LOCAL PRESS

Vucic thanks India for firm support to Serbia’s territorial integrity (Beta/RTS)

During a visit to the Indian city of Gandhinagar, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic met with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi and said he was grateful for India’s firm support to Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and supported India’s combat against terrorism. In his address to the reporters of Serbian media, Vucic also said that Serbia would ask India to, in the event of the expected repeated vote in UNESCO on the admission of Kosovo into this organization, once again be “absolutely against” such a possibility. Besides bilateral relations, Vucic and Modi also discussed the furthering of economic cooperation – primarily in the food industry, agriculture, pharmacy, military industry, tourism and IT technologies. He also announced that, in the course of this year, a mixed Serbian-Indian committee would be formed for economic cooperation which wasn’t formed in 2016 as had been foreseen because of the lack of readiness of the Serbian side.

Indictment against Haradinaj expanded (N1)

The Serbian War Crimes Prosecution has decided to expand the indictment against former KLA leader Ramush Haradinaj. The decision was made because the Prosecution has new evidence, N1 reported. The evidence concerns Haradninaj’s responsibility for war crimes committed in Kosovo that were not previously considered by the Hague Tribunal, and represent an addition to the evidence already submitted to France. The new evidence will be sent to the French court dealing with the case as soon as it has been translated into French – which is expected to happen before the end of this week.

Belgrade instructs stepping up security of 40 Serb diplomats (Novosti)

Serb diplomats in embassies believed to be the possible target of “Albanian terrorist” received instructions from Belgrade to raise security to a higher level, to avoid public events and limit their movements to a minimum, Novostireports. “The Ministry of Interior asked diplomatic representatives of Switzerland, Greece, Turkey, Germany and Italy – countries thought to be vulnerable to attacks against Serbian missions – to step up security of Serbian diplomatic missions, including around residential buildings, and where possible, to provide additional security to member of families of diplomats,” reads the daily.

EU: Haradinaj’s arrest proves that dialogue is necessary (Beta)

In an official EU reaction on the arrest of Ramush Haradinaj in France, Angelina Eichhorst said in the European Parliament (EP) on Jan. 9, that such situations are of no use, and that they rather implied a necessity of sorting out relations between Belgrade and Pristina, including the implementation of their agreement on judiciary. European diplomatic officials in Brussels told Beta off the record that the European External Action Service (EEAC) feared that the Haradinaj case could be used by the forces against the dialogue. The same sources said that it was necessary to calm the situation, answering a question about their take on Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama’s comment that Haradinaj’s arrest might have bad consequences for the entire region.

Integrated justice system requires Serbian law (Politika)

The integration of Serbian judges and prosecutors with the Kosovo system will not work until the state of Serbia passes a law on the status of judges and prosecutors, Politika reported. “The key to integration with the Kosovo system is the adoption of a law which would regulate the status of judges and prosecutors. That cannot be solved with any act, considering the fact that an act is a decision by the executive authorities, i.e. the government, which judicial staff and prosecutorial staff will not accept,” said a source close to the Serbian justice system, cited by Politika. An integrated justice system in northern Kosovo was supposed to start on 9 January, but the beginning was prolonged, due to administrative difficulties, according to the EU. Politika’s source said that no one would accept to file a request for their own sacking and transfer to the

Kosovo judicial system until the state of Serbia defined the status of judges and prosecutors. “I am sure that the full functioning of the integrated justice system will need at least a month,” Politika’s source said, adding that the training of judicial workers was being done in passing, while the technical problems with court buildings were now less important.

Explosive device thrown at hotel in Kosovska Mitrovica (Tanjug)

Unknown persons late on Tuesday threw an explosive device at the Sasa Hotel in Kosovska Mitrovica. Nobody was injured during the incident, but the blast caused material damage.

Head of the Regional Kosovo Police Zeljko Bojic told Tanjug that the explosion happened at 20:20, and that it broke the windows on the hotel. This was the second attack on the hotel during the past two weeks. The device thrown on 28 December failed to explode.
Vulin: Comparing RS and NDH great insult for all NDHvictims (RTS/Tanjug)

Serbian Labor Minister Aleksandar Vulin has stated that comparing the Republika Srpska (RS) Day with the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) is a huge and serious insult for all NDH victims. “Mr. Inzko would have to at least show that he respects Serbian victims in both World War II and in the Yugoslav war,” said Vulin, adding that he expects from Inzko to apologize for the deep insult he had caused to the RS, Serbs but also all descendants of NDH victims.

