LOCAL PRESS

 

Kosovo’s privileged EU path (Politika/Tanjug)

Unlike Serbia, which took five years to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, it took Kosovo only two years to sign the SAA in Strasbourg yesterday. The EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy Johannes Hahn, who signed the SAA with Kosovo on behalf of the EU, assessed that this was a significant step in the relations between the EU and Kosovo. “The first step towards enlargement is requesting the candidate status, and Kosovo cannot do this as long as it is not recognized as an independent state by all EU member states and institutions,” a European official who wished to remain anonymous told Tanjug. Since Kosovo is not recognized by five EU member states, Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania, it was decided at the beginning of the process for the SAA not to be signed with Kosovo with member states, as in the cases of other candidates in the Balkans, but with the EU, which received with the Lisbon agreement the status of a legal entity and possibility to negotiate on international agreements. On the other side, the Head of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Djuric pointed out that the fact that the SAA was signed with Kosovo in a different way goes to say that Kosovo is not a state. The Head of the Office for EU Integration Ksenija Milenkovic explains that the SAA signed by Pristina is “such that it doesn’t imply attributes of statehood”, noting that the agreement contains only elements that are in the EU jurisdiction, but not of member states. The EU Council approved in June 2013 the opening of SAA negotiations with Kosovo after the feasibility study was done, and the European Commission adopted the SAA at the end of April this year and forwarded it to the EU Council of Ministers, and then the member states gave a green light last week at the meeting of the preparatory body of the Council.

 

Macedonian Ambassador dismissed over the vote for Kosovo in UNESCO? (Vesti online)

Macedonian President Georgi Ivanov has dismissed by decree Agron Buxhaku from the post of the Macedonian Ambassador in France. Buxhaku was the Minister of Transport from the ranks of the Albanian government coalition partner DUI, and he was appointed the Macedonian Ambassador to France in 2009. The reasons for his dismissal had not been given, but it is speculated that he was dismissed over the decision to vote for Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO. Several days before the decree of President Ivanov on Buxhaku’s dismissal, Macedonian journalist close to the authorities Milenko Nedelkovski told Sputnik that Macedonia’s decision to support Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO was a big surprise since it is contrary to its national interests. He stressed that Skopje’s decision to support Kosovo is a result of arbitrary action of the Macedonian Ambassador. “We have a problem with the ambassador in Israel, but the problem with the ambassador in Paris is even bigger. This is an Albanian staffer who has for years been beyond the control of the central authorities in Skopje, so Paris is lost for Macedonia as long as Buxhaku is there,” said Nedelkovski. He added that 25 percent of the Albanian minority in Macedonia voted against the will of 75 percent of people who neither wishes nor approves this. “If this means anything to you in Serbia, I apologize to you on behalf of the Macedonian people for this more than stupid decision for Kosovo to join UNESCO,” said Nedelkovski.

 

Textbooks still stuck at customs (Danas)

Instead of the first regular class, more than 7,000 Albanian pupils in eight Presevo and five Bujanovac elementary schools had the opportunity to hear from their teachers the stand of the National Council of Albanians, according to which, due to the ignoring of the Serbian Education Ministry, more than 100,000 textbooks sent from Kosovo have been at the customs terminal at the Presevo border crossing for nearly two months. The paradox is even more complete when one bears in mind that these textbooks are not on the “list of disputable”, as was the case with books for history, geography and biology. “The textbooks are for mathematics, physics, chemistry that cannot be disputable. I don’t understand the ignorant stand of Minister Verbic, who is obviously creating a problem out of nothing and causing discrimination of pupils in one part of Serbian territory,” explains Skender Destani, member of the National Council of Albanians and the leader of the Democratic Union of the Valley (DUI) from Presevo. He says the decision on the boycott is “only a warning” for the time being and no party has passed this decision but the National Council of Albanians that is in charge of education, including the usage of textbooks in the Albanian language. MP of the Party for Democratic Action (PDD) from Bujanovac Saip Kamberi sees this as a purely political problem: “We sent a letter two months ago to the Serbian Education Ministry and relevant embassies in Serbia and pointed to this problem. We have no response. They annulled the positive practice from the period between 2003 and 2007 when the education minister approved the usage of certain textbooks for classes in Albanian in southern municipalities, which were sent from Pristina. Now we have a bad atmosphere for unknown reasons, which mostly harms Albanian pupils.”

