• Hajrulla Ceku with biggest vote increase in Vetevendosje Movement (Nacionale)
• Will Duda Balje vote for Kurti 3 government? (Indeksonline)
• Rama talks about a daily fee for vehicles from other cities entering Pristina (media)
• Luxembourg opens funding call for business innovation projects in Kosovo (SeeNews)
• Analysts on Kurti’s latest remarks about President and potential new elections (Telegrafi)
• Five challenges that will define in Kosovo in 2026 (Telegrafi)
• There will be no substantial progress in Kosovo-Serbia dialogue in 2026 either (Koha)
• Serwer: Serbia is not on the fast track to Europe (Danas/media)

Hajrulla Ceku with biggest vote increase in Vetevendosje Movement (Nacionale)

The news website reports that Hajrulla Ceku has marked the biggest increase in votes in the Vetevendosje Movement in the December 28 parliamentary elections. Compared to the February 2025 elections, Ceku has almost 80,000 more votes. In February he had 36,900 votes and based on the count so far he has around 115,000 votes.

Will Duda Balje vote for Kurti 3 government? (Indeksonline)

Duda Balje, political representative of the Bosniak community in Kosovo, told the news website today that she has managed to win a seat in the Assembly after the December 28 parliamentary elections. “Based on the results so far, I have managed to win a seat in the Assembly of Kosovo,” she said.

Asked if she will vote in favor of a Kurti 3 government, Balje said: “it is early to talk about this. The certification of the results needs to be completed first. I am in favor of the creation of institutions, because a long time has passed without institutions”.

Rama talks about a daily fee for vehicles from other cities entering Pristina (media)

Pristina Mayor Perparim Rama, in two separate interviews, mentioned the possibility of introducing a €1 daily fee for vehicles from other parts of Kosovo entering Pristina. He said that the funds from the fee would be used to construct the Inner Ring Road in Pristina. “Knowing that 140,000 vehicles enter the capital, if we introduce a €1 fee, this would be €140,000 daily, and if there is a €2 fee then it is €280,000 daily, and if you multiply this by 365 days, you see how fast we can finance the inner ring road,” Rama said.

Rama also said that they are discussing the fee with their professional teams. “I believe that around the middle of next year, we will start with this. It is going to have a positive impact on traffic and it will improve the air quality,” he said.

Luxembourg opens funding call for business innovation projects in Kosovo (SeeNews)

Luxembourg's development agency, LuxDev, said it has opened calls for well-established Kosovo businesses to propose innovation-driving projects for which it will provide grants under a 1 million euro ($1.17 million) development innovation fund.

Businesses can receive up to 350,000 euro for their projects, in the sectors of digital and green innovation, aiming to scale digital technologies, link skills to jobs, advance HealthTech, improve energy efficiency, promote circular economy and sustainable agribusiness models, and deliver climate adaptation solutions for resource security, LuxDev said in a press release last month.

Eligible companies must have been registered before November 2022, employ at least 5 persons, have a turnover below 50 million euro per year, deploy an innovative product or service already tested to generate revenue, and propose a 1-2 year project which they will be able to co-finance with at least 50% of the total cost.

Proposals can be submitted until February 6, with a final selection of 3-4 projects to be announced by July 2026.

Analysts on Kurti’s latest remarks about President and potential new elections (Telegrafi)

Kosovo caretaker Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s remarks about potential new elections in spring in case the election of the President is blocked is being interpreted by political analysts as a pressure strategy on the opposition and not as a real objective to send Kosovo to another round of elections. 

Donika Emini from the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group said in an interview with the news website that Kurti’s remarks should be interpreted in the function of parliamentary balances and current political interests. “Kurti’s statements about new elections in spring in case the election of the President is blocked, should be interpreted more as a political strategy and a form of pressure on the opposition, rather than a real objective to take the country to elections again,” she argued.

