authorities’ insufficient efforts to investigate the disappearance in order to establish the fate of the victim and to bring perpetrators to justice (Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 1751/2008, views of 25 October 2010, § 7.7, CCPR/C/100/D/1751/2008). In the case Amirov v. Russian Federation the Committee observed that “[w]ithout wishing to spell out all the circumstances of indirect victimisation, the Committee considers that the failure of a State party responsibly to discharge its obligations to investigate and clarify the circumstances of the harm suffered by the direct victim will be usually be a factor. Additional factors may be necessary. In the present case, the Committee notes the horrific conditions in which the author came to find his wife's mutilated remains (…), followed by the dilatory, sporadic measures undertaken to investigate the circumstances that have lead to the above findings of violations of articles 6 and 7, read together with article 2, paragraph 3. The Committee considers that, taken together, the circumstances require the Committee to conclude that the author's own rights under article 7 have also been violated” (HRC, Amirov v. Russian Federation, cited in § 76 above, at § 11.7).

127. The Panel also takes into account that according to the European Court, the analysis of the authorities’ reaction should not be confined to any specific manifestation of the authorities’ attitudes, isolated incidents or procedural acts; on the contrary, in the Court’s view, an assessment of the way in which the authorities of the respondent State reacted to the
applicants’ enquiries should be global and continuous (see ECtHR, Açış v. Turkey, no. 7050/05, judgment of 1 February 2011, § 45).

128. In this respect, it is the position of the European Court that findings under the procedural limb of Article 2 would also be of direct relevance in considering the existence of a violation of Article 3 (see ECtHR, Basayeva and Others v. Russia, cited in § 124 above, at § 109; ECtHR, Gelayev v. Russia, cited in § 115 above, at § 147; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, cited in § 75 above, at § 140).

129. The Panel observes that the European Court has already found violations of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to disappearances in which the State itself was found to be responsible for the abduction (see ECtHR, Luluyev and Others v. Russia, no. 69480/01, judgment of 9 November 2006, §§ 117-118; ECtHR, Kukayev v. Russia, no. 29361/02, judgment of 15 November 2007, §§ 107-110). However, in contrast, in the case under the Panel’s consideration, in no way is UNMIK implicated in the actual disappearance and UNMIK cannot be held responsible for the applicant’s mental distress caused by the commission of the crime itself.

130. The Panel is mindful that in the absence of a finding of State responsibility for the disappearance, the European Court has ruled that it is not persuaded that the authorities’ conduct, albeit negligent to the extent that it has breached Article 2 in its procedural aspect, could have in itself caused the applicant mental distress in excess of the minimum level of severity, which is necessary in order to consider treatment as falling within the scope of Article 3 (see, among others, ECtHR, Tovsultanova v. Russia, no. 26974/06, judgment of 17 June 2010, § 104; ECtHR, Shafiyeva v. Russia, no. 49379/09, judgment of 3 May 2012, § 103).

b) Applicability of Article 3 to the Kosovo context

131. With regard to the applicability of the above standards to the Kosovo context, the Panel first refers to its view on the same issue with regard to Article 2, developed above (see §§ 70 - 79 above).

132. The Panel reiterates that a normally functioning law enforcement system should take into account the protection needs of victims and witnesses, as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations. The Panel has already considered the fact that by 2003 the police and justice system in Kosovo was described by the UN Secretary-General as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” (see § 16 above).

133. The Panel again notes that it will not review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations in abstracto, but only in relation to their specific application to the complaint before it, considering the particular circumstances of the case.

134. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it has to establish with regard to each case whether the attitude and reactions of UNMIK authorities to the disappearance itself and to the complainants’ quest for information with regard to the fate of their relatives and the criminal investigation, would amount to a violation of the obligation under Article 3, having regard to the realities in Kosovo at the relevant time.
c) Compliance with Article 3 in the present case

135. Against this background, the Panel discerns a number of factors in the present case which, taken together, raise the question of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

136. The Panel notes the proximity of the family ties between the complainant and Mr Stajko Andelković, as he is the complainant’s father.

137. The Panel recalls the failure established above in relation to the procedural obligation under Article 2, despite the fact that UNMIK Police had the minimum necessary information to pursue investigation from the outset. The Panel further notes that the complainant was never contacted by UNMIK authorities, including for the purpose of gathering further information on the disappearance, providing an update in the investigation, and involving him in the search for Mr Stajko Andelković. In this respect, the Panel reiterates that from the standpoint of Article 3 it may examine UNMIK’s reactions and attitudes to the complainant in their entirety.

138. As was shown above with regard to Article 2, no investigation, even a bare minimum, was conducted in this case. The complainant was never formally interviewed by either UNMIK Police or prosecutors; the ante-mortem data present in the investigative file was collected by the ICRC. Instead of investigating, the police was simply waiting for information to appear by itself.

139. Also, while assessing the investigative process in this case against the requirements set forth under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the ECHR, the Panel has already rejected a possibility that the failure to contact and interview the complainant and other family members may have been caused by the lack of contact details (see § 90 above). Drawing inferences from UNMIK’s failure to provide a plausible explanation for the absence of any contact with the complainant, the Panel considers that this situation, which continued into the period of the Panel’s temporal jurisdiction, caused grave uncertainty to the complainant and his family about Mr Stajko Andelković’s fate and the status of the investigation.

