As with many other issues in relation with the EU and America, the key is that government in Belgrade is determined to persist under heavy pressures from Brussels and Washington, in implementing its policy. If the Serbian government makes it clear that any pressure would be counterproductive and possibly cause consequences to the interests of the EU, especially on Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia could defend the current position - said in an interview Obrad Kesic, head of Office of Republika Srpska in USA, and former political analyst. Do you believe that a new binding agreement between Belgrade and Pristina should be speeded up before solving the conflict in Ukraine, when observed from the perspective of Serbian state and national interests?  I'm not sure what is meant by "new binding agreement" between Belgrade and Pristina, so it is difficult to assess whether such an agreement would be in the interests of Serbian state and national interests. I think that in American politics is created a vacuum around Kosovo issue, and other matters relating to the Balkans. The burning issues in the foreign policy of the EU and the United States provide more space to Serbia for its foreign policy and future negotiations with Pristina. Simply, for the EU and the United States is much more required completing of that new agreement, as soon as possible, than it is for Serbia. With that in mind, Belgrade has an advantage, but can use it only if there is a clear policy, with clear objectives which are very well defined, as well determination to carry it out. How do you comment on evaluations of the Serbian opposition that Dacic and Vucic "gave Kosovo and Metohija, especially the North for nothing," although the government defends its actions with announcement on the formation of so far unrealized Community of Serbian municipalities, as key result of the Brussels Agreement? I can say only two things. First, it is not true that this government launched a policy that led Serbia to its present position and attitude. The previous government led by President Boris Tadic has built the foundation for the current policy. So when criticizing the current government, it should be borne in mind that this is only upgrading of policy for which the foundations were set much earlier. As second, from the beginning of negotiations with Pristina, I argued that Serbia has a great advantage, because the consolidation and implementation of independence cannot be accomplished without the active participation of Belgrade in these processes. Because of that Serbia was in a position to defend against pressure from Brussels and Washington, and at the same time to fight for the legitimate interests of the state and the interest of Serbian community in Kosovo. I think the potential was never fully and in the best way utilized. Is it expected that Brussels will request from Belgrade an official recognition of self-proclaimed Kosovo and support to its membership in the UN? The whole concept of the present policy of the EU and the USA is that everything that is done through negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, leads to formal recognition of Kosovo, as an independent state. It should be borne in mind that for a long time, this process consists of two steps. First, that Serbia no longer actively opposes Kosovo's independence and to help the EU and the United States in this process, by solving open questions, which essentially are the key obstacles to the consolidation of Kosovo's independence. The second step is a formal recognition. The first step is in the process of implementation, but now due to global political and security crisis, political crisis in Pristina and inertia in Brussels and Washington, everything related to the consolidation of Kosovo's independence slows down. Therefore, it is difficult to predict when Brussels will seek formal recognition. In fact, Serbia has more space and trump cards that could slow down the whole process and adequately protect from the pressure from Brussels. How do you see the outcome of the post-election political crisis in Pristina - whether the United States is willing to let off Thaci "down the water"? What is your position regarding the growing anti-American feeling among Kosovo Albanians and their war engagements in Syria? The political crisis in Pristina is a normal result of the deep divisions among the Albanians in Kosovo. Their unity exists only around key issue - independence, and all the rest is questionable and raises serious political and social conflicts. I think that for a long time America is not actively dealing with the issue of "who will lead the government in Pristina." Their desire was that Thaci and Haradinaj agree and create so-called grand coalition, in which they would share the power and build consensus, not only on future negotiations with Belgrade, but also about all the other important issues. When it became clear that it probably will not happen, the American administration, through the embassy in Pristina, took a backup position – they are not in favor of Thaci, nor Haradinaj, but it pressures both- to with the least violence and turbulence decide who would rule in Kosovo. The main goal of American policy is that the decision on who will form Pristina government pass without causing instability in Kosovo, because Washington fears it could further jeopardize the consolidation of independence and create a frozen conflict between Belgrade and Pristina. In regards to the negative response of Albanians regarding the new tribunal against KLA commanders, in Washington, at least for now, there is not great concern that it could cause violence or a serious anti-American reaction. As they believe, the approval of key political leaders of Kosovo Albanians, including Thaci and Haradinaj about accepting such a tribunal is a sufficient guarantee for American interests. Which echo had a statement of Clint Williamson in the United States and to which extent it could change current views on the Kosovo issue? Unfortunately, report did not have a significant response in the American public. Neither has it showed indications on future Washington actions towards Serbia and Kosovo issue. For a long time the American public has not much room for news about events in the world. In order to draw the attention of the American public the news must be or directly related to the current situation, or must directly threaten American interests. Williamson's statement does not fall into one of these two categories. However, we should say that it increased the activity of the Serbian community and activists who were against American support for Kosovo's independence. They are now very effectively using this report to create new momentum in the United States Congress, where for the first time the Serbs were presented as victims of crime, while Albanians, especially the KLA, is put in the category of bad guys and criminals. Already there are indications that in the Congress enthusiasm for Kosovo independence is declining.