Emini said that Kurti is aware about the numerical limitations in the Assembly, “and he knows that although he has a stable majority to form the government, he cannot guarantee a quorum of 80 MPs for the election of the President without the cooperation of the opposition”. “In his victory speech, Kurti addressed this issue with maturity, by not calling for general political cooperation, but by linking any coordination only with cases that require a quorum and the votes of the opposition. This was not a call for cooperation, but rather a numerical and pragmatic approach,” she said.

Emini also said that the opposition is currently in an unfavorable position. “The PDK is still in the phase of transition with the new leadership, while the LDK is going through internal changes and has little time for political recalibration. New elections at this point would be much more damaging for the opposition than for the government,” she said.

According to Emini, there are signs of institutional coordination between Kurti and President Vjosa Osmani. “Both have shown that despite political differences they have a joint interest for Kosovo’s institutional functioning,” she said.

Dritero Arifi, political commentator, said in an interview with Telegrafi, that Kurti’s latest remarks are a clear political message built on several objectives. “With these remarks, Kurti is packaging the idea of a President that should be under his command 100 percent regardless of who the candidate is,” he opined.

Arifi also said that Kurti’s message toward the opposition is direct. “Whoever Kurti proposes for President, the opposition must stay in the [Assembly] room and secure the quorum, otherwise, Kosovo will go to elections again, and Vetevendosje could score an even bigger victory,” he argued. 

Five challenges that will define in Kosovo in 2026 (Telegrafi)

Opinion by Telegrafi editor-in-chief Muhamet Hajrullahu.

For the people of Kosovo, the year 2026 is not a political debate, but a direct question: will there be work, well-being, better services and institutional stability?

After a year-long deadlock, Kosovo is finally entering a new political phase. The elections ended without incident and with a record-setting publication of preliminary results by the Central Election Commission, an indicator of democratic functioning and institutional stability.

According to the results, the people trusted Albin Kurti with another mandate. With 56 deputies secured by Vetevendosje and its partners, the formation of the Kurti 3 Government seems only a matter of time. But victory in the elections does not replace the responsibility of governance. 2026 will be a political and institutional test.

Five challenges that will define not only the work of the Kurti 3 government, but also the people’s trust in politics and governance.

Budget 2026 and the economy

The economy remains the main challenge. The adoption of the budget for 2026 must be urgent, sustainable and developmental. Without capital investment, support for the private sector, and prudent fiscal management, any other reform remains limited.

In addition to fiscal management, the government needs to address high energy prices, inflation, and the pressure on household budgets. Sustainable institutional support for businesses and citizens is needed, to avoid further price increases and deep social consequences.

The election of the President – the real test

The election of the President is expected in the spring of 2026. This process should not plunge the country into a political crisis or take it to new elections. Compromise and institutional maturity are required.

So far, President Vjosa Osmani has expressed readiness for a second term in office. The near future will tell whether this will happen or will we have another figure at the head of the institution.

This situation will be the real test for the Kurti 3 Government and for the positions that the main political entities – PDK, LDK and AAK – will hold in the Assembly of Kosovo.

The Assembly and the legislative agenda

After long blockades, the Assembly must function. Before the MPs are key laws and agreements, including financial agreements with the World Bank, projects for health and education, as well as the first review of the budget for 2026.

These decisions determine Kosovo’s economic development and international relations. Any new blockade would be not only a political failure, but also a direct cost to the citizens.

Foreign policy and partners

Relations with the European Union and safeguarding the alliance with the United States of America remain serious challenges. Kosovo needs more proactive diplomacy and less confrontation leading to isolation.

Diplomatic isolation is not a wise move, but a strategic risk for a small state. New recognitions and membership in international organizations and institutions remain a key priority. The dialogue with Serbia will be in the focus, but it will also depend on the political situation in Serbia.

Internal governance

Education, health and public administration remain a test for any government, and especially for a government with a second or third term. The people expect concrete results, not political excuses.

The elections are over. Now there are no more excuses, nor blame. 2026 will show whether the new mandate will be remembered for governance, or for another missed opportunity.