Drecun on Wilz’s statement (Politika)

The Chairperson of the Serbian parliamentary delegation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization Milovan Drecun said that the statement of Commander of the NATO Headquarters in B&H, Brigadier General Giselle Wilz symbolizes “clear intention to create as big influence as possible on processes in B&H”, and that pressure on the RS is “justified with alleged creation of stability” and used to deprive the RS of the competences given to the RS in Dayton. Asked to say if change in the White House might result in changes of NATO’s policy towards the Balkans, Drecun said that it is too early to say, as one has to see first what will be the policy of the new US Administration, especially when it comes to enlargement of the NATO and relations between Washington and Moscow.

Wilz stated that participation of any B&H Army member in celebration of the RS Day would represent violation of the law and that soldiers who decide to participate in celebration would be a subject to disciplinary measures.

REGIONAL PRESS

HR Inzko’s comparison between RS Day and 10 April, day when the NDH was established sparks fierce reactions (TV1)

Commenting on Monday’s speech of Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik in which he expressed aspirations for the RS to join Serbia, High Representative Valentin Inzko stated on Tuesday that secessionist intentions would definitely be “crossing of the red line”.

Inzko noted: “If we start marking 9 January as holiday, then it might occur to someone to celebrate, for instance, 10 April, the day when Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was formed.” Inzko stressed the need to look to the future rather than to the past. According to Inzko, the Prosecutor’s Office of B&H should take action in case there was violation of the Constitution and laws of B&H during Monday’s celebration in the RS.

RTRS carried that HR Inzko has shocked everyone in the RS on Tuesday, by comparing the RS to the NDH, a criminal organization from the Second World War. Political leaders from the RS agree that Inzko’s statement is rude and added that he forgot what his job is. Reacting to Inzko’s statement, the RS Veterans Organization (BORS) said it was an insult to Serbs and demanded from Inzko to either apologize or leave. RS President Milorad Dodik stated for Srna that Inzko has forgotten that he is supposed to protect the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), including the RS. He said Inzko is “a well-known clown of the international community”, who did not offend anyone in the RS by comparing the date of formation of the RS to the date of formation of NDH, but did show his real face in the end. Dodik said Inzko reminded with his statement that he belongs to those who supported NDH at the time, in which several hundred thousand Serbs disappeared and hinted that he has sympathies for that criminal creation. State MP Stasa Kosarac (SNSD) stated that the statement is over the line and reminded that Serbs suffered from policies of NDH. PDP leader Branislav Borenovic said Inzko obviously lost the sense of direction and reality and stressed that he is the last person who should make such comparison. SDS wondered if Inzko compared the internationally-recognized RS to criminal NDH due to ignorance. SDS called on representatives of the IC to say whether the role of the HR is related to implementation of peace in line with the DPA or spreading hatred and distrust among peoples in B&H. DNS said such appalling Inzko’s statements show his real role and his relations to the RS.

Russian Ambassador to B&H Petr Ivantsov stated for Srna on Tuesday that he was surprised with the comparison of the RS and NDH by HR Inzko. Ivantsov said such Inzko’s assessments are unacceptable, because he is obliged to contribute to reconciliation in B&H. He said such statements distort the reality and cause additional tensions, and added that previous international representatives took active part in marking of the RS Day.

B&H MoD launches investigation in connection with participation of B&H AF at RS Day celebration (BHT1/TV1)

The B&H Defense Ministry launched on Tuesday an investigation in connection with the participation of the members of the Armed Forces (AF) of B&H in the celebration of the RS Day. The investigation has been launched into the chain of command and other functional responsibilities in the defense system. Commenting on the issue, Deputy B&H Minister of Defense Sead Jusic stated that it is not true that he signed an order on the participation of the members of B&H AF in the celebration of the Day of the RS, which the B&H Constitutional Court (B&H CC) declared unconstitutional. Jusic explained that he did put his signature on a document that was later, after the reaction of the NATO HQ Commander in B&H, withdrawn. He noted that from that very moment, his signature, i.e. consent, became invalid. “The order, according to which all activities related to the earlier request were abolished, was forwarded to the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of B&H,” he explained. Jusic added that he does not know if Ivanic directly made the order or if all three members of the Presidency of B&H reached an agreement on the matter. Chairman of B&H Parliament’s Joint Commission for Defense and Security Sifet Podzic underscored that participation of B&H AF members in the RS Day celebration represents direct violation of the Law on Defense of B&H. Former B&H Minister of Defense and Bosniak member of the Presidency of B&H and leader of SDA Bakir Izetbegovic’s advisor Selmo Cikotic emphaszied that, according to the Constitution, NATO HQ Commander, Brigadier General Giselle Wilz has the power to dismiss B&H AF generals.

