In an opinion piece today, publicist Veton Surroi writes that the election of the president of Kosovo was a crucial moment for both the government and the opposition. For the government, the successful election of the president means that the ruling parties will remain in power and there will be no early elections. The successful election of the president also implies that the political crisis is over as the opposition’s goal to bring down the government and hold early elections has obviously failed. However, remarks Surroi, “not only has Kosovo not overcome the crisis but it is likely to have advanced even further into it.” At present, two courts could have dealings with the newly-elected president. One is the Constitutional Court and the other is the Special Court headquartered in The Hague. If a case is brought before the Constitutional Court asking it to interpret the legality of the election of the new president of Kosovo, the court could refer its decision to its previous ruling of 2011 when it established that the election of Behgjet Pacolli as president of Kosovo was anti-constitutional because not all MPs had the possibility to exercise their constitutional right to vote. The Constitutional Court, at the time, had ruled that the election of the president of Kosovo is so important as to necessitate the presence of all members of the Assembly at the voting process. “Whatever the decision of the Constitutional Court it will lead Kosovo a step further into the crisis,” writes Surroi. If the Court were to say that Thaci’s election was in line with the Constitution while that of Pacolli, that took place under the exact same circumstances, was not, it would only widen the gap between the opposition and the government. At the same time, if the Constitutional Court ruled that Thaci’s election was anti-constitutional it would become involved in the crisis as it would have to propose a way out of it. If its decision is reached before 7 March, which is highly unlikely in Surroi's view, the Assembly would have to initiate another voting process from scratch. If, however, the decision of the Constitutional Court is reached after 7 March, Kosovo would either try to elect a president once again or hold early elections. The idea of trying to elect a president again, beyond the constitutional time frame, is one that can easily be challenged, whereas the prospect of early elections would be more realistic, says Surroi. As for the second court that could have dealings with the new president Hashim Thaci, the Special Court, could call Thaci in different capacities, including that of an indictee. Regardless of what post Thaci will occupy at the time of this call, it is certain that his possible indictment would present part of a crisis for even more serious countries than Kosovo. “Whichever the decision of the Court towards Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s name, to a large extent due to H.Thaci’s name, is likely not to emerge out of the crisis zone,” concludes Surroi.