There will be no substantial progress in Kosovo-Serbia dialogue in 2026 either (Koha)

Opinion piece by Brussels-based correspondent Augustin Palokaj:

The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia after 15 years is at a stage that cannot be defined. It would not be wrong even if it was declared dead, but the EU does not want that. And, on the other hand, for a long time there has been no progress in the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which is the final goal of the dialogue, and there have not been any high-level meetings either. Even the meetings of experts and those at the level of chief negotiators have been few and have not produced anything.

For the European Union, it is impossible to declare the dialogue a failure, because it has invested so much in it. Therefore, in the EU, they continue to unofficially talk about the “revival of the dialogue”, while officially they only repeat what they have always said: that “the dialogue agreements must be implemented without delays and without any new preconditions”. Perhaps the words “no delays” is the one that has been repeated most often in the past three years, but it has not helped to avoid delays.

In February, it will be 3 years since the EU said that the agreement was reached. But the same EU, from the day it announced the agreement, has allowed it to be relativized to the extent that it can even be said that such an agreement does not formally exist. First, the EU remained silent when Serbia refused to sign the agreement. Then the EU relativized the statements coming from Serbia that that country not only did not sign but also did not accept the agreement in its entirety. And even in writing, Serbia has informed the EU that it does not consider that document legally binding and that it does not intend to implement its main parts related to Kosovo’s membership in international organizations and those related to Kosovo’s statehood. The facilitators in the dialogue not only helped Serbia not to face any consequences due to non-compliance with the obligations under the agreement, but it also placed the main blame on Kosovo for the failures in the process of normalizing relations.

During the mandate of Josep Borrell and Miroslav Lajcak, both proven opponents of Kosovo's independence, the impression was created in the EU that Kosovo “wants to sign the agreement, but not implement it”, while Serbia “does not want to sign it, but wants to implement it”.

Lajcak and Borrell are said to have often said this in meetings with representatives of the member states. And this impression has dominated and continues to dominate, because Kosovo has failed to convince EU member states that this is not the case.

Now the structures in the EU that deal with dialogue have changed. They do not give up on what has been done earlier and insist on continuity, but at least they have a more balanced approach than Borrell and Lajcak had. Nevertheless, even now the EU does not give up on the demands that Kosovo implement all the obligations from the dialogue and that the non-signing of the agreement should not be used as a pretext for not implementing the obligations.

Another problem with the unsigned agreement is the fact that the legal obligation for its implementation is related only to the advancement towards EU integration. So, the only consequence for Serbia in case of non-implementation of obligations may be on the path towards the EU. And EU integration is not an obligation, but a choice. Now Serbia is increasingly proving that it does not want EU membership, at least not under the conditions set by the EU. Therefore, the EU should also prepare to clarify what the fate of the agreement is if Serbia or one day Kosovo does not want to join the EU.

All this improvisation by Lajcak and Borrell has made the EU look unserious, because the agreement is both binding and not binding. It will remain so in the future, because there does not seem to be sincere interest in the EU in forcing the parties to implement their obligations. Mentioning obligations only in EU communiqués or in response to journalists’ questions is not enough.

And in this failure, the EU has so far found it easy to shift the blame to the parties. This will remain the case in 2026, when no significant progress is expected in the dialogue process.

While 2025 was an election year in Kosovo, 2026 will be an election year in Serbia. For this reason, but also because the EU itself no longer takes the Brussels Agreement seriously, no significant progress is expected in 2026 either. Kosovo must do its best so that it is not identified as an obstacle in the process. Kosovo must do this through cooperation and good faith with the EU member states and the Quint countries. These relations, including the topic of dialogue, must be transparent and honest regardless of Serbia’s behavior. Because the normalization of relations with Serbia at this moment seems an illusion and the internal tensions in Serbia will be negatively reflected in relations with Kosovo too. This is also because the opposition in Serbia too has illusions about Kosovo and it opposes the implementation of obligations related to at least the de facto recognition.