B&H Minister of Defense Marina Pendes said that there is nothing disputable about engagement of the Honorary Unit, because Ivanic is entitled to that. “The Third Regiment did not take part in the ceremony of marking the RS Day on 9 January. Part of the regiment, or more precisely the Honorary Unit, only participated in rendering salute to Chairman of B&H Presidency, Mr. Ivanic. By that, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and B&H AF did their job,” Pendes noted.

Dodik announces possible withdrawal of RS from agreement on formation of B&H AF (TV1)

RS President Milorad Dodik told reporters that Commander of NATO Headquarters Brigadier General Giselle Wilz’s actions are surprising and added that this has revoked the RS’ “already fragile and minimal confidence in that organization”. Dodik also announced possible withdrawal of the RS from the agreement on formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) Armed Forces (AF). Dodik said that the RS does not need “hostile” AF. “After these events and what the NATO Commander here in B&H did, the RS absolutely has no intention of dealing with issues of accession to NATO”, Dodik said. Dodik also announced that he as the RS President has no intention of dealing with any issue related to fulfillment of NATO conditions, which includes registration of military property. “The property must remain in the RS”, Dodik added. According to Dodik, the RS authorities will consider how the RS can terminate the agreement on B&H AF and return to “original Dayton agreement which implies that the RS has its army”. In this regard, he announced that he will gather Serb politicians in the RS in the upcoming days, in order to discuss this issue and whether this is the right moment to launch the initiative.

Ivanic prevented scandal by ordering 3rd Infantry Regiment to attend marking of RS Day (EuroBlic)

EuroBlic daily learned that the decision of B&H Presidency Chair Mladen Ivanic to issue the order to members of the Third Infantry Regiment to attend marking of Republika Srpska (RS) Day prevented more serious consequences for internal relations in B&H because, as sources claimed, there was a possibility for soldiers coming from the RS to self-willingly organize themselves and attend the celebration had not Ivanic issued such order. “At least 100 members of the Armed Forces of B&H from the RS, whose contracts are about to expire, would have surely appeared in Banja Luka. Had that happened, political crisis this would have caused in B&H would be immeasurable. In this way, the best possible compromise was made”, a source noted.

EP Rapporteur for B&H Dan Preda said he was shocked to find out that officials from Serbia attended the celebration of the Day of the RS (BHT1)

Official Brussels reiterated that the B&H Constitution and the institutions of this country need to be respected. European Parliament’s (EP) Rapporteur for B&H Cristian Dan Preda emphasized that he was shocked to find out that officials from Serbia attended the celebration of the Day of the RS on Monday, reminding that Serbia is on the road to the EU accession. According to him, it is unacceptable for Serbian officials to support events which are contrary to the Constitution of another country, which is a potential candidate for the EU membership. Preda also pointed out that Russia is the only winner in this whole story, given that it is in Russia’s interest to keep Serbia, as well as B&H, away from Europe.

Markovic talked to McCain: Ratification soon (CDM)

The US Senate will ratify the NATO–Montenegro accession protocol soon, said Sen. John McCain in a telephone conversation with Montenegrin Prime Minister Dusko Markovic. As the government announced, McCain called PM Markovic to congratulate him on the new position and expressed regret cancelling his visit that was supposed to be paid on 2 January due to unexpected obligations that emerged in Washington. “He said he would visit Montenegro as soon as possible along with a group of US senators,” it was said in the government’s statement. Markovic thanked McCain for his congratulations and said he was confident that the partnership between Montenegro and the United States would be continued in the future. “The strategic partnership between the two countries will be further strengthened by Montenegro’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance,” said Markovic.