140. In view of the above, the Panel concludes that the complainant has suffered severe distress and anguish for a prolonged and continuing period of time on account of the way the authorities of UNMIK have dealt with the case and as a result of her inability to find out what happened to Mr Stajko Andelković. In this respect, it is obvious that, in any situation, the pain of a son who has to live in uncertainty about the fate of his father must be unbearable.

141. For the aforementioned reasons, the Panel concludes that, by its behaviour, UNMIK contributed to the complainant’s distress and mental suffering in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

142. In light of the Panel’s findings in this case, the Panel is of the opinion that some form of reparation is necessary.
143. The Panel notes that enforced disappearances constitute serious violations of human rights which shall be investigated and prosecuted under any circumstances. The Panel also notes that UNMIK as the territorial administration of Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 had the primary responsibility to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for the disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković’s, and that its failure to do so constitutes a further serious violation of the rights of the victim and his next-of-kin, in particular the right to have the truth of the matter determined.

144. The Panel notes the SRSG’s own concerns that the inadequate resources, especially at the outset of UNMIK’s mission, made compliance with UNMIK’s human rights obligations difficult to achieve.

145. It would normally be for UNMIK to take the appropriate measures in order to put an end to the violation noted and to redress as far as possible the effects thereof. However, as the Panel noted above (see § 18), UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to the administration of justice in Kosovo ended on 9 December 2008, with EULEX assuming full operational control in the area of rule of law. UNMIK therefore is no longer in a position to take measures that will have a direct impact on the investigations that are still pending before EULEX or local authorities. Likewise, following the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on 17 February 2008 and subsequently, the entry into force of the Kosovo Constitution on 15 June 2008, UNMIK ceased to perform executive functions in Kosovo, this fact limiting its ability to provide full and effective reparation of the violation committed, as required by established principles of international human rights law.

146. The Panel considers that this factual situation does not relieve UNMIK from its obligation to redress as far as possible the effects of the violations for which it is responsible.

With respect to the complainant and the case the Panel considers appropriate that UNMIK:

- In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on situations of limited State jurisdiction (see ECtHR [GC], Ilașcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, no. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, ECHR, 2004-VII, § 333; ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, judgment of 2 March 2010, § 171; ECtHR [GC]), Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, judgment of 19 October 2012, § 109), must endeavour, with all the diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis EULEX and the Kosovo authorities, to obtain assurances that the investigations concerning the case at issue will be continued in compliance with the requirements of an effective investigation as envisaged by Article 2, that the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković will be established and that perpetrators will be brought to justice. The complainant and/or other next-of-kin shall be informed of such proceedings and relevant documents shall be disclosed to them, as necessary;

- Publicly acknowledges, within a reasonable time, responsibility with respect to UNMIK’s failure to adequately investigate abduction and disappearance of Mr Stajko Andelković, as well as the distress and mental suffering subsequently incurred, and makes a public apology to the complainant and her family in this regard;
- Takes appropriate steps towards payment of adequate compensation to the complainant for the moral damage suffered due to UNMIK’s failure to conduct an effective investigation as well as for distress and mental suffering incurred by the complainant as a consequence of UNMIK’s behaviour.

The Panel also considers appropriate that UNMIK:

- In line with the UN General Assembly Resolution on “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (A/Res/60/147, 21 March 2006), takes appropriate steps, through other UN affiliated entities operating in Kosovo, local bodies and non-governmental organisations, for the realisation of a full and comprehensive reparation programme, including restitution compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, for the victims from all communities of serious violations of human rights which occurred during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict;

- Takes appropriate steps before competent bodies of the United Nations, including the UN Secretary-General, towards the allocation of adequate human and financial resources to ensure that international human rights standards are upheld at all times by the United Nations, including when performing administrative and executive functions over a territory, and to make provision for effective and independent monitoring;

FOR THESE REASONS,

The Panel, unanimously,

1. FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

2. FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

3. RECOMMENDS THAT UNMIK:

   a. URGES EULEX AND OTHER COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF MR STAJKO ANDELKOVIĆ IS CONTINUED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THAT THE PERPETRATORS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE;
b. PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S FATHER, AS WELL AS FOR DISTRESS AND MENTAL SUFFERING INCURRED, AND MAKES A PUBLIC APOLOGY TO THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS FAMILY;

c. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS PAYMENT OF ADEQUATE COMPENSATION OF THE COMPLAINANT FOR MORAL DAMAGE IN RELATION TO THE FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 AND ARTICLE 3 OF THE ECHR.

d. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF A FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMME;

e. TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A GUARANTEE OF NON REPETITION;

f. TAKES IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL AND TO INFORM THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PANEL ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS CASE.

Andrey Antonov
Executive Officer

Marek Nowicki
Presiding Member
## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCIU</td>
<td>Central Criminal Investigation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPO</td>
<td>District Public Prosecutor’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRAP</td>
<td>Human Rights Advisory Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>United Nation Human Rights Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACtHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMP</td>
<td>International Commission of Missing Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>International Security Force (commonly known as Kosovo Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPU</td>
<td>Missing Persons Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUP</td>
<td>Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Serbian: Министарство унутрашњих послова)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMPF</td>
<td>Office on Missing Persons and Forensics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRIIC</td>
<td>Victim Recovery and Identification Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCIU</td>
<td>War Crimes Investigation Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>