In order to ensure the understanding of international partners, Kosovo should not use the dialogue as a topic for internal political clashes. Therefore, a national consensus must be created on this. If this is not achieved, then Kosovo risks taking responsibility for failures and bearing the consequences.

Although in reality no significant progress is expected in the dialogue this year, the EU has extended the mandate of Danish diplomat Peter Sorensen for at least two more years as special envoy for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

The current mandate expires in February, as he was initially appointed to the post for only 13 months. This is because at that time in the EU they were not sure how they intended to approach the dialogue after the end of Miroslav Lajcak's mandate.

Although there has been no progress in the dialogue, the EU believes that it can be revived and that the parties will understand the damage they are doing their countries in case they do not make progress in the process of normalization of relations, as that progress is also a condition for their European paths, as well as for benefits from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. But if it really wants to revive the dialogue, the EU too must be more serious in its approach.

Serwer: Serbia is not on the fast track to Europe (Danas/media)

Several news websites in Kosovo cover an interview that US commentator on the Balkans, Daniel Serwer, gave to Belgrade-based Danas. Below is the interview that Serwer published on peacefare.net.

How do you see the student protests over the past year? Can they lead to a change of government in Serbia?

Sure they can, but I don’t know that they will. President Vučić is a master at manipulating popular protest: firing a minister here or there, scheduling new elections, stuffing ballot boxes or voters into swing districts, without however putting his own hold on power at serious risk. He is not likely to make the mistake Milosevic made of thinking he would win in a relatively free and fair election. Vučić will be even more careful to ensure the outcome.

Aleksandar Vucic is doing absolutely everything to stay in power. How do you see his moves – from Caciland to the detention of those who publicly criticize him?

It’s all part of his ensuring zero risk to his own hold on power.

It seems that the EU still does not understand the scale of corruption and crime in Serbia and does not criticize Vucic’s regime as much. In your opinion, why does the EU not side with the students?

I don’t think anyone should expect the EU to “side with the students.” The EU should side with its own values, which are antithetical to the growing autocracy in Serbia. Hunger for lithium, dependence on “stability,” and even countering Russian influence are all secondary to restoring the rule of law and democracy in Serbia. That is what European values and interests dictate.

Vucic tried to sell “Generalstab” building to Trump’s son-in-law. He is clearly trying to win Trump over. How do you see the fact that Trump’s son-in-law withdrew from the purchase of the that building?

I’m not privy to Kushner’s thinking. But Vucic seems to have offended the Trump Administration in some fashion, which in my view is a good thing. It means Belgrade and Washington can’t, at least for the moment, sell out rule of law and democracy in the way Washington has already done in much of the rest of the world.

What do you think about the creation of a “Serbian world”? Many media outlets write about how Serbia is interfering in the politics of Montenegro, in the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina through Republika Srpska…

The Serbian world is just a modernized form of Greater Serbia. It will mean death and destruction in much of the Balkans today, as it did in the 1990s. It will also end Serbia’s EU hopes. Belgrade is putting the prosperity and security of its own citizens at risk in order to extend its influence into neighboring countries. That is not an ambition that will end well.

How do you see the region in 2026 and Serbia’s role in these relations?

I find it hard to expect anything but further stagnation of regional relations. The best hope for progress is in EU accession for Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. Serbia has opted for the slow road.

What do you think marked 2025 when it comes to foreign policy?

For me, the key development was the Trump Administration’s decision to side with Russia against Ukraine and to stop speaking out in support of democracy and rule of law worldwide. The US is now governed by a profoundly corrupt Administration that requires payoffs, including into the pockets of the President and his family. None of us have quite come to terms with this dramatic change.

Is the end of the war in Ukraine in sight?

No. There may be a ceasefire and even an agreement, but I expect Ukrainians to continue to resist continued Russian occupation and aggression. The only quick end to this war would be a Ukrainian victory in Donbas and Crimea. That isn’t likely with American support missing.