Vajgl: Serbia’s relations with neighbors unacceptable, especially FM statement on Macedonia (MIA)

Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs attacked Monday Serbia over its relations with neighbors, especially Macedonia, MIA reports from Brussels. During a discussion on the European Commission’s 2016 Progress Report for Serbia, Slovenian MEPs Alojz Peterle and Ivo Vajgl, along with several other members from the Balkan region, condemned the recent statement by Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, who said they made a mistake of recognizing Macedonia under its constitutional name. “Regarding Serbia’s relations with its neighbors, they can be described as unacceptable. Here I refer to Dacic’s statement regarding Serbia’s recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name”, said MEP Vajgl. The EP draft-report praises Serbia regarding its progress to the EU, but has remarks over the judiciary’s independence, fight against corruption, failure to align its foreign policy with the one of the EU, lack of transparency in media ownership, pressure and intimidation of journalists etc.

Poposki: Interfering of PM, President in internal affairs of neighboring country is improper behavior (MIA)

An interference of a Prime Minister or President of a neighboring country in Macedonia’s internal affairs is neither decent nor appropriate. Especially not after the completion of democratic elections and ahead of the formation of the country’s new government, as such moves send wrong signals in the region, Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki says in regard to Tirana and Pristina recent activities of interference in Macedonia’s internal affairs. Such approach in a place of multicultural tradition is rather dangerous and far from the practice of good-neighborly relations, Poposki says. “If we agree that our future is in Europe we should work for stability, peace, justice and economic prosperity for all citizens. We have always been fair in the cooperation with our neighbors. It will be the best for them to join us on that road instead of laying mines that brings risks to everybody,” Poposki says.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS

The International Community and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: 25 Years Later (counterpunch, by Jamie Davidson, 10 January 2017)

January 15th will mark the 25th anniversary of the European Economic Community’s recognition of the independence of the Republic of Croatia. This event has become a notable point of contention amongst those seeking to understand and explain the international community’s involvement in and response to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and to decide what, if any, blame lies with the international community for the savagery the people of that land endured between 1991 and 1995.

A common theme running through the commentary of those who advocated military intervention in Yugoslavia, particularly those who have come to be known as “liberal interventionists”, is that the international community stood by and did nothing. This allowed the largest republic of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia, to enact a programme of naked aggression and expansionism. According to this narrative, Serbia aimed to achieve, by force, a new “Greater Serbia”, whereby all Serbs could live under one state. They argue that, in a total dereliction of duty, the United States and the EEC nations, Britain in particular, pursued a policy of appeasement towards the Serbian government and its President, Slobodan Milošević. John Major’s government insisted on seeing the violence in Croatia as a civil war, rather than Serb aggression, until it was too late, seeking to settle things at the negotiating table rather than with air strikes. This resulted in tens of thousands dead and the phrase “ethnic cleansing” lodged firmly in the public lexicon and consciousness. Emboldened by his position as a credible international negotiating partner, Milošević moved his attentions towards Bosnia, unleashing unimaginable carnage before the international community was finally shamed into a proper, violent response by the horror of Srebrenica.

As a recent reminder of humankind’s capacity for inhumanity towards our neighbours there is none starker or more effective, which is why the memory of Bosnia, and Srebrenica in particular, is so commonly invoked by liberal interventionists today. We saw it when intervention was called for against Gaddafi in Libya and the perceived threat of a Srebrenica-esque massacre against civilians in rebel-held territories was deemed serious enough to justify risking turning Libya into a failed state. We saw it when Assad’s troops closed in on Eastern Aleppo in Syria. One Srebrenica survivor wrote a piece for The Guardian reminding us that it was said such things could never be allowed to happen again, as he believed was imminent in Aleppo. In this narrative, the failure by peacekeepers to protect the UN safe area at Srebrenica is a microcosm of the general reluctance to engage with the Yugoslav problem at all.

The problem with this narrative is that it’s inaccurate in various crucial aspects. The international community did not merely stand by and do nothing as an inferno of ethno-nationalist slaughter raged around the people of the former Yugoslav republics, it was in fact an active agent in the political manoeuvring that variously fed and suffocated the fire. The actions it took sometimes reduced the intensity of the fighting and the slaughter and sometimes made it worse. Sometimes legitimate moves towards peace were instigated by the international community and sometimes they were blocked. Perhaps no country had a greater impact on the direction of the wars in the early stages than Germany, and perhaps no individual had a greater impact than Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor of West Germany and later the reunified state.

