The paper carries an opinion piece from Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, who was head of the economics unit of the International Civilian Office in Kosovo and member of the Board of Directors at Kosovo's Privatization Agency from 2008 until 2011. He has recently published the book "State-building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans. Below find the full text of the opinion piece:

Those who want cleaner government in Kosovo have a good opportunity, which should be pursued. The élite is weak, for reasons both internal and external, intrinsic and contingent. A well-aimed, determined blow can succeed, and would diminish its power and credibility permanently.  The target of the blow should be the foreign minister, Dr Enver Hoxhaj.

The élite is probably at its weakest since 2008. Because the 2014 elections left it with less popular support and less internal cohesion. Because since then the protests for the association-community and border demarcation made it very unpopular. Because this coalition government is plainly ineffective. Because socio-economic discontent remains high. And because with the exception of LDK they all live under the Damocles’s sword of the Hague indictments. So, this is the right moment to strike a blow.

Hoxhaj should be the target not because he is particularly bad, compared to his government colleagues and PDK friends, but because he is a relatively easy one. There are two reasons why he is more vulnerable than any other prominent politician. The first is that – as I wrote on these pages a few weeks ago – there is a judicial decision saying that he had the intention to commit the crime of abuse of office (and stopped once this became public knowledge). So, it will be very easy to make the argument that such a person is not fit to hold public office, much less represent Kosovo in the world; and foreign embassies will find it difficult to defend Hoxhaj, for they always say that bad governance and corruption should be fought, not rewarded.

The second reason is that Hoxhaj is part of the élite not because he has the capacity to exercise violence, because they he has lots of clientelistic followers, or because he has lots of money. He is a minister because he is intelligent, he has a PhD, he speaks the foreign languages well, he looks professional, and, for all these reasons, he is also more liked by Western diplomats than people like Hxavet Haliti or Sami Lushtaku (who have real power, but lack Hoxhaj’s superficial qualities). So, both the élite and PDK can easily discard such a person: Thaci and Veselj and the others may well like Hoxhaj very much, but in the end he is an instrument for them, and one they can easily drop and replace (someone like Petrit Selimi could easily take his place, for example).

So, the aim of popular pressure would be to force the élite to remove Hoxhaj from his post (on the argument that his intention to abuse his office disqualifies him from holding public office: the syllogism is rather simple). The élite has been discussing a cabinet reshuffle for some time, so it would not be too painful for them to bow to popular pressure, because they could save face and say that Hoxhaj’s removal is part of the reshuffle.

At this point, one might ask: but if Hoxhaj is vulnerable, the élite doesn’t need him, and could easily save face, why should citizens bother to launch a campaign against Hoxhaj? The answer is simple: because it can succeed, and because, if it succeeds, it will be much easier to launch other campaigns. The credibility of the élite rests in large measure on its reputation of invincibility. They enjoy near-complete impunity for their crimes, they have a rock-solid electoral base, and reliable Western support. It is true that they failed to implement the association-community and the border demarcation: but these are not defeats that bite in their flesh, because they don’t care about those two issues at all (they did them only because of Western pressure).

On the contrary, should popular pressure force them to change the foreign minister, the defeat would bite. Because Hoxhaj is a useful instrument, and is one of them: once he is abandoned, other people like him will be less sure of the support of the real leaders of the élite. So, the élite overall will become weaker and less cohesive.

Above all, should popular pressure succeed in toppling Hoxaj confidence in civic activism would grow. The demonstration effect can be very powerful: once citizens win one battle, they will realise that they can win other battles too. And each battle can aim at bigger targets. Anticipating all this, moreover, the élite will have every incentive to gradually improve the quality of cabinet members and public officials: and this is one important way through which governance can improve even under the current élite. In other words, popular pressure can force better behaviour from the élite, and the two dynamics can reinforce each other, for improved behaviour by the élite will expose and side-line its worst members and practices.

This is why it is important to start from a target that is prominent enough to be significant, but vulnerable enough to be easy to attack. Hoxaj is the perfect target. Before you feel sorry for him, incidentally, consider that morally he is arguably worse than the average PDK leader: because they are village boys to whom society gave next to nothing, whereas he received a lot from society (a PhD in Vienna in history or something like that), and should know better.

Thus far I spoke of popular pressure. This is vague, and I cannot say more than this. Citizens’ mobilization to have Hoxhaj removed should be broad, insisted, and determined. As it is a genuinely political act, there would be no problem if the opposition organizes and supports it: but it would be important for it to retain the character of a civic movement for clean government. The targets of the citizens’ mobilization should not just be the obvious ones, namely the government and PDK, but also Hoxhaj’s possible silent defenders, namely the Quint embassies. Those embassies should be dared to defend Hoxhaj, and shamed if they try, using against them the very statements they often make against bad governance. And the mobilization should continue until Hoxhaj is replaced: because with a bit of persistence, this is a battle that can be won.

To conclude, after I published my article on Hoxhaj’s misdeeds a young Kosovar analyst now studying abroad (whose name it is charitable not to mention) replied that there was no need to comment on my ‘grudges’ with Hoxhaj. So, it may be useful to explain that I never met Hoxhaj (except once by chance at a restaurant), had very little to do with him or his ministry during my work in Kosovo, and have no grudges against him.

With one exception. Sometime in 2010 the building that housed Hoxhaj’s education ministry was given to the auditor general. I visited it then, and the auditor general showed me the way in which Hoxhaj’s quarters were organized, which made me rather angry considering the poverty of Kosovo. Suffice it to say that twelve people worked in Hoxhaj’s former office, five in his deputy’s, and the auditor general placed himself in what previously was a clerk’s office. In Hoxhaj’s period the rent of the building (which is privately owned) was twice as high as the rent that the auditor general managed to negotiate, moreover, and half as many people worked there. I hope that if the campaign begins the (former) auditor general will be available to provide further details, which might be useful.