 

Markotic: Serbia and Croatia victims of migrant crisis (Beta/RTS)

The Croatian Ambassador to Serbia Gordan Markotic has stated in Cuprija that Serbia and Croatia were victims of the migrant crisis situation that occurred unexpectedly. He says that both Serbia and Croatia had been transit states for refugees and migrants until now. “After the latest Sunday meeting in Brussels, we will probably have to shelter one part of the refugees for some time and that is why cooperation of the two states is necessary,” said Markotic. He points out that the Serbian and Croatian interior ministers agreed to jointly cooperate. “Without that cooperation this process cannot be adequately resolved and directed. It is important that there has been cooperation on the ground from day one. Police members in both states cooperate on the ground and harmonize their activities,” said the Ambassador. “One may expect, considering that the situation in Syria is very complicated, that the number of refugees towards Western Europe will even increase,” said Markotic.

 

ICTY published cause of Dunjic’s death before autopsy (Novosti)

No autopsy results on the causes of the death of Professor Dunjic were submitted to his family and defense lawyers of Ratko Mladic until late afternoon Tuesday. Novosti’s source claims that it is unknown on what grounds The Hague Tribunal released an official statement on Monday that the forensic specialist died of natural causes. Both the ICTY and the lawyers had the information from the police that the analysis of tissue and blood samples would be completed on Tuesday, yet the ICTY published the announcement of the natural death a day earlier. In the meantime, Mladic’s defense in general agreed cooperation with an eminent Serbian pathologist who is supposed to defend Dunjic’s findings on how exactly the victims buried in Srebrenica had died. If the court agrees, this person will take over extensive work. Dunjic processed all Hague court records, 3,568 of them, and determined that of this number of victims, 422 soldiers were undoubtedly executed, that some of them were killed in battle, while the cause of death for a certain number of soldiers cannot be accurately determined. Novosti’s source in The Hague requested yesterday that it doesn’t publish the name of the pathologist who is to replace Dunjic until this person gives consent, as it seems being a pathologist in The Hague has become risky business. The same source claims that it is perhaps not disputable that he had a heart attack or a stroke, but what had caused it. “Professor Dunjic was a healthy man and he didn’t require any special medical attention,” Novosti’s source states, pointing that he had refused to fill the ICTY form for medical attention. “Serbia should form together with the Republika Srpska Army a commission that will conduct forensic analysis of the remains found in Srebrenica. If this analysis would confirm Dunjic’s findings, we could tell the whole world what we have – that there was no genocide in Srebrenica. Russia and China could help us with this. We would not be able to change anything legally with these forensic findings, but this is very important for history and the future,” attorney Toma Fila told Novosti.

 

REGIONAL PRESS

 

SBB reveals names of new ministers (Bosna danas)

After the final agreement of the presidents of the Alliance for a Better Future (SBB) Fahrudin Radoncic and SDA Bakir Izetbegovic, SBB released names of the future ministers in the FB&H government. The SBB submitted the names of the candidates to the Office of the FB&H President. Edita Djapo has been proposed as a Minister of Tourism and Environment, Nermin Dzindic as a Minister of Energy, Mining and Industry, Vesko Drljaca as a Minister for Labor and Social Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, and Zlatko Vujanovic as a Minister of Commerce. Drljaca and Vujanovic are from the ranks of Serb people. Unofficially, new ministers should be appointed by Friday.

 

Crnadak: Joint session of B&H and Serbia’s governments on November 4 (Bosna danas)

The joint session of the B&H Council of Ministers and the government of Serbia will be held on November 4 in Sarajevo in the morning hours, B&H Foreign Minister Igor Crnadak has confirmed. Crnadak told reporters today he expects that this joint session will have a great symbolic importance because it will confirm the continuation of good relations between B&H and Serbia which are getting better and stronger. The meeting is also expected to produce concrete result since it will be the opportunity to discuss new agreements, protocols and new joint projects. Crnadak said that Council of Ministers did not discuss the appointment of the Director of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) because the session was not attended by the Minister of Security Dragan Mektic and his deputy Mijo Kresic. “There will be no problem concerning this issue and we will appoint SIPA director as soon as next Tuesday, when many appointments will be on the agenda”, Crnadak said.