Genscher, who died last year, spoke years after the wars about Germany’s initial desire to keep Yugoslavia together. This is not an altogether incredible claim. While its non-threatening position as a non-aligned communist state, so attractive to the West during the Cold War, became obsolete after the demise of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was not a threat to any obvious European ambitions per se. A common perception on the left is that Milošević’s resistance to external economic control was the motive for hostility from the EEC countries. It is certainly the case that, unlike President Tuđman of Croatia and President Izetbegović of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milošević did not run on an avowedly nationalist platform when multi-party elections came to Yugoslavia. This is perhaps ironic given that he is credited with sparking the nationalist revival in Yugoslavia

While promoting Serbian strength and doing much work behind the scenes to ensure friendly figures attained high office in the other Republics, Milošević advocated Yugoslav unity, which meant Yugoslavia following Serbia’s lead. The leaders of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia advocated national sovereignty for their republics, freer trade and closer ties to western Europe, while Milošević governed as leader of a nominally socialist party. 20Th century history being littered with examples of socialist states being crushed by the US and its allies, a simple neo-colonialist reading of the demise of Yugoslavia has been tempting for some, but it’s not entirely supported by the behaviour of the other European nations. Germany has specific cultural ties to Croatia. Political Catholicism is strong in Germany, stronger still in Croatia and a large number of Germany’s gastarbeiters or “guest workers” were Croats. Sympathy in Germany for Croatia’s cause was high in the crucial early stages of the war. When Croatia’s declaration of independence became an inevitability, there was obvious political capital to be gained for Genscher and Germany by fervently supporting it. After reunification, Germany was the obvious candidate to take over the leading role in European geopolitics and here was a chance to define itself as the defender of national sovereignty, self-determination, the sanctity of historical borders (particularly relevant to the interests of Germans at this time for obvious reasons). Genscher and Kohl argued that “preventative” recognition would halt the violence in Croatia and discourage it in Bosnia. All that stood in the way of Genscher adopting the role of Croatia’s knight was the rest of the European community.

Key to this lack of enthusiasm on the part of the rest of Europe for Croatia’s independence declaration was that it simply did not satisfy many of the most crucial conditions for statehood, namely, a strong government in control of all of the territory it claimed and a commitment to ensuring the rights of minorities. By the Autumn of 1991, when Germany was stepping up its encouragement for the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence, the Croatian Serbs controlled around a quarter or more of Croatian territory, and a political settlement seemed unlikely to be hastened by provoking the Serbs. Genscher’s claim that recognition was necessary to bring about peace seemed implausible. Furthermore, President Tuđman’s personal habit of committing racist gaffes in public, and allowing his local party officials to dismiss Serbs from their jobs without cause, made claims of respecting minority rights hard to take seriously.

Lord Carrington, former Secretary General of NATO and the chair of the European Community’s Yugoslav Peace Conference, argued that premature recognition would hinder any lasting agreement between the Croats and the Serbs and “might well be the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzegovina alight”. Croatia would have what it wanted, independence, without having to make any concessions at all, including on minority rights, and the Croatian Serbs would feel that, abandoned by the world, they had no option but to defend themselves by force. Further to this, there was a very real concern about the impact recognition might have on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the republic most primed for an explosive internecine ethnic conflict, due to its unusual demographic make-up and political climate.

Whereas the overwhelming majority of Croatian citizens in 1991 were ethnic Croats, with the Serbs comprising a minority of 12.2%, Bosnia had no ethnic majority at all. In 1991, 43.5% of Bosnians belonged to the Muslim ethnic group (hereafter referred to by the more modern term “Bosniaks”, for simplicity’s sake). 31.2% of the population were Serbs and 17.4% were Croats. A further 5.5% defined themselves as “Yugoslavs” in that year’s census. That the nascent political parties had divided themselves along national lines in 1990 when the federal communist party was dissolved did not bode well for the future. When Alija Izetbegović was appointed chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he ran on the ticket of an ethnic nationalist party committed to the interests of an ethnic group to which well over half of Bosnians didn’t belong. This is not mentioned as a criticism specific to Izetbegović or the Bosniak leadership – the Serbs and Croats had their own nationalist parties too – it merely serves to illustrate the willingness of Bosnia’s political leaders to place its people in the most precarious position at the worst possible moment.

Recognising this danger, albeit late, Izetbegović joined the cautious European countries in arguing against premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Cyrus Vance, the US special envoy to Croatia, told the US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, “”My friend Genscher is out of control on this. What he’s doing is madness.” As a result of this opposition, and with US backing, the EEC members set up an arbitration commission, chaired by Robert Badinter, to issue legal opinions on some of the most pressing issues regarding Yugoslavia. The commission was to conclude that only Slovenia and Macedonia met the conditions necessary for international recognition, as Bosnia had not yet put the decision to declare independence to a referendum and Croatia had not dealt with concerns over minority rights.

