Lumir Abdixhiku, executive director of the Pristina-based research institute RIINVEST, writes in an opinion piece that dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade must happen but that "the process should respect some general principles that Kosovars need to lay out”. The first and most important principle, according to Abdixhiku, should be national unity. “National unity is important especially if we are obliged to address Kosovo’s internal arrangements – always in compliance with the Constitution. National unity (…) requires the inclusion not only of the government – as legitimate representatives of the people – but also of opposition forces, independent thinkers, academics and other activists. The Kosovar side should insist on building unity before continuing with any process of talks. At the end of the day, if dialogue will be interrupted because of elections in Serbia, there is no reason why it should not be interrupted until a unity solution is found in Kosovo”. The second principle, Abdixhiku writes, is that Kosovo must lay out a framework of red lines that should never be crossed. “By red lines I do not mean only the red lines of the constitution that should have no alternative, but also about other conditions that we should present as a party. For example, one of the red lines should say that new processes should not commence until the previous ones are completed. If Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s license plates even two years after the signing of the agreement on freedom of movement, then dialogue on other topics becomes senseless. Or if Serbia continues to prevent Kosovo’s membership of international organizations, then it is unreasonable to insist on dialogue. Kosovo and Serbia should first agree on a memorandum of understanding that creates the minimal conditions for addressing the problems at hand”. Abdixhiku suggests that as the third principle, Kosovo should determine a clear roadmap from now to the end of the process of dialogue. “In this roadmap, the Kosovar side should determine the eventual results and outcomes of the process. For example, Kosovo should foresee its ultimate benefits. Recognition by Serbia? Membership of the United Nations? Recognition by the five non-recognizing EU member states? In line with the expected results, one needs to make eventual compromises. Because if we allow for a telecom company in the north we get recognition by Serbia in return, we can call it a good agreement. However, if we give away everything and receive nothing in return, as has been the case for quite some time now, it will be a futile process, without the results that can help stabilize Kosovo”.