 

B&H Presidency considers report on the preparedness of B&H for EU membership (Patria)

At the upcoming session of the B&H Presidency, to be held on Wednesday at 2 p.m., the first item on the agenda is the Report on the preparedness of B&H for the submission of application for EU membership. Among other things, three members of the Presidency will give approval for the conclusion of the Protocol between the B&H Security Ministry and the Serbian Interior Ministry in the field of forensic and expert examinations. Moreover, the proposal of the decision on ratification of Protocol between the B&H Council of Ministers the government of the Republic of Moldova on travelling of the citizens without visas will also be considered.

 

INTERNATIONAL PRESS

 

Serbia to remain Russia’s friend but for rational reasons — PM Vucic (TASS, 27 October 2015)

Aleksandar Vucic is confident that Russia and Serbia would step up cooperation in many spheres

Russia and Serbia sign documents on cooperation in economy, investment and joint projects

MOSCOW. Serbia will remain Russia’s friend but for rational and pragmatic reasons, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic told journalists on Tuesday after talks with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. "Serbia will remain a friend of Russia for rational reasons," Vucic said. According to him, Serbia is close to signing an agreement with Gazprom for expanding the area of a gas storage to 1 billion cubic metres. "We are close to signing an agreement with Gazprom on expanding the gas storage to 1 billion cubic metres," the Serbian prime minister said. Vucic said he was confident that Russia and Serbia would step up cooperation in many spheres. He added that Serbia was ready to invite Russian companies to Serbia to build infrastructure facilities in the Serbian territory and expected the Russian side to do the same. According to Vucic, the two prime ministers discussed measures to increase Serbian exports to Russia and prospects for organizing the repairs of some sorts of machinery and equipment in Serbia. The Serbian prime minister also said that Serbia intended to pay all its outstanding debts to Russia, Gazprom in the first place, in advance. "The improving situation in the Serbian budget and a desire to build relations with Russia on a transparent and responsible basis makes it clear that Serbia will pay its outstanding debts to Russia, Gazprom in particular," Vucic said in Russian. Serbia proved its friendly attitude to Russia when it refused to impose the anti-Russian sanctions and pledges to continue this policy, Vucic told the Russian prime minister. "We believe that we proved our sincere and friendly attitude to Russia when we became one of the European countries, which refused to impose sanctions on Russia despite numerous demands from the whole world. Serbia will continue pursuing this policy in future," Vucic stressed. Vucic said that Serbia was genuinely grateful to Russia for its help and protection of Serbia’s vital interests at the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in which Serbia is fighting for the preservation of its churches, monasteries and historical monuments. Serbia proved its friendly attitude to Russia when it refused to impose the anti-Russian sanctions and pledges to continue this policy, Serbian Prime Minister said. "We believe that we proved our sincere and friendly attitude to Russia when we became one of the European countries, which refused to impose sanctions on Russia despite numerous demands from the whole world. Serbia will continue pursuing this policy in future," Vucic stressed. The Serbian premier added that he had invited Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to pay an official visit to Serbia in 2016. "Welcome to Serbia."

 

Ambassadors Demand Action From Macedonia PM (BIRN, by Sinisa Jakov Marusic, 28 October 2015)

Western ambassadors have called on Macedonia's Prime Minister to urgently show more commitment on implementing the stalled crisis agreement.