Before these opinions could even be issued, Germany unilaterally broke with the other states and declared its unconditional recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on December 23rd. Germany refused to recognise Macedonia, which met all stated conditions and which Badinter specifically recommended for recognition, because of Greek objections to a nation of Slavs using the name which they historically claimed as Hellenic. This was the clearest evidence that the German push for recognition of Croatia was not about the sacred right to self-determination. The other major European nations withheld recognition of Macedonia for the same reason. President Tuđman promised to pass a constitutional law protecting minority rights as soon as possible. Perhaps not unreasonably, the Serbs were not placated, but Germany continued to apply pressure for European recognition, notably offering Britain an opt-out of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. For the Major government, this was a great boon, as the nation was still in the grip of Thatcherism and a Conservative Prime Minister forced to accept European directives ordering member states to protect workers’ rights and support society’s most vulnerable was likely to be viewed as a traitor within his own party. In capitulating to Germany over recognition, Major effectively betrayed British workers, ordinary Croatian Serbs, the citizens of Macedonia and, above all, the people of Bosnia. Chancellor Kohl and Genscher made similar encouragements to the other states. With this in mind, the other EEC states, and the United States, duly recognised Croatia and Slovenia on January 15th.

The effect of this was more or less immediate. Fighting did die down in Croatia, as a result of the Vance plan, an agreement to allow UN peacekeepers to observe the key conflict one, rather than as a result of recognition. Genscher’s theory that recognition would hasten, rather than hinder a resolution to the political issue was disproved when Croatia breached the ceasefire in 1993. The real impact of the EEC’s actions was felt in Bosnia. With Croatia and Slovenia gone, and Macedonia likely to follow as soon as the naming issue was resolved to the satisfaction of Greece, President Izetbegović felt obliged to follow suit and scheduled a referendum on seeking independence from what remained of Yugoslavia. Without a political settlement in place for the large Bosnian Serb and Croat minorities, this was a recipe for disaster. As the BBC’s Misha Glenny said at the time:

“Once Croatia and Slovenia had been granted international recognition, Izetbegović had no option but to seek the same, as to remain in Yugoslavia dominated by Milošević and Belgrade would have been unacceptable to all Muslims and Croats in BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Izetbegović was thus forced by German-led EC policy into the same mistake that Tuđman has made voluntarily – he embarked upon secession from Yugoslavia without securing prior agreement from the Serbs.”

There has been much debate in the West over whether such an agreement could ever have been achieved or whether the Bosnian Serb forces were determined, by hook or by crook, to murder and rape their way across those parts of Bosnia which they believed were theirs by right. To view political objectives and military conduct as essentially interchangeable is a tempting trap to fall into, but where evidence to the contrary exists it must be avoided. What evidence there is suggests that a political settlement prior to recognition was not quite as unattainable as Germany’s enthusiasm seemed to suggest. The first attempt to formulate a peace plan between the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats of Bosnia came soon after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, but before the recognition of Bosnia, in March of 1992.

The proposal, drawn up in Lisbon by Lord Carrington and José Cutileiro, divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into cantons, each of which would have a degree of devolution to the ethnic group to which they were assigned, while administration at the federal level would be comprised of a power-sharing system which also included each of the three main ethnic groups. The plan was far from perfect, every canton was assigned solely to one of the ethnic groups regardless of whether it had a dominant ethnic majority, and Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, was particularly unhappy, knowing that the Serbs could get more territory militarily, but after much negotiation and several redrafts, the leaders of all three sides signed the agreement. Lisbon was the last, best hope for peace in Bosnia.

One week after signing, allegedly on the encouragement of ambassador Warren Zimmerman, President Izetbegović withdrew his signature from the agreement. Mate Boban, the Bosnian Croat representative, promptly did the same. The Lisbon maps were very similar to those put forward by the Vance-Owen peace plan in 1993, which Izetbegović happily signed and which was torpedoed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly to widespread international condemnation. Yet in early 1992, the Bosniaks, and apparently the United States, felt they could get a better deal, despite the looking spectre of war. Widely perceived by the Serbs as proof that not only did the Bosniaks intend to dominate an independent Bosnia but that they would do so with international support, the collapse of the Lisbon agreement did indeed light the touchpaper for violence in Bosnia. The EEC and the US recognised Bosnian independence on April 7th. Already in the process of arming and mobilising by this point, and having declared their own autonomous region, later to be known as Republika Srpska, in anticipation of such an eventuality, the Serbs were ready to take by force what they felt had been denied to them at the negotiating table.

By the end of March the first massacre of civilians, carried out against Serbs by combined Bosniak and Croat forces, occurred in the village of Sijekovac. Among the exhumed bodies were some 18 children. A week later the infamous Serb Volunteer Guard under the command of Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović, a Serb career criminal and businessman who led the organised supporters of Belgrade’s Red Star football club, swept into the town of Bijeljina and reportedly embarked on a spree of murder, rape and looting against the Bosniak population, for which no member of Arkan’s paramilitaries has yet been prosecuted. It was hard to see, at this early stage, how Genscher’s principle of preventative recognition had achieved any of its aims. The cycle of slaughter had begun.

Three years later, the massacre of thousands of Bosniak civilians in the UN safe area of Srebrenica by the army of Republika Srpska and Serb paramilitaries finally convinced the international community that a serious, fair, negotiated settlement, rather than the air strikes which had begun in 1994, was necessary to end the killing. When the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia descended on a US military airbase in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 to thrash out the terms of what would become a lasting peace agreement, those who had been present at the negotiations for the Lisbon agreement might have been forgiven for thinking they were experiencing déjà vu. The terms of Dayton were not so very different from those initially agreed upon by Izetbegović, Karadžić and Boban three years earlier, yet the cost of revisiting these terms in Dayton included over 100,000 lives lost and the inflicting of deep community-damaging wounds that may never fully heal.

Neither the international community as a whole nor any one foreign state directly caused the Yugoslav wars. Nor is it as easy as sometimes claimed to apportion blame within the former Yugoslavia. The causes are so many and so complex that pinning all of the blame on individuals or ascribing simplistic motives to them seems only to provide an emotional solution to comprehending the sheer horror of the events. Granted, it seems fair to say that selfish, vain, power hungry leaders from each of the largest Yugoslav republics did more than any other individuals to create the conditions where fear of close neighbours festered and the vague memories of former political defeats and humiliations were brought to the fore again. Yet, when exasperated by the harsh, difficult realities of dealing with such issues, the willingness of those from outside the former Yugoslavia to divide the main players up into the forces of good and evil made it much easier for those inside the maelstrom to do the same.

One of the traits which outsiders, even those who view them as bloodthirsty aggressors, have found so odd about the Serbs in particular is their tendency to honour their great defeats, not the victories, and to portray themselves as victims of their history, not the heroic masters of their own destiny. Whether believing this is a distortion of history or not, whether their politicians have twisted facts to present them as the innocent victims of history and innocent bystanders of events in the 1990s or not, on an individual level the psychology of people who feel this way must be understood in these terms. In Misha Glenny’s book, The Fall of Yugoslavia, he observes that many of the worst atrocities during the Bosnian war, particularly those committed by Serb forces, took place in the same areas where atrocities were committed against Serbs by Croats and Bosniak allies of the Germans during the second world war, most notably in Prijedor. Nobody reading Glenny’s book could mistake him for an apologist for Greater Serb expansionism, much less an apologist for the atrocities committed by Serb forces during the wars, which he describes in gruesome detail, yet he hints at what Genscher, Kohl and the European leaders who followed them failed to acknowledge or contend with; that fear is the mother of hatred, and can incite the most terrible acts even if, and especially when, it is misplaced and exaggerated. Dismissing the deeply-held fears of others merely heightens them.

In the latter half of 1991, the only place for realpolitik was in the negotiating rooms where the Yugoslav leaders met to work out ways to avoid or halt the fighting. That it found its way so fatefully into the policy of Europe’s leaders for reasons that had nothing to do with respecting national sovereignty and self-determination (proven by the hypocrisy shown towards Macedonia) should be seen as a cautionary tale a quarter of a century later. A cursory glance at any newspaper reveals the same hypocrisy leading to the same mistakes now. We should echo the calls of “Never Again”, but we should know what we are calling for.

Jamie Davidson writes about politics and history. He studied neither of those fields at Goldsmiths, University of London and now lives and works in Shropshire, England.