The ambassadors of the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union, in a joint statement on Tuesday urged Nikola Gruevski's VMRO DPMNE party to urgently implement several key reforms that they agreed this summer. "Late Friday night, we met with Prime Minister Gruevski and expressed our disappointment at the failure to meet the October 20 deadline agreed to in the July 15 Przino Agreement for the exchange of ministers," the statement said. The warning came after the government and opposition at EU-mediated talks missed the October 20 deadline to appoint new opposition ministers to the government. The parties previously missed the deadline for a package of urgent electoral reforms to ensure free and fair early elections in April. They also failed to enable the Special Prosecutor to start probing the illegal surveillance cases on which the entire crisis in Macedonia centres. "We urge VMRO-DPMNE to demonstrate the required commitment and to implement the agreement in a constructive and urgent manner and with good faith," the ambassadors said. They called on Gruevski "to empower his team to finalise agreement on the unresolved issues in the Przino Agreement and implement the necessary reforms quickly." They also urged Gruevski to give all necessary resources to the Special Prosecutor, whose team of 14 deputies has still not formally been approved. Failure to act with "absolute urgency that the situation demands," the ambassadors continued, "will impact [on] the assessment by the European Commission", which is due to publish its annual progress report on Macedonia next week. "Governments, and especially their heads, have a special responsibility in times of political crisis", the ambassadors pointed out. This message reached Gruevski when he was out of the country, however. He is yet to return from his business visit to the United Arab Emirates. The ambassadors also called on the opposition Social Democrats, who recently threatened to release more compromising wiretaps of official conversations, to stick to the agreement and refrain from such acts. The talks on urgent reforms are part of the EU-brokered political deal reached this summer aimed at ending the crisis in Macedonia over the unlawful mass surveillance allegations. The opposition claims the covertly recorded tapes that it has been releasing since February show that Gruevski was behind the illegal surveillance of some 20,000 people, including ministers. Gruevski, who has held power since 2006, insists the tapes were “fabricated” by unnamed foreign intelligence services and given to the opposition to destabilise the country. Last week, EU mediator Peter Vanhoutte said that the EU-brokered crisis deal would be dead - and Macedonia could find itself as isolated as Belarus - if leaders failed to agree on the key reforms.

 

Bosnia flags EU membership bid by end-2015 (Reuters, 28 October 2015)

SARAJEVO: Bosnia plans to kick-start a long-delayed bid to join the European Union by applying for membership by the end of this year, the chairman of the country's three-man presidency said on Tuesday. The Balkan country signed an association agreement with the EU as far back as 2008 but, having dragged on reforms, did not see that ratified until June, after Germany and Britain last year moved to revive its membership bid by focussing on economic and social rather than political issues. Under that initiative, the EU required the ethnically divided country's leaders to agree a reform agenda and timetable, a task Bosnia has completed. "The goal is ... to file a credible application by the end of this year," Dragan Covic, the Croat chairman of the inter-ethnic presidency, told a news conference, adding he was convinced outstanding issues would be resolved by then. Bosnia lags behind its neighbours on road to joining the 28-nation EU. It has struggled to overcome ethnic divisions that linger 20 years after the end of a war in which some 100,000 people died, and many observers believe membership is unlikely before 2025. Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, the head of the EU delegation in Bosnia, said the bloc expected "meaningful progress" on the reform agenda. "But we as Europeans stand ready to support you... along the way," Wigemark said. "I think it's time for good news to come out of Bosnia-Herzegovina." In its negotiations with the EU, Bosnia has agreed on a long-disputed coordination of decision-making among various government layers, which its leaders have yet to endorse. The country's two autonomous regions have also kicked off social and economic reforms, though most remain blocked in their respective parliaments. Wigemark said the bloc would support Bosnia's reforms with 1 billion euro (718.52 million pound) over the next three years, and a further 500 million euros for infrastructure investment.

 

Bosnia’s Fragile Stability Masks a Downward Spiral (BIRN, by Kurt Bassuener, 28 October 2015)

Underlying all the elements of a disturbing security picture is the West’s retreat from its role as enforcer of the Dayton order and driver of reform

As Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches the first anniversary of the German-British initiative and the 20th anniversary of the Dayton Accords, the Democratization Policy Council, DPC, and the Atlantic Initiative, AI, are collaborating on a series of policy notes which examine various aspects of BiH’s security situation. Written by my DPC colleague Bodo Weber, AI’s Vlado Azinović, and myself, these papers comprise the DPC and AI’s second edition of our 2011 Security Risk Analysis.  The first four policy notes – on inflammatory political rhetoric, socio-economic drivers, the Armed Forces of BiH, and EUFOR – have been published; two more – on police and Islamic extremism – are forthcoming. Little has improved since four years ago, and there has been significant regression on a number of fronts. Underlying all the elements of the multifaceted security picture is a Western retreat from its earlier role as enforcer of the Dayton order and driver of reform expected to navigate BiH out of its systemic dysfunctional arrangement toward a stable democracy based on the rule of law, political accountability, economic prosperity and social justice. The result of that retreat is the existence of a rules-free environment which has propelled BiH into a downward spiral. The resulting rules-free environment propels the downward spiral. The media is largely politically suborned. The pronounced nationalist themes articulated by politicians and their adjuncts, revolving around the future of the state and alleged threats posed to ethnic communities by adversaries both domestic and foreign (and their alleged local allies), have inflamed the public discourse and contributed to fear and homogenization. The topic of “war” has returned to popular discussion. This phenomenon was evident in media coverage of the 2012 municipal elections, the 2014 general elections, issues and events relating to Srebrenica, acts of Islamist terrorism, and the popular protests of February 2014. In each instance, political leaders, dubious “experts,” and commentators have all fed into a dynamic that could have dire consequences, generating volatility that could ignite violence by design or accident. While all those with unfulfilled agendas are pursuing them without restraint to form perceptions and opinions in the media, the most consistent and radical messaging is emanating from the Republika Srpska government and President Milorad Dodik in particular. While BiH politicians define the agenda, the politically captive media provides the means to radicalize, intimidate, provoke anger, and stoke fear.  This information dominance is a vital element of the political elites’ life support system. The socio-economic outlook is also bleak.  Despite a shallow recovery beginning in 2011 and implementation of basic initial structural reforms, the structural causes of BiH’s socio-economic weakness, and above all the patronage system, remain untouched.  To buy social peace, the ruling elites have become increasingly reliant on the IMF, other IFIs, and on commercial borrowing. The IMF provided credit arrangements since 2010 (the last infusion being in June), although structural reform commitments were not being honored and despite rising political instability. The reasons for this generosity lie primarily with the EU’s policy of that time: unable to muster the political will to confront domestic political resistance to reforms in BiH, the EU has lowered or dropped altogether its reform conditions. In 2013, the EU provided direct budget support to BiH without serious conditionality. With rapidly rising levels of public indebtedness and social disaffection, this approach proved unsustainable in the long run, as became evident in the violent outburst of social frustration in February 2014. Those protests – and most specifically the political reaction to them – underscore the nature of the danger. Bosnia’s full political spectrum attempted to instrumentalize the protests, with many leaders mischaracterizing them as ethnic in essence.  When they are under popular pressure, ethnic fear-mongering is the go-to tool of the political elites. Luckily, they got little traction but it wasn’t for lack of effort.  All the socio-economic and political factors that underlay the 2014 protests remain salient today. The only partial good news story is to be found in the one institution which emerged from the May 2014 flood emergency with its reputation enhanced: the Armed Forces. Despite limited resources, predicated by its being put on a starvation diet since birth ten years ago, the AFBiH rescued citizens in flood affected areas, protected property, and conducted vital recovery tasks (collecting dead livestock, etc).  In so doing, it provided a boost to morale and won the greatest popular appreciation it has enjoyed in a near-decade of existence. With the exception of some municipalities, the remainder of the government sector was an abject disaster.  The experience of the flood response also highlighted various equipment and training deficiencies that can be targeted for improvement. In addition, the forward movement toward registering defense property, still resisted by RS authorities despite court judgments in the state’s favor, will – if continued – help pave the way towards activating the NATO Membership Action Plan. The AFBiH’s foreign deployments, most notably to Afghanistan, have improved skills and exposure to other NATO member and partner forces. However, the AFBiH suffers from all the institutional maladies that infuse (mal)governance in BiH: patronage and clientelism, short-termism, and a lack of accountability. The polarized political environment has taken its toll on the development of the force. The AFBiH came into existence in 2006, when state-building reforms halted and went into reverse.  The RS has regularly targeted the AFBiH budget as part of its policy of demilitarizing BiH, thereby further weakening the state. Ominously, RS President Dodik recently said that the dissolution of the Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, was among the biggest mistakes of his predecessors. He has intimated in the past that the RS should have its own army, most visibly in the floods when he appointed former VRS General Momir Zec to command the civil defense response in Doboj – and punish Mayor Obren Petrović for his “pro-Bosnian” policy. In addition, much like Dayton BiH itself, the AFBiH is built on compromises that impede its further integration and development. These include the (ceremonial) regimental system, which was intended to contain the traditions of the three wartime armies – the (mainly Bosniak) Armija, the VRS, and (the Bosnian Croat) HVO – among the veterans of those forces.  These are now recruiting new inductees. Furthermore, the fact that the AFBiH fields nine ethnic-majority infantry battalions, based in areas of majority affiliation, also poses a barrier to integration and a threat to cohesion. Interviewees have reported increased displays of political and religious affiliation within the ranks for career advancement.  While none of those interviewed for the study believed that the AFBiH would initiate violence or destabilization, all of them believed that it would collapse in the event of serious inter-ethnic conflict. Finally, the study spotlights the weakened state of EUFOR, which has been cut by more than half since 2011 to a mere 600 troops, less than 10 per cent of its original strength in 2004. The deterrent force is not currently configured for its peace enforcement mandate, as stipulated in Dayton’s Annex 1A and mandated by the UN Security Council; it can neither deter not react to security threats. Few expert interviewees expressed confidence that it could secure Sarajevo International Airport as an arrival site for reinforcements; several questioned its capability to secure its own base at Butmir. This amounts to a yet-unchallenged deterrence failure for the EU and the West. The just-completed Brzi Odgovor (rapid response) exercise just held in Manjača, near Banja Luka, did involve British, Slovak, Bulgarian and Romanian troops, in addition to the Austrian, Hungarian and Turkish forces already composing EUFOR, along with AFBiH troops.

The exercise involved a civil disturbance scenario with unruly demonstrators.  This choice was odd on two levels, however. The AFBiH has no mandate or training to respond to civil disturbances. Secondly, the AFBiH has no mandate to respond to other internal threats to the “safe and secure environment” – EUFOR’s mandate includes both. One military professional interviewed since the exercise derided it as “a show” rather than a test of the EU’s ability to react. The desire of most EU member states to retreat from the executive role of EUFOR is evident in the latest renewal of its authorization from the EU Foreign Affairs Council: “(EUFOR) retains the capability to contribute to the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities' deterrence capacity if the situation so requires while focusing on capacity building and training.” Which BiH authorities are being referred to remains unclear but the implication seems to be the AFBiH, which has no deterrent role except to external threats. The alternative is local law enforcement bodies, for which “deterrence” is an odd choice of word. So the language is practically nonsensical, except as a reflection of the desire of most EU member states to get out of the peace enforcement business in BiH. They may get their wish in a few weeks’ time, when EUFOR’s Chapter 7 mandate comes up for a vote in the UN Security Council. The DPC and others feared a veto last year, owing to a still unexplained shift in the RS position on EUFOR from support to opposition and increased tensions with Russia following its seizure of Crimea and initiation of a war in Ukraine.  Russia abstained, but only after delivering a vitriolic attack on BiH’s future in the EU and NATO. Since then, Russia cast its veto over the UK-sponsored Srebrenica commemoration resolution in July 2015. There is no evident political preparation for a Russian veto, despite the potential for one. Recent interlocutors relate that, as drafter of the resolution this year, Russia will redact the Euro-Atlantic integration language it objected to last year and not cast its veto. This remains to be seen. Sources in EUFOR related a sense that in the event of a Russian veto, NATO would re-assume the Annex 1A deterrent role and obtain an open-ended authorization from the BiH Presidency to do so.  But no political action has been taken to date to ensure this in advance, to the author’s knowledge.  The international default setting, as last year, seems to be to hope for the best without preparing for the worst. Responding to these challenges is well within the West’s capabilities and mandate. But the will to confront them directly and with unflinching resolve is lacking; maintaining stability in BiH trumps promotion of real progress among EU and other Western capitals leaving them too timid to act. But as our research shows, the status quo is far from stable. Ruling out the use of executive security tools leaves the West with only one effective lever of influence: money. BiH’s political elites know this. Neither do any internal incentives exist to induce political elites to operate differently. Reducing the security risk would enable application of greater pressure on BiH political elites. But it would also entail an embarrassing policy reversal, which is why it remains off the policy menu.

 Kurt Bassuener is a Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.  He lives in